Hap Arnold's Inconsistency

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If I remember well, it was estimated that the average pilot hit about with 2 % of its rounds. This theorically means quite a lot of rounds fired to score thoses 20 hits.

Most shots miss. The actual average hit amount is possibly less. I have seen basic heavy AA estimates around 10,000:1. However, I think the subject here is heavy Bomber vulnerability
in the real operational environment Vs Policy. The Flying Fortress was never a fortress, it suffered terrible losses, as did most bombers in WW2.

Eng
 
Is there a facsimile of the order available?

From the USAAF official history identified below:-

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This policy changed two days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the USAAF immediately started the process to have the 75 gallon drop tanks that Lockheed wanted to fit to the P-38 approved for manufacture and use. I have, at this time, found no start date for the P-40 drop tank process.

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Note that it took until April 3, a total of 116 days, to get those tanks, that apparently had already been built in small quantities, to the stage where the USAAF was willing to place an order. Note also that the contractor was given a further 60 days to start deliveries of the mass production tanks.

In relation to the P-40 drop tanks the USAAF first initiated action to produce these tanks on 28 February 1942 and that the tank to be produced was the same part number 75-45-433 proposed for the P-36C and available as a customer option on export H-75 (P-36) aircraft.

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The phrase initiating action to procure can be read several ways with the shortest time frame being that Curtiss or some other P-40 tank manufacturer had already completed their preproduction tasks such as the blueprints, the creation of all the tooling needed, creation of test assemblies, flight, vibration and drop testing of those prototype units, and had then made the necessary refinements as required. This would have been followed by an order which, like the Lockheed P-38 tanks, would have included a requirement to deliver the first examples within 60 days so we are looking at May 1st as the earliest realistic date these tanks could have entered service.

Additionally of course the aircraft had to be modified to carry the tanks. Given the modification documentation, and flight manual documentation, also had to be created, tested, and approved, PLUS the required components had to be purchased or manufactured, collated and delivered prior to the tanks actually being fitted shows that even a May 1 operational start date was probably very optimistic.
 
OK, What fighters were the Army ordering in May of 1939?

From memory P-36 and P-38 and P-39 and P-40 were all ordered on or before May of 39. None were allowed to carry drop tanks but because they were classified as Tactical airplanes. Both Curtiss and Lockheed had recognised the lessons of the Spanish civil war and knew drop tanks were going to be required but Hap Arnold said NO.
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I would appreciate the group's advice since this is my first post.

In reviewing the literature, I find no criticism of General "Hap" Arnold's failure to protect bombers with escort fighters prior to early 1942. If I missed it, please help me find it.

Arnold prevented escort fighters from keeping up with bombers by prohibiting drop tanks on escort fighters in May 1939. This prevented escort fighters from having the necessary range to keep up with the bombers. Arnold also asserted that bombers could protect themselves. Yet, on page 8 of Winged Warfare, a tome he wrote with Ira Eaker, Arnold writes that "the only reliable antidote to the enemy bomber is the fighter."⁠1

Arnold added that the bombers needed more range with "leakproof fuel tanks," but mentioned nothing about extending the range of escort fighters sent along to protect the bombers. This may have been because in May 1939, General Arnold prohibited drop tanks on escort fighters. Drop tanks had only one function and that was to increase the range of escort fighters, whose purpose was to defend the bombers so they could reach their targets. But Arnold claimed bombers, prior the disastrous experiences in the summer and fall of 1943, could defend themselves.

Despite Arnold's admission of his bombers' vulnerability to fighters, he failed to spend money to protect them. To Arnold, every dollar spent on a drop tank was one less dollar he could spend on his bombers.

"Bombers in far larger numbers than are available today [January 1941] will be required for wiping out people in sufficient numbers to break the will of a whole nation."⁠2


View attachment 702402
1 H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare, (New York: Harper & Brothers), 1941, p. 8

2 Ibid. p. 134

Welcome aboard the forum from Australia.

And thanks for starting with such a good topic.
 
You can compress and split the file to have more multiple but easier to sent volumes.


Many of the dozens of PDF programs allow you to split a file into smaller sections and if you have Adobe Acrobat Pro you can also optomise scanned files and reduce file sizes. In many cases the file can be reduced up to 90% with no loss of detail. I use the ancient Acrobat 9 pro extended because when I bought 11 Pro many of the keyboard functions I use very regularly had been replaced with multiple mouse clicks and I have never seen the sense in taking one hand off the keyboard to drive a mouse all over the screen when a keyboard shortcut is far far far quicker. I deleted Acrobat 11 within months of buying it as it had no new functions that I needed.

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From memory P-36 and P-38 and P-39 and P-40 were all ordered on or before May of 39. None were allowed to carry drop tanks but because they were classified as Tactical airplanes. Both Curtiss and Lockheed had recognised the lessons of the Spanish civil war and knew drop tanks were going to be required but Hap Arnold said NO.
View attachment 795412
If you read futher down the memo, there were no objections at contractor expense
 
Jesus wept and Moses crept, Greg's conspiracy nonsense has been indulged far too much here based on an irrelevant document in early 1939 when the USA was at peace and didnt have a strategic bomber force let alone a fleet of fighters capable of escorting them anywhere. The first jet produced by the USA was the Bell P-59 which first flew on October 1st 1942. Hap Arnold was instrumental in making that happen ( extract from the P-59 wiki page below) I dont see how anyone could be consistent in a world where you were still operating bi planes they were being replaced by monoplanes whose power consumption weight and everything else changed by the month and jets were the obvious future. Hap Arnolds involvement in the development of jet fighters for the USA is COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT with any barking mad, howl at the moon conspiracy theory about the bomber maaaaaaaffffiia.



Major General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold became aware of the UK's jet program when he attended a taxiing demonstration of the Gloster E.28/39 in April 1941. The subject had been mentioned, but not in-depth, as part of the Tizard Mission the previous year. He requested and was given, the plans for the aircraft's powerplant, the Power Jets W.1, which he took back to the U.S. He also arranged for an example of the engine, the Whittle W.1X turbojet, to be flown to the U.S. on 1 October in a Consolidated B-24 Liberator,[1] along with drawings for the more powerful W.2B/23 engine and a small team of Power Jets engineers. On 4 September, he offered the U.S. company General Electric a contract to produce an American version of the engine, which subsequently became the General Electric I-A. On the following day, he approached Lawrence Dale Bell, head of Bell Aircraft Corporation, to build a fighter to utilize it.
 
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Which is why Curtiss and Lockheed already had tanks in an advanced state of readiness two days after PH when people below Arnold got the ball rolling.
Agreed, but truncating the twx implies that AAC also against any design feature to enable auxiliary tanks - which was not true. North American also had pylon/bomb/tank design for the Low Altitude Attack in 1941, which was NA-83 morphing into A-36.

My point is that contractors were aware of the AAC/AAF flight safety prohibitions against external auxiliary drop tanks, but were wise enough to know that drop tanks could be designed to use the same sway braces as bombs - so why not prep the fuselage or wing to support fuel feed also?

AKAIK, no contractor supplied immersed pumps until 1941.

What I do not understand is why Republic did not design the P-47 to carry a bomb - until forced to adopt B-7 racks in Mid/late 1943 to mount US specified drop tanks.
 
Which is why Curtiss and Lockheed already had tanks in an advanced state of readiness two days after PH when people below Arnold got the ball rolling.

I think we are confusing cause and effect.

Bell, Curtiss and Lockheed during 1941 were trying to figure out how to restore the original fuel capacity (range/endurance) of their fighters before they fitted self sealing tanks.
The P-38 lost 25% of it's fuel capacity with the self sealing tanks. The P-39 lost about 30% and the P-40 lost about 20% between the P-40NL and P-40C.
They all gained more than they lost but they also had higher drag when using the tanks.
Lockheed was also lucky, they had a lot of room between the fuselage and the engine booms to fit rather large tanks without dragging them on the ground like the P-40.
It was also easier to fit single drop tanks on the single engine fighters and two drop tanks on the P-38 than trying to figure out where to put the now "missing" fuel and keep it both in the CG range and not require major structural changes.

Restoring fuel for ferrying/deployment is not quite the same as adding fuel for long range escort duty. As noted earlier in the thread, the orders for the tanks in early 1942 (?) were for 6 tanks per plane. Using the tanks for 'combat' would require more tanks and using them for inside the US deployments would require less. Time needed to gear up production.

P-47 and P-51 had more protected internal fuel and didn't need drop tanks to meet early specifications for range (not later escort ranges) but Bell, Curtiss and Lockheed needed to restore range/endurance to keep their planes looking competitive with the 1941/early 42 P-47 and P-51.
 
The P47 didn't fly its first combat mission until April 1943, so I'm not quite sure what you mean.
XP-47 first flight was May 6, 1941. it could carry 305 gal US internal protected so it's deployment range was better than the protected P-40C/D/E or the P-39D or the P-38D without external fuel. What should the army order in late 1941 or in 1942 for planes to be delivered in 1943?
 
The P-38 wing centre section had to be very strong to keep the engines attached and probably had fuel lines for cross feeding, apart from having the room under the wing to carry large size loads and the benefits of load carrying almost under the fuselage. Mid or outer wing loads meant a mixture of wing strengthening and tighter flight limits, like G's pulled.

The P-47 was the last of the main USAAF production fighters to come into service, the C model was considered the first combat worthy version, produced from September 1942, Evansville began first production in October, Curtiss in September, with plans to replace P-40 production. The P-47 was meant to be the next generation USAAF single engine single seat fighter, 3 were delivered for the USSR in September 1943, 2 for the RAF in November were the only non US allocations to end 1943. By coming up with their own attachments Republic could carry more fuel under the fuselage than the standard USAAF drop tanks of the time allowed. A more recent slogan of not one pound for air to ground come to mind.

The P-38 had room in the wings once the cooling system was redesigned, the P-51 room in the rear fuselage for fuel plus a heavier engine up front to help CoG, the P-47 had none of these.

To use all 200 gallons of the Republic tank in Europe would have required using Spitfires to escort the P-47 until the external tank was empty and the P-47 could climb to full combat height.

If I have this correct,
P-38L first with outer wing ability to carry external stores, produced from June 1944
P-40N-5 first wing racks, produced from May 1943
P-47D-15 first wing racks, produced from October 1943.
A-36 first P-51 variant with wing racks, produced from October 1942, as it was meant to be a light bomber and the radiator position made under fuselage loads impossible.

The obvious questions, when would P-38 external loads have arrived if they had to be under the outer wing, and when for the P-51 if there was no A-36 version.

The 9th Air Force says only its P-47 and P-63 used rockets, which supports the outer wing load carrying arriving with the P-38L.
 
The P-38 wing centre section had to be very strong to keep the engines attached and probably had fuel lines for cross feeding, apart from having the room under the wing to carry large size loads and the benefits of load carrying almost under the fuselage. Mid or outer wing loads meant a mixture of wing strengthening and tighter flight limits, like G's pulled.
Geoffrey - Did have cross feed and submersible pumps.
The P-47 was the last of the main USAAF production fighters to come into service, the C model was considered the first combat worthy version, produced from September 1942, Evansville began first production in October, Curtiss in September, with plans to replace P-40 production. The P-47 was meant to be the next generation USAAF single engine single seat fighter, 3 were delivered for the USSR in September 1943, 2 for the RAF in November were the only non US allocations to end 1943. By coming up with their own attachments Republic could carry more fuel under the fuselage than the standard USAAF drop tanks of the time allowed. A more recent slogan of not one pound for air to ground come to mind.
IMO Kartveli was dragged kicking and screaming when P-47 was forced to accommodate external stores.
The P-38 had room in the wings once the cooling system was redesigned, the P-51 room in the rear fuselage for fuel plus a heavier engine up front to help CoG, the P-47 had none of these.
All true. The P-38 had enough room under/aft cockpit to accommodate a 50gal tank but Cg issues were also a problem.
To use all 200 gallons of the Republic tank in Europe would have required using Spitfires to escort the P-47 until the external tank was empty and the P-47 could climb to full combat height.
The Ferry tank was not designed for combat ops, dangerous to eject empty, unpressurized. The mission profile to carry and use all 200+gal would have been to climb to approximately 20,000 feet, cruise at 60+mph below optimal cruise speed until tanks, dry - then eject and climb to escort altitude 'clean'.

That profile placed the P-47 at a severe disadvantage against LW so the tanks were limited to 100 gal, ejected over Channel/N.Sea, then climb an cruise normally.
If I have this correct,
P-38L first with outer wing ability to carry external stores, produced from June 1944
The P-38E was kit modified in Dec 1941 for inboard pylons, wing pylons were production articles on P-38F in Feb 1942. the P-38 J first flew in ~ july 1943, with new intercooler design, had 55gal LE tanks installed as kits through 1943, production J-10 equipped with 55gal wing tanks. J-15 had most cockpit and oil cooler and turbo issues sorted in March 1944. I sense that the thrust of the point was external wing mounted bombs and rockets? Production P-38L-5 with kits for J-25 and L-1.
P-40N-5 first wing racks, produced from May 1943
P-47D-15 first wing racks, produced from October 1943.
True. First date of ETO ops for -15/-16 mid-March 1944
A-36 first P-51 variant with wing racks, produced from October 1942, as it was meant to be a light bomber and the radiator position made under fuselage loads impossible.
True for all Mustangs, but A-36 was first with wing racks and external auxiliary tank feed.
The obvious questions, when would P-38 external loads have arrived if they had to be under the outer wing, and when for the P-51 if there was no A-36 version.
The A-36 was a critical contract. Had Echols been successful in killing it, there was no timeline for the P-51A or P-51B
The 9th Air Force says only its P-47 and P-63 used rockets, which supports the outer wing load carrying arriving with the P-38L.
 
Thanks for the information. Still trying to obtain a handle on the times to resolve the technical issues of wing racks (P-38 outer wing racks) and the changing priorities.

US 75 gallons 100 octane at 6 pounds per gallon comes in at 450 pounds, plus tank, essentially a 500 pound load. Been trying to dig out time lines for how many WWII fighter designs could carry that weight on wing racks and when, things like the Fw190F and G, the later Hurricane, the Typhoon, the P-40 etc., and how long it took to design and produce the first example, so far not many results. The P-47 needed telescoping landing gear to fit 8 machine guns plus ammunition in the wings, it meant the wing racks were more than 10 feet from the centre line.

Francis Dean, yardstick ranges (no reserves, zero wind, 10,000 feet)
P-38G 800 miles with 300 gallons
P-40E to M 650 miles with 157 gallons
P-47C to D-22 900 miles with 305 gallons.
P-51B to D 1,300 miles with 269 gallons.

End 1942 the US was receiving very good reports on the P-38 in the Pacific but poor ones from North Africa where it was effectively using Spitfires as air superiority fighters. Even if the schedules could be met the P-51 was going to be a 1944 fighter in Europe, arriving in numbers in time for the 1943/44 winter at best, making the 1943 USAAF single engine air superiority fighter the P-47, it would be the best performer the USAAF had in numbers if for example Overlord was launched in 1943 as the US was still pushing or there were major air fights as the allies moved out of North Africa. 1943 promised to be a difficult year for the USAAF around Europe if it could not obtain better performing fighters in numbers.

Production plans as of end January 1943
P-38F or later, total program 4,147, total ordered 3,347, accepted 768
P-40E or later, total program 9,930, total ordered 9,930, accepted 5,205
P-47C or later, total program 9,491, total ordered 5,298, accepted 473
P-51 or later, total program 6,152, total ordered 5,652, accepted 158

1943 expected allocations of all P-38 and 4,700 P-47 to USAAF, P-40 2,477 non US, 2,285 USAAF, P-51 600 to RAF, 2,269 to USAAF.

1943 Production 2,213 P-38, 4,428 P-47 and 1,710 P-51, Evansville had built 10 P-47 starting October 1942, Dallas built its first P-51 in August 1943, it built is first AT-6A in February 1941. North American Dallas had 7,574 employees in January 1943, to 20,206 in December, Inglewood 24,974 to 24,471. Republic Evansville 2,923 to 7,379, Farmingdale 14,445 to 16,525, looking at the monthly production figures Evansville was usually under half of Farmingdale in 1943.

End 1942 the USAAF overseas strength was 547 P-38, 104 P-47 and 0 P-51, June 1943 790 P-38, 478 P-47 and 29 P-51, end September 1943 800 P-38, 1,197 P-47 and 225 P-51, end 1943 1,129 P-38, 2,147 P-47 and 515 P-51. All this includes reserves and in units not yet operational, the USAAF was arriving for a northern winter battle, which for the first time stopped the Luftwaffe day fighter force from using winter for rest and refit.

There was a lot of pressure for P-47 in numbers in 1943 and little feedback in early to mid 1943 that extra range was really important, it would be easy to defer adding wing racks to keep production flowing/growing given air superiority aircraft do not need bomb racks. The P-51 would be available end 1943 as well. However when you look at the monthly production figures the addition wing racks to the P-47 did little to nothing to output. Nor did the addition of extra internal fuel. According to the contract dates the USAAF ordered A-36 on 7 August 1942 and accepted the first in October.

According to the USAAF DA-140 in 25 Sep 41 for 150 P-51, AC-27396 on 7 August 1942 for 500 A-36A, then AC-30479 on 24 August 1942 for 1,200 P-51A and B, supplement 1 on 5 January 1943 added another 550 P-51B (2 accepted as D), supplement 3 on 11 February 1943 added another 150 P-51B while AC-33923 on 28 December 1942 added 400 P-51B while Dallas had AC-33940 on 28 December 1942 for 1,000 P-51C, supplement 1 on 11 February 1943 added another 350 P-51C.

P-47 had 1,624 ordered by 14 October 1941 including prototypes, first production order 13 September 1940, another 2,000 on 30 June 1942, another 2,112 on 26 may 1943, Evansville received an order for 1,050 on 31 January 1942, same date as Curtiss received its P-47G order of which only 354 were built, next Evansville order was 500 on 25 January 1943 then another 2,078 on 26 May 1943

P-38 had 1,387 ordered by 31 October 1941 (including prototypes), 1,600 on 20 June 1942, 450 on 28 December 1942, picked up 143 P-322 and 524 P-38F from the French/British order, then 800 on 16 February 1943

4,761 USAAF P-38 as of 16 February 1943, 9,718 P-47 as of 26 May 1943, 4,302 USAAF P-51 as of 11 February 1943. Another 3,880 P-51 ordered on 21 July 1943, next P-38 and P-47 orders were in February 1944.
 

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