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Hi Vincenzoimho for the italian armed forces more easy a amphibious operation (not in large scale as a invasion) that win the desert war, i think for all the armed forces are so
The early landings, at about 0140 directly on the town, resulted in heavy casualties for the paratroopers. Some buildings in town were on fire that night, and they illuminated the sky, making easy targets of the descending men.
At 8:00 am on 20 May, German paratroopers landed near Maleme airfield and the town of Chania. The 21st, 22nd, and 23rd New Zealand Battalions defended Maleme airfield and its direct surrounding area. The Germans suffered heavy casualties within the first hours of the invasion. One company of the III Battalion, 1st Assault Regiment, lost 112 killed out of 126; 400 of the battalion's 600 men were killed before the end of the first day.
Of the initial forces, the majority were mauled by New Zealand forces defending the airfield and Greek forces near Chania. Many of the gliders following the paratroops were hit by mortar fire within seconds of landing. Those who did land were wiped out almost to a man by the New Zealand and Greek defenders.
Not necessarily. The allies were reading a good deal of Axis signal traffic from April 1940, including the Italian Supermarina coded messages. The security of the italian high commands signals were notoriously bad from the very beginning of hostilities. So the likley outcome is that the Rock would be reinforced prior to any undertaking of an operation of this magnitude.
Moreover, it takes time to plan and prepare for an operation of this magnitude. The planning and preparation for Normandy, for example took over a year, Sicily was being planned and prerpred for for more than 3 months. Given that the Italians would be starting from a point very far behind, an operation of this kind would take more than 6 months to prepre for. The planning for Hercules (the invasion of Malta) was begun in 1941, and could not be undertaken until after July 1942, according to the Italian High Command. Even thenn they were not quite ready.
Given the lethargy the italian High Command displayed in all their other major operations, a realistic estimate to undertake an operation of this type might be March or April 1941. They could start planning in 1939, but then we are starting to leave the realm of possibility, and relying on fantasy and conjacture.
I think most of us agree that the chances for a para/amphib operation without Spanish help looks very bleak at best.
Also that an operation from Spain is doable, a "Sevastopol" type operation.
Parsifal, what about the third option, if Germany Italy have access to French N Africa bases, but that Spain is strictly neutral?
1.) Germany/Italy try an airborne/amphib operation with no French or Spanish help
2.) Spain allows the Axis to invade from Spanish territory
3.) The Axis have the assistance of the French, but Spain remains neutral
Assuming that the Germans try the operation in Jan/Feb 1941, is there any chance of success?
Assume that they could break out with Bismarck, 2 x BC's 2 CA's to bring down to Gibraltar.
Could they force a landing somewhere on Gibraltar?
(Assumes that a powerful Luftwaffe based in Algeria has driven off the RN)
.... it would demonstrate conclusively that the Axis could not be trusted. This, at a time when the US presidential elections are being run, and every neutral is considering whether the Germans could be trusted at all. This act of duplicity would show that they could not be trusted....
for the codes only the 0,76% (37800 msgs) of all RM signal traffic was cleared from the british, only the 10% of traffic was on C-38 machine. Many of trouble in war was that the british cleared the german code that give many info also on italian navy movement.
I think that it was a given by Oct 1939 that the Germans could not be trusted in any circumstance.
I think the French North African option has problems. Ive commented on this at length previously, but essentially the issue is this....the ability of the Axis to support troops in North Africa is limited. For an operation in North Africa, they could support perhaps another 4-6 Divs and maybe 200-300 aircraft, but would be resisted by more than 15 French Divisions.
BTW, how weer the axis fleets going to handle the RN sub threat? If the allied ASW capabilities at this time of the war were "poor" at best, the axis capabilities were even worse.
Any invasion force off of Gibraltar had better be ready for some big time, possibly crippling losses, even before the attack starts in earnest.
France agreeable to the entry of German troops to their territory tips the military balance completely in favour of the Axis. Gibraltar under those circumstances becomes all but untenabl.
However, as a scenario it was never going to happen. The whole raison detre of Vichy was to protect what was left of France and her empire from a German occupation. They adhered to that idea, despite some overtly unfriendly acts by the British. The British were able to get away with things like Dakar, invasion of Levant and Mers El Kebir because no matter what, the Vichy were even more distrustful of of the Germans than they were of the british.
If Laval and his cronies had made declarations to join the Axis or even allow Axis military access, they would have faced a revolt by the military governors in Vichy, particularly Darlan.