Hap Arnold's Inconsistency

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If I remember well, it was estimated that the average pilot hit about with 2 % of its rounds. This theorically means quite a lot of rounds fired to score thoses 20 hits.

Most shots miss. The actual average hit amount is possibly less. I have seen basic heavy AA estimates around 10,000:1. However, I think the subject here is heavy Bomber vulnerability
in the real operational environment Vs Policy. The Flying Fortress was never a fortress, it suffered terrible losses, as did most bombers in WW2.

Eng
 
Is there a facsimile of the order available?

From the USAAF official history identified below:-

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This policy changed two days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the USAAF immediately started the process to have the 75 gallon drop tanks that Lockheed wanted to fit to the P-38 approved for manufacture and use. I have, at this time, found no start date for the P-40 drop tank process.

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Note that it took until April 3, a total of 116 days, to get those tanks, that apparently had already been built in small quantities, to the stage where the USAAF was willing to place an order. Note also that the contractor was given a further 60 days to start deliveries of the mass production tanks.

In relation to the P-40 drop tanks the USAAF first initiated action to produce these tanks on 28 February 1942 and that the tank to be produced was the same part number 75-45-433 proposed for the P-36C and available as a customer option on export H-75 (P-36) aircraft.

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The phrase initiating action to procure can be read several ways with the shortest time frame being that Curtiss or some other P-40 tank manufacturer had already completed their preproduction tasks such as the blueprints, the creation of all the tooling needed, creation of test assemblies, flight, vibration and drop testing of those prototype units, and had then made the necessary refinements as required. This would have been followed by an order which, like the Lockheed P-38 tanks, would have included a requirement to deliver the first examples within 60 days so we are looking at May 1st as the earliest realistic date these tanks could have entered service.

Additionally of course the aircraft had to be modified to carry the tanks. Given the modification documentation, and flight manual documentation, also had to be created, tested, and approved, PLUS the required components had to be purchased or manufactured, collated and delivered prior to the tanks actually being fitted shows that even a May 1 operational start date was probably very optimistic.
 
OK, What fighters were the Army ordering in May of 1939?

From memory P-36 and P-38 and P-39 and P-40 were all ordered on or before May of 39. None were allowed to carry drop tanks but because they were classified as Tactical airplanes. Both Curtiss and Lockheed had recognised the lessons of the Spanish civil war and knew drop tanks were going to be required but Hap Arnold said NO.
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I would appreciate the group's advice since this is my first post.

In reviewing the literature, I find no criticism of General "Hap" Arnold's failure to protect bombers with escort fighters prior to early 1942. If I missed it, please help me find it.

Arnold prevented escort fighters from keeping up with bombers by prohibiting drop tanks on escort fighters in May 1939. This prevented escort fighters from having the necessary range to keep up with the bombers. Arnold also asserted that bombers could protect themselves. Yet, on page 8 of Winged Warfare, a tome he wrote with Ira Eaker, Arnold writes that "the only reliable antidote to the enemy bomber is the fighter."⁠1

Arnold added that the bombers needed more range with "leakproof fuel tanks," but mentioned nothing about extending the range of escort fighters sent along to protect the bombers. This may have been because in May 1939, General Arnold prohibited drop tanks on escort fighters. Drop tanks had only one function and that was to increase the range of escort fighters, whose purpose was to defend the bombers so they could reach their targets. But Arnold claimed bombers, prior the disastrous experiences in the summer and fall of 1943, could defend themselves.

Despite Arnold's admission of his bombers' vulnerability to fighters, he failed to spend money to protect them. To Arnold, every dollar spent on a drop tank was one less dollar he could spend on his bombers.

"Bombers in far larger numbers than are available today [January 1941] will be required for wiping out people in sufficient numbers to break the will of a whole nation."⁠2


View attachment 702402
1 H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare, (New York: Harper & Brothers), 1941, p. 8

2 Ibid. p. 134

Welcome aboard the forum from Australia.

And thanks for starting with such a good topic.
 
You can compress and split the file to have more multiple but easier to sent volumes.


Many of the dozens of PDF programs allow you to split a file into smaller sections and if you have Adobe Acrobat Pro you can also optomise scanned files and reduce file sizes. In many cases the file can be reduced up to 90% with no loss of detail. I use the ancient Acrobat 9 pro extended because when I bought 11 Pro many of the keyboard functions I use very regularly had been replaced with multiple mouse clicks and I have never seen the sense in taking one hand off the keyboard to drive a mouse all over the screen when a keyboard shortcut is far far far quicker. I deleted Acrobat 11 within months of buying it as it had no new functions that I needed.

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From memory P-36 and P-38 and P-39 and P-40 were all ordered on or before May of 39. None were allowed to carry drop tanks but because they were classified as Tactical airplanes. Both Curtiss and Lockheed had recognised the lessons of the Spanish civil war and knew drop tanks were going to be required but Hap Arnold said NO.
View attachment 795412
If you read futher down the memo, there were no objections at contractor expense
 
Jesus wept and Moses crept, Greg's conspiracy nonsense has been indulged far too much here based on an irrelevant document in early 1939 when the USA was at peace and didnt have a strategic bomber force let alone a fleet of fighters capable of escorting them anywhere. The first jet produced by the USA was the Bell P-59 which first flew on October 1st 1942. Hap Arnold was instrumental in making that happen ( extract from the P-59 wiki page below) I dont see how anyone could be consistent in a world where you were still operating bi planes they were being replaced by monoplanes whose power consumption weight and everything else changed by the month and jets were the obvious future. Hap Arnolds involvement in the development of jet fighters for the USA is COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT with any barking mad, howl at the moon conspiracy theory about the bomber maaaaaaaffffiia.



Major General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold became aware of the UK's jet program when he attended a taxiing demonstration of the Gloster E.28/39 in April 1941. The subject had been mentioned, but not in-depth, as part of the Tizard Mission the previous year. He requested and was given, the plans for the aircraft's powerplant, the Power Jets W.1, which he took back to the U.S. He also arranged for an example of the engine, the Whittle W.1X turbojet, to be flown to the U.S. on 1 October in a Consolidated B-24 Liberator,[1] along with drawings for the more powerful W.2B/23 engine and a small team of Power Jets engineers. On 4 September, he offered the U.S. company General Electric a contract to produce an American version of the engine, which subsequently became the General Electric I-A. On the following day, he approached Lawrence Dale Bell, head of Bell Aircraft Corporation, to build a fighter to utilize it.
 
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Which is why Curtiss and Lockheed already had tanks in an advanced state of readiness two days after PH when people below Arnold got the ball rolling.
Agreed, but truncating the twx implies that AAC also against any design feature to enable auxiliary tanks - which was not true. North American also had pylon/bomb/tank design for the Low Altitude Attack in 1941, which was NA-83 morphing into A-36.

My point is that contractors were aware of the AAC/AAF flight safety prohibitions against external auxiliary drop tanks, but were wise enough to know that drop tanks could be designed to use the same sway braces as bombs - so why not prep the fuselage or wing to support fuel feed also?

AKAIK, no contractor supplied immersed pumps until 1941.

What I do not understand is why Republic did not design the P-47 to carry a bomb - until forced to adopt B-7 racks in Mid/late 1943 to mount US specified drop tanks.
 
Which is why Curtiss and Lockheed already had tanks in an advanced state of readiness two days after PH when people below Arnold got the ball rolling.

I think we are confusing cause and effect.

Bell, Curtiss and Lockheed during 1941 were trying to figure out how to restore the original fuel capacity (range/endurance) of their fighters before they fitted self sealing tanks.
The P-38 lost 25% of it's fuel capacity with the self sealing tanks. The P-39 lost about 30% and the P-40 lost about 20% between the P-40NL and P-40C.
They all gained more than they lost but they also had higher drag when using the tanks.
Lockheed was also lucky, they had a lot of room between the fuselage and the engine booms to fit rather large tanks without dragging them on the ground like the P-40.
It was also easier to fit single drop tanks on the single engine fighters and two drop tanks on the P-38 than trying to figure out where to put the now "missing" fuel and keep it both in the CG range and not require major structural changes.

Restoring fuel for ferrying/deployment is not quite the same as adding fuel for long range escort duty. As noted earlier in the thread, the orders for the tanks in early 1942 (?) were for 6 tanks per plane. Using the tanks for 'combat' would require more tanks and using them for inside the US deployments would require less. Time needed to gear up production.

P-47 and P-51 had more protected internal fuel and didn't need drop tanks to meet early specifications for range (not later escort ranges) but Bell, Curtiss and Lockheed needed to restore range/endurance to keep their planes looking competitive with the 1941/early 42 P-47 and P-51.
 

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