Hap Arnold's Inconsistency

[Topgun Editor]

I would appreciate the group's advice since this is my first post.

In reviewing the literature, I find no criticism of General "Hap" Arnold's failure to protect bombers with escort fighters prior to early 1942. If I missed it, please help me find it.

Arnold prevented escort fighters from keeping up with bombers by prohibiting drop tanks on escort fighters in May 1939. This prevented escort fighters from having the necessary range to keep up with the bombers. Arnold also asserted that bombers could protect themselves. Yet, on page 8 of Winged Warfare, a tome he wrote with Ira Eaker, Arnold writes that "the only reliable antidote to the enemy bomber is the fighter."⁠1

Arnold added that the bombers needed more range with "leakproof fuel tanks," but mentioned nothing about extending the range of escort fighters sent along to protect the bombers. This may have been because in May 1939, General Arnold prohibited drop tanks on escort fighters. Drop tanks had only one function and that was to increase the range of escort fighters, whose purpose was to defend the bombers so they could reach their targets. But Arnold claimed bombers, prior the disastrous experiences in the summer and fall of 1943, could defend themselves.

Despite Arnold's admission of his bombers' vulnerability to fighters, he failed to spend money to protect them. To Arnold, every dollar spent on a drop tank was one less dollar he could spend on his bombers.

"Bombers in far larger numbers than are available today [January 1941] will be required for wiping out people in sufficient numbers to break the will of a whole nation."⁠2

1 H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare, (New York: Harper & Brothers), 1941, p. 8

2 Ibid. p. 134

 

[Zipper730]

General Arnold was an interesting person: He was a person who could be quite creative and innovative, but also very stubborn.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

The main criticism I remember reading was from an anonymous Eighth AF gunner when he said, "Jesus Christ, give us fighters."

There's plenty of critique aimed at USAAF in the era for not providing for fighter escort, but none I remember being aimed at Arnold in contemporary accounts.

 

[Topgun Editor]

I believe the issue was not a lack of fighters but a lack of range on the fighters available.

 

[tomo pauk]

Arnold prevented escort fighters from keeping up with bombers by prohibiting drop tanks on escort fighters in May 1939.

This may have been because in May 1939, General Arnold prohibited drop tanks on escort fighters.

Is there a facsimile of the order available?

 

[pbehn]

Which escort fighter did anyone prevent anyone else fitting drop tanks to in May 1939? As far as I understand things through 1942 into 1943 it became increasingly obvious to some but not all in the USAAF that escorts were required. Hap Arnold finally fixed on having escorts in June 1943 for the offensive due to start in 1944. US bombers had turbo superchargers so had two stage engines. It was necessary for any escort to also have two stage engines. Initially Spitfire Mk IXs were used, including Mission one where Arnold flew in a plane as observer. Later P-47s increased the range and added to the range of the Spitfires from UK, while P-38s were used in N Africa.

 

[Shortround6]

Arnold prevented escort fighters from keeping up with bombers by prohibiting drop tanks on escort fighters in May 1939.

OK, What fighters were the Army ordering in May of 1939?
And which bombers are they to escort?
The B-23 had been ordered in 1938. 1st delivery was in July 1939. Normal range 1400 miles with 4000 pounds of bombs.
The first B-17B flew for the first time at Seattle on June 27, 1939. This was the 2nd B-17 with a turbo charger.

So we have Arnold preventing future fighters (don't exist yet) preventing escort to bombers (which also don't exist yet) in May of 1939.
We do have the Army requesting designs for bombers (B-25 and B-26) the goal of flying 2,000 miles with a 2,000lb bombload. Consolidated in working on the B-24.
The practicality of a fighter, designed in 1939, escorting a bomber on such missions was about zero.
Please note that even the Mustang fighter (almost 1 1/2 years in the future) could not escort turbo charged B-17s for another 2 years after that (and it took even longer to get into service.)
Bomber ranges did not turn out as planned.

 

[Reluctant Poster]

Is there a facsimile of the order available?

 

[The Stannum Liberator]

Wow, that's fascinating. Why did Gen. Arnold order that?

Bizarrre

 

[The Stannum Liberator]

Which escort fighter did anyone prevent anyone else fitting drop tanks to in May 1939?

The source says P-36 type aircraft, so P-36s (Don't think P40s came out till end of the year)

 

[ThomasP]

The memo says ". . . no tactical airplane will be equipped with droppable auxiliary fuel tanks."

Such an order was intended as - and taken as - a prohibition against any pursuit (aka fighter) being equipped with drop tanks, as well as light, medium, and heavy attack aircraft/bombers - though the prohibition was only in relation to it being at the expense of the US government.

Effectively, this restricted any auxiliary fuel tanks to the ferry variety, ie not intended to be dropped (and in many cases not capable of being dropped).

Arnold did not rescind this order in any sense (as far as I know) until about the time of the Schweinfurt raids.

 

[pbehn]

The source says P-36 type aircraft, so P-36s (Don't think P40s came out till end of the year)

The USA was not at war with anyone in 1939, in May 1939 no one in Europe was at war either. The P-36could not escort any strategic bomber and the USA at the time didnt have a strategic bomber force. Why would US planes drop tanks on the US countryside instead of landing with them? At the time the UK chain Home RADAR was not completed and the effects of RADAR were unknown, without the Dowding system to rapidly get the information from a RADAR station to an airfield all RADAR did was say you should have taken off 5 minutes ago.

 

[The Stannum Liberator]

The USA was not at war with anyone in 1939, in May 1939 no one in Europe was at war either. The P-36could not escort any strategic bomber and the USA at the time didnt have a strategic bomber force. Why would US planes drop tanks on the US countryside instead of landing with them? At the time the UK chain Home RADAR was not completed and the effects of RADAR were unknown, without the Dowding system to rapidly get the information from a RADAR station to an airfield all RADAR did was say you should have taken off 5 minutes ago.

You can't forget at this point the US still controlled areas like the Phillipines, and it was pretty clear that war was absolutely going to happen in 1939.
As well as this, the US was actively working on a strategic bombing force as far as I am aware

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The USAAF switched back to wanting more range and droppable external tanks in early 1942. The inconsistency is more peace versus wartime and the changes in what the USAAF thought it would be doing in 1939 and what it was doing/going to do over 2 years later.

Lots of the details in Greg of Auto and Airplanes has asked for a Debate from about page 4 and

Another 'Gem' from Greg - just released.

Greg apparently had his feelings hurt by me regarding 'contrarian' views on his P-47 series regarding range, and now his recent 'breathless' breaking news about Fokker being the real engineering and production cadre that built P-51. I am banned...

ww2aircraft.net

Is absolutely clear about the future in 1939 include France falling so any USAAF bases to attack Germany would need to be in Britain? Or that Japan would keep fighting in something like a stalemate in China and take on what became the Western Allies? or that Congress would vote to buy lots of 4 engined types instead of the cheaper and shorter ranged 2 engine types? or that radar nets would dramatically increase interception chances? Radio navigation devices enable easier more accurate long range navigation? And so on.

 

[pbehn]

You can't forget at this point the US still controlled areas like the Phillipines, and it was pretty clear that war was absolutely going to happen in 1939.
As well as this, the US was actively working on a strategic bombing force as far as I am aware

Where can you go from the Phillipines to in a P36? In May 1939 the P-51 did not exist. The design study it was developed from did not exist. The British had not even considered ordering it and wouldnt for over a year. The two stage Merlin did not exist and neither did the requirement for a high altitude bomber it was initially developed for. The British hadnt even put 100 Octane fuel in service let alone the higher octanes that the P-51 eventually ran on. Despite all this the P-51B was in service with extended range due to fuselage tank and drop tanks before the P-47. Since all three types that were used for escort had to be developed and changed any document about drop tanks in 1939 is completely irrelevant.

 

[pbehn]

The USAAF switched back to wanting more range and droppable external tanks in early 1942. The inconsistency is more peace versus wartime and the changes in what the USAAF thought it would be doing in 1939 and what it was doing/going to do over 2 years later.

Lots of the details in Greg of Auto and Airplanes has asked for a Debate from about page 4 and

Another 'Gem' from Greg - just released.

Greg apparently had his feelings hurt by me regarding 'contrarian' views on his P-47 series regarding range, and now his recent 'breathless' breaking news about Fokker being the real engineering and production cadre that built P-51. I am banned...

ww2aircraft.net

Is absolutely clear about the future in 1939 include France falling so any USAAF bases to attack Germany would need to be in Britain? Or that Japan would keep fighting in something like a stalemate in China and take on what became the Western Allies? or that Congress would vote to buy lots of 4 engined types instead of the cheaper and shorter ranged 2 engine types? or that radar nets would dramatically increase interception chances? Radio navigation devices enable easier more accurate long range navigation? And so on.

With the rate of progress and change in aviation and use of different measures and counter measures, any commander who used the same philosophy regardless of situation throughout the war would be remembered in history as a fool. Inconsistency is one way to describe a good commander who reacts to a change in situation with new methods.

 

[Shortround6]

In 1939 the USAAC was ordering the B-17C that was supposed to carry a 4000lb bomb load 2400 miles.
They were also issuing specifications for medium bombers, the B-25 and B-26 that were supposed to carry a 2000lb load 2000miles (they didn't get it).
Now what kind of a fuel tank are you going to need to strap to the bottom of a P-36 to fly 2000 miles?
What kind of internal fuel tank are you going to need to even get back from 500 miles after dropping the external tank and fighting for 10-15 minutes?

The P-36 was NOT supposed to fight with the rear fuselage tank full. The plane was out of CG limits for fighter type maneuvers.

Nobody believed that a single engine fighter could fly the distances needed to escort long range bombers.
In part because the long range bomber fanboys were considerably over estimating the actual distances their bombers could operate at. It hadn't sunk in that operating in enemy airspace (flying to and from the target/s) was a lot different than flying the same distance with nobody shooting (or potentially shooting) at you.

B-17s rarely flew even 800 miles one way, let alone the 1000-1100 miles the 1939 specification called for.

 

[drgondog]

I would appreciate the group's advice since this is my first post.

In reviewing the literature, I find no criticism of General "Hap" Arnold's failure to protect bombers with escort fighters prior to early 1942. If I missed it, please help me find it.

Arnold prevented escort fighters from keeping up with bombers by prohibiting drop tanks on escort fighters in May 1939. This prevented escort fighters from having the necessary range to keep up with the bombers. Arnold also asserted that bombers could protect themselves. Yet, on page 8 of Winged Warfare, a tome he wrote with Ira Eaker, Arnold writes that "the only reliable antidote to the enemy bomber is the fighter."⁠1

The first source refers to memo issued by Materiel Division, Wright Field in which Arnold is quoted from Delivering Pursuit (P-36 et al - my note) with auxiliary tanks at government expense'. Deeper in the memo is the following comment 'but subcontractor free to do so at own expense'.

in 1939 and then 1940, Arnold was very aware that bombers in Spanish Civil War and BoB were 'not getting through'

In May 1940, Arnold moved Emmons Board recommendation of 'development of 1500mi range escort fighter from #4 to #1.

In February 1942 Arnold issued a Technical Order to Wright Field to Extend Range of Fighters, Attack and Light Bombardment Aircraft'. In May the Fighter Aircraft Range Extension Program was initiated by MG Muir Fairchild AC/AS Operational Requirements and Planning, to drive both external combat and ferry tankage plus internal fuel to extend range.

On April 29, 1942 Major General Carl A. Spaatz sent a memorandum from Bolling Field to General Arnold, stating: - "Auxiliary (expendable) tanks offer the only immediate solution for extending the range of fighters, unless it can be developed that the bomber, with its firepower, can substitute ammunition for bomb load and act as an accompanying fighter."[1] This memorandum marks the beginning of the armament modifications leading to YB-40 (B-17) and YB-41 (B-24) delivered mid-1943.

[1] Memo from Spaatz CG USAAFE to Arnold, CG USAAF, dated 29 April, 1942.

Arnold added that the bombers needed more range with "leakproof fuel tanks," but mentioned nothing about extending the range of escort fighters sent along to protect the bombers. This may have been because in May 1939, General Arnold prohibited drop tanks on escort fighters. Drop tanks had only one function and that was to increase the range of escort fighters, whose purpose was to defend the bombers so they could reach their targets. But Arnold claimed bombers, prior the disastrous experiences in the summer and fall of 1943, could defend themselves.

This sounds very much like lifted opinions of the Chicagoboyz or Gregs Airplanes.

The problem is that (IMO) the pre WWII (9/39) struggles and comments, when AAC were struggling for limited $$ versus Navy, the focus was placed on procuring B-17s and the mantra of 'the bomber will always get through' was born. Pursuit was focused on battlefield superiority and fuel fractions requested by Mat.Div were low to maintain desirable climb and maneuver. The external fuel tank was first deemed a hazard to pilots by Westover, before Arnold.

You may recall that Arnold tasked four P-38FGs to provide ESCORT for 8th AF. Eaker had them removed to Torch because Torch was higher priority than the future Combined Bomber Offensive developed at Casablanca. In fairness Eaker, although deeply disappointed in allocation of short range P-47, saluted and went to war with what he had, believing that given the inventory of 600 B-17s, coupled with heavy defensive firepower, the B-17 could succeed with acceptable losses - that opinion morphed in May through July 1943 when he increasingly pled for return of P-38s or the new P-51B. Blitz Week in July, followed by Tital Wave and Schweinfurt-Regensburg put the question into crisis mode.

The lack of range for the P-47 was in fact a dual accountability - both Materiel Command for a bureaucratic approach to specifying, release for bid, test, re-design and finally approve the combat tank for production delayed the 75gal tank delivery to ETO in June 1943. That failure to deliver a highest priority Technical Order from Arnold 16 months earlier is unforgivable. That said, Republic P-47B through P-47D-5 was Not capable of attaching ANY AAF specified combat tank - only the 'bullfrog croak' Republic Proprietary 200gal plastic composite ferry tank could be mounted on the four point attach, skid plate. The 4000 Brisbane tanks developed by Ford followed in the SWP but the key point here is that Republic a.) did not follow the lead of every other fighter design for external stores with the P-47, and b.) were incapable of mounting anything else designed in the US. Even the UK contracted Bowater-Floyd paper 108gal tank was designed with B-7 kit installation on all existing P-47s in UK.

Despite Arnold's admission of his bombers' vulnerability to fighters, he failed to spend money to protect them. To Arnold, every dollar spent on a drop tank was one less dollar he could spend on his bombers.

"Bombers in far larger numbers than are available today [January 1941] will be required for wiping out people in sufficient numbers to break the will of a whole nation."⁠2


View attachment 702402
1 H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare, (New York: Harper & Brothers), 1941, p. 8

2 Ibid. p. 134

See my comments associated with pre-war versus December 1941 forward. His Chief Air Staff Barney Giles and AC/AS Muir Fairchild performed herculean tasks cleaning out the stables and cajoling Lockheed and North American to add more fuel internally, with no need to work on external tank capability already in place in 1942 for P-38 and A-36, then P-51A/B.


Mistakes and incompetency were made. Personally, I point to Oliver Echols as chief of fools and incompetency but I also hold Arnold culpable for not stepping in sooner to re-route P-38s back to ETO than July 1943 or replacing Echols for all R&D before the XP-75 fiasco ran its course - and Kartveli for stubbornly refusing to dirty up his P--47 with bomb racks and wing pylons when everybody else was doing so.

What I find repugnant are the claims that the Bomber Mafia conspired to prevent long range escort from the ETO, then conspired to cover it up.

Any Mo Ron that ever picked up a book regarding the histories of 1930 Air Force leaders, understand the importance of the vision of a separate Force of Arms equal to Army and Navy - and Independent of Both. The success of Strategic bombardment was central and the Holy Grail for the acolytes. Risking that Vision by stubbornly babbling the bomber will always get through, while writing letters to 600 families on August 17th, 1943, presumes extreme stupidity on the part of Arnold and his leadership team. The succeeding bloodbath on October 4th and 17th was not stupidity or bullheadedness - it was a mission committed to limits of endurance fighting with what they had, absent what they wanted.

Defeat of the Plan, and probable defeat at Normandy, was deferred then eliminated by the arrivals of the P-51B and P-38J to escort to deepest targets in Poland, Germany and Rumania was the final piece of the puzzle.

 

[drgondog]

The memo says ". . . no tactical airplane will be equipped with droppable auxiliary fuel tanks."

Such an order was intended as - and taken as - a prohibition against any pursuit (aka fighter) being equipped with drop tanks, as well as light, medium, and heavy attack aircraft/bombers - though the prohibition was only in relation to it being at the expense of the US government.

Effectively, this restricted any auxiliary fuel tanks to the ferry variety, ie not intended to be dropped (and in many cases not capable of being dropped).

Arnold did not rescind this order in any sense (as far as I know) until about the time of the Schweinfurt raids.

The order was certainly rescinded with his 1942 Technical Order to Extend Range for Fighter, Attack and Light Bomber aircraft, issued February 24,1942.

In quick succession the P-38F has wing pylons and fuel feed mods delivered in February, The A-36 with provisions for both bombs and fuel tanks were ordered in April 1942, The P-51A with same in June 1942, the P-51B in August 1942. Ditto for A-20 but I don't recall the date.

Arnold was surprised when Kelsey informed him that the P-38s heading for ETO were equipped with pylons and fuel tanks but made no effort to either stop follow on use or issue any such orders.

Arnold at no time ordered Eaker in ETO, or Kenney in SWP to cease negotiations and acceptance (incl.$$) from UK and Australia contractors. What he did do is crucify Echols, comparing weeks of full development to delivery off-shore vs 'vaporware' in the US after 16 months of floundering.

 

[ThomasP]

Hey drgondog,

I have read in anecdotal & 2nd hand references that Arnold ordered some such, but I have never run across any actual hard copy record of any such order. I am not saying it did not happen, but Eslinger's paper is the only semi-authoritative source I have ever run across that claimed this.

Have you run across a written order from Arnold ordering the adoption of DTs issued in or around Feb'42?

My understanding re Lockheed is that they initiated the development of the original 150(165) USgal aluminum DTs for the P-38E all on their ownsome, though they were originally primarily intended for ferry purposes. They were looking at the streamlining of the tanks in mid-1941.