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For the life of me I have zero idea what you wish to prove?
.....
I could belabor the point regarding context and communication but will just comment that your presentations are a steady stream of statistics that never seem to be framed to answer a question or assert/postulate a claim that you wish to make..
Because context is everything. for example mission 226 on 20 Feb 1944 had 94 P-38 Lightnings, 668 P-47 Thunderbolts and 73 P-51 Mustangs. From WikiAs he has stated repeatedly...
HE IS NOT TRYING TO MAKE A POINT!!!!!!!
He is presenting data for YOU (and the rest of us) to use to evaluate your (our) positions and opinions, to determine whether you (us) is/are full of it or on-target with your (our) positions and opinions.
Why is that so hard for you to comprehend?
Keep in mind that no one is trying to make a point, aparently...Because context is everything. for example mission 226 on 20 Feb 1944 had 94 P-38 Lightnings, 668 P-47 Thunderbolts and 73 P-51 Mustangs. From Wiki
The 668 P-47 could only take the B-17s to the German border and back, the 94 P-38s and 73 P-51s had to take the bombers from the German border to the target and back. More P-47s would have been no use at all, just giving more domination of where they were already dominant. It was the P-38 and P-51 which allowed the US strategy to progress and initially at least the important statistic was bombers lost not enemy fighters shot down. Big Week - Wikipedia
Suggest you go to Greg's Airplanes etc on YouTube. Watch his 38 vids. I suspect his assessments of the 38 are as good as we're going to get at this remove.I have some questions about the P-38, and I'm inviting comments.
I've always considered the Lightning a super cool craft, both because of the way it looks and performs and because it was one of the earliest products of Kelly Johnson's team at Lockheed which would become known as the Skunk Works. It was the first combat airplane to achieve 400 mph in level flight. And even though it came out before the P-40 and the P-39, both of those planes ceased production in 1944, but the Lightning was good enough to be produced throughout the entire war.
But only fairly recently have I been reading much about its mediocre reputation in the European theater of operations. Seems that a lot of American and British pilots and generals didn't think highly of it, and some German pilots considered it an "easy kill" even though others counted it a worthy and dangerous foe. I know it was popular and successful in the Pacific theater, but now I'm wondering if any of that success was because the Japanese flying forces had already been gravely weakened by 1943 through loss of good pilots, even before the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. (Perhaps the Turkey Shoot was the result of the deterioration of Japanese air power, rather than the cause of it, as has often been suggested?)
Anyway, how good (or bad) was the P-38, really?
Simply because presenting data with no content is like looking at binary code for a JCL desck. So, now as a champion of 'data makes your day', what POINT do you comprehend or opinion that You wish to opine based on the dump?As he has stated repeatedly...
HE IS NOT TRYING TO MAKE A POINT!!!!!!!
He is presenting data for YOU (and the rest of us) to use to evaluate your (our) positions and opinions, to determine whether you (us) is/are full of it or on-target with your (our) positions and opinions.
Why is that so hard for you to comprehend?
So context,Because context is everything. for example mission 226 on 20 Feb 1944 had 94 P-38 Lightnings, 668 P-47 Thunderbolts and 73 P-51 Mustangs. From Wiki
The 668 P-47 could only take the B-17s to the German border and back, the 94 P-38s and 73 P-51s had to take the bombers from the German border to the target and back. More P-47s would have been no use at all, just giving more domination of where they were already dominant. It was the P-38 and P-51 which allowed the US strategy to progress and initially at least the important statistic was bombers lost not enemy fighters shot down. Big Week - Wikipedia
So I am to go away and find the data, it will not be supplied, definition of VERY high is? Using the online US kill claims, 479th FG monthly May to September, 0, 1, 4, 19, 42. Of the September 1944 kills 27 on the 26th and 13 on the 28th. So 2 combats and the 8th AF says the group officially changed to P-51 on the 27th, but all of the 26th and 28th claims were made by P-38 pilots? The citation the 479th received for the 26th says combat near Munster, Mighty Eighth War Diary says the P-38 were on Market Garden support in Holland.but if you look at 479th FG May through September 1944, you would be stumped if you try to explain its VERY high Victory Credit to loss ratio - air to air..
So the destroyed on ground figures are requested, supplied, complaints of too much data are followed by more data is required and it should be presented graphically. After all I collected the data, cited the sources, put it into a tangible format, claims per sortie sent and am told not good enough.If the P-38 lagged in productivity vs P-51 in Ground Destruction of LW aircraft, - show it month to month in the form of a plot as a f(sorties). Conversely if you wish to assert (either way) regarding LW destroyed on the ground vs losses due to strafing - collect the data, cite your sources and plot the data into tangible and visual format.
"Like people with autism, people with Asperger's syndrome have a dreadful time understanding what is going on, socially. They do not always pay attention to the social scene in which they find themselves, and even when they do, they are often not able to make sense of what they see, or to respond appropriately."Autists and Asperger's syndrome afflicted folks also put out incoherent streams of consciousness.
It was me that stated the German border because thats how far P-47s took the B-17s on the Schweinfurt raids. I know where these places are because I worked there for 9 years, I used take my wife shopping in Braunschweig and Hanover..Wiki has an interesting idea of where the German border is.
108 gallon drop tanks first used on 27 September 1943, enabling P-47 to make Emden from Britain. P-47 radius of action with the tank rated at 325 miles.
150 gallon flat fuel tanks available in February 1944, P-47 radius of action to 375 miles with 1 tank, 550 miles with 2.
Cambridge to Brunswick around 430 miles, German border reached at about 280 miles.
Cambridge to Leipzig around 525 miles, German border reached at about 260 miles.
(Distances read from a map, so allow a margin for error)
I am being serious, I would be interested to know the thought processes behind the question.Now with regard to your post, if the text in bold is correct there was no need for any P-38s or P-51s on any raid to The Braunschweig area, so what were they doing?
As far as I am aware non paper external tanks were often held onto unless hostile aircraft were encountered, at least before the idea of strafing targets on the way home became general practice.Issuing a tank for use isnt the same as having production in UK of 1000s per day 668 P-47s require 1336 drop tanks for a days work.
That was like reading a phone book.So context,
July 28th 1943 -The 4th and 56th and 78th FG used the 205 gal Ferry "Tub" tank and the 4th FG managed to penetrate to Emmerich, GY and attack a mixed force of 109s and 109s east of Rotterdam on the way back from R/V to find the returning bombers from either Kassel or Oschersleben - to score 9-1-5 for one loss.Wiki has an interesting idea of where the German border is.
P-47D never had 550 mi Combat Radius until the P-47D-25 first entered combat operations in flight level strength mid May 1944 - and only then with a.) wing pylons, b. 2x 108 Gal externals and c.) with 370 gallons of internal fuel (from 305), could the P-47D get close to Berlin/Leipzig. The P-47C/D prior to P-47D-15, were modified with Depot mod wing changes to achieve Hamburg, Brunswick, Stuttgart at 400-425m CR. The Group level force of equivalent D-16s weren't flying to Brunswick/Stuttgart radii until the end of March.108 gallon drop tanks first used on 27 September 1943, enabling P-47 to make Emden from Britain. P-47 radius of action with the tank rated at 325 miles.
150 gallon flat fuel tanks available in February 1944, P-47 radius of action to 375 miles with 1 tank, 550 miles with 2.
Cambridge to Brunswick around 430 miles, German border reached at about 280 miles.
Cambridge to Leipzig around 525 miles, German border reached at about 260 miles.
(Distances read from a map, so allow a margin for error)
Your data for late September was for a mixed force of P-51 and P-38 beginning with 9-26.So I am to go away and find the data, it will not be supplied, definition of VERY high is? Using the online US kill claims, 479th FG monthly May to September, 0, 1, 4, 19, 42. Of the September 1944 kills 27 on the 26th and 13 on the 28th. So 2 combats and the 8th AF says the group officially changed to P-51 on the 27th, but all of the 26th and 28th claims were made by P-38 pilots? The citation the 479th received for the 26th says combat near Munster, Mighty Eighth War Diary says the P-38 were on Market Garden support in Holland.
Sorry about that. Prior data dumps were like dumpster diving when one doesn't know what to looks for.So the destroyed on ground figures are requested, supplied, complaints of too much data are followed by more data is required and it should be presented graphically. After all I collected the data, cited the sources, put it into a tangible format, claims per sortie sent and am told not good enough.
I believe that one of the points is that one can't reach macro conclusions without essential data to parse, analyze and arrive at conclusions? I am well aware of the limitations of available data - I have devoted 40 years to gathering and parsing and gathering more and parsing more to arrive at postulates, claims base on facts but not 100% sourced, and qualified opinions.Fighter ground claims are listed under the headings aircraft, locomotives, oil tank cars, trains, goods and other rail wagons, armored vehicles and tanks, flak towers and gun positions, motor trucks, other vehicles, tug boats and barges and freighters, rail stations and facilities, radio and power stations, oil storage tanks, hangars and miscellaneous buildings. Destroyed and damaged. It is not like the 8th assigned airfield or other specific targets to a specific fighter type. The aircraft come with a by fighter type breakdown, the others do not.
"Like people with autism, people with Asperger's syndrome have a dreadful time understanding what is going on, socially. They do not always pay attention to the social scene in which they find themselves, and even when they do, they are often not able to make sense of what they see, or to respond appropriately."
So at the moment there is no evidence of "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered", just requests for lots more data, indicating the claim lacks evidence.
I am being serious, I would be interested to know the thought processes behind the question.
The 8th mounted 3 raids on 20 February 1944, one completely unescorted, as well something like the equivalent of around half a US Group of RAF Spitfires was used as part of the withdrawal cover. Also the 8th was borrowing 9th AF groups, which in the end created problems because it denied those units training and experience in fighter bomber operations. The answer seems obvious, the US was short of fighters, it needed all it could obtain. As expected the P-47 were doing the shorter range cover, the P-38 and P-51 the longer range, but shorter range was still tens of miles into Germany, not to Germany. I have no evidence P-47 went all the way to Braunschweig, any with the 150 gallon tank could get most of the way.
The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank.
As far as I am aware non paper external tanks were often held onto unless hostile aircraft were encountered, at least before the idea of strafing targets on the way home became general practice.
Roger Freeman states the 150 gallon steel tank actually held 165 gallons and was made in both Britain and the US, no idea on US supply numbers.
Ministry of Aircraft Production, monthly Statistical Bulletin, drop tank production for US fighters, January to May 1944
US 108 gallon paper, 8,465, 9,494, 13,758, 12,677, 16,740
US 108 gallon metal, 3,292, 3,257, 4,238, 3,001, 3,897
US 150 gallon metal, 0, 420, 2,280, 3,450, 5,865
Expressed another way, the destruction of the Luftwaffe by USSTAF (8th and 15th AF) took first priority prior to Overlord - and subsequently got what Spaatz demanded to achieve the expected result. The 9th AF XI FC did not 'loan' their Fighter Groups - they were ordered to subordinateI am being serious, I would be interested to know the thought processes behind the question.
The 8th mounted 3 raids on 20 February 1944, one completely unescorted, as well something like the equivalent of around half a US Group of RAF Spitfires was used as part of the withdrawal cover. Also the 8th was borrowing 9th AF groups, which in the end created problems because it denied those units training and experience in fighter bomber operations. The answer seems obvious, the US was short of fighters, it needed all it could obtain. As expected the P-47 were doing the shorter range cover, the P-38 and P-51 the longer range, but shorter range was still tens of miles into Germany, not to Germany. I have no evidence P-47 went all the way to Braunschweig, any with the 150 gallon tank could get most of the way.
I'm sorry, the first ID loss date I have for a -15RA MIA is 42-76449 - 360FS/353FG near Dummer Lake. April 11, 1944.The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank.
I believe the thought process is called subtraction, you stated the range of the P-47 and the distance to Leipzig which is within your stated range, if the P-47 had the range to reach Hanover at the end of Jan 1944 then some of the 800 P-47s used for example on 20 Feb would have gone all the way to the target. But you know this because you state "The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank." Drgondog has expanded on this in his post.I am being serious, I would be interested to know the thought processes behind the question.
Yes it was unescorted because at the time it couldnt be escorted. The raid was to the Rostock area but specifically Tutow airfield, on the coast directly north of Berlin. This was to put pressure on the LW, previous raids had seen the LW send aircraft from places like Tutow, that particular raid was to show they had to defend all Germany at all times or allow a free hit. This site describes Big Week as the apogee of the P-47 with regard to bomber escort P-47 Thunderbolt with the USAAF – European Theatre of Operations. The P-38 was better than the P-47 and the P-51B C D were better than both. So the P-47 was gradually replaced by both initially and then the P-38 was also replaced by the P-51. All three were improved in their lives but the basic difference remained, improving the range of the P-47 just gave bigger shoulders for the other two to stand on.The 8th mounted 3 raids on 20 February 1944, one completely unescorted,
So I stated the Roger Freeman reported combat radius with 1 and 2 150/165 gallon drop tanks and the assumption was made I was assuming some P-47 on 20 February 1944 were in fact carrying two tanks, clearly I should not have included the 2 tank data. Though I listed where the P-47 saw combat, which were clearly (well) west of both Leipzig and Braunschweig, with the point of the data was to show the wiki P-47 only to the German border idea was incorrect.I believe the thought process is called subtraction, you stated the range of the P-47 and the distance to Leipzig which is within your stated range, if the P-47 had the range to reach Hanover at the end of Jan 1944 then some of the 800 P-47s used for example on 20 Feb would have gone all the way to the target. But you know this because you state "The P-47D-15 were the first to have wing pylons, coming off the production lines starting in October and November 1943. Given shipping time and then waiting to be issued it is not surprising the first 8th AF P-47D-15 loss is in late January 1944. So in late February 1944 plenty of P-47 in the units would only have the ability to carry a belly tank."
I have posted a couple of times now the change over of the equipment of 8th AF fighter groups, what does the site add?This site describes Big Week as the apogee of the P-47 with regard to bomber escort P-47 Thunderbolt with the USAAF – European Theatre of Operations.
If the objective was destruction of the Luftwaffe then the P-38 was not better than the P-47, given the number of kill claims lodged, even as a percentage of sorties. If the objective was to allow day bombers to strike at more distant targets with acceptable losses then the P-38 was better at least until mid 1944, after which the P-51 took over anyway.The P-38 was better than the P-47 and the P-51B C D were better than both.
Given what I have read about the 9th Air Force being continually short of fighters, including the need for 1 P-51 group to convert to P-47 for a while in late 1944, the shortage of fighters was present. Then comes the 9th AF units being used for long range escort meant those units had less ability to prepare for their main purpose, the support of the armies, something that showed up post D-Day. Not just doing strikes but training with the ground forces and learning the new army support doctrine coming from the Mediterranean.The USA wasnt short of fighters, it was short of fighters that could do the job it wanted to. Quoting data for each type through out the war doesnt really show the true situation.
First a complaint about presenting data, then comes the too little data. I noted the first use of the 108 gallon fuel tank in September, but did not include a history of 8th AF external fuel tanks from first combat use in July 1943, the part filled 200 gallon ferry tanks, such information will be added if I do not include it.That was like reading a phone book.
July 28th 1943 -The 4th and 56th and 78th FG used the 205 gal Ferry "Tub" tank and the 4th FG managed to penetrate to Emmerich, GY and attack a mixed force of 109s and 109s east of Rotterdam on the way back from R/V to find the returning bombers from either Kassel or Oschersleben - to score 9-1-5 for one loss.
The 'So What' was July was the first time for VIII FC to penetrate German border - not September..
Good to see confirmation of the P-47 with twin 150/165 gallon tanks combat radius.P-47D never had 550 mi Combat Radius until the P-47D-25 first entered combat operations in flight level strength mid May 1944 (snip)
479th FG destroyed (per VIII FC Victory Credits Board dated 9/45), for P-38J, from May 1944 through September 30th 1944 (last mixed P-38/P-51 mission) were credited with 32 air for the loss of 4 air to air, a ratio of 8:1. By contrast, the 4FG for the same 6.5 56FG 10.9, 78FG 6.9:1, 353rd 7.9:1, 355th 8.5:1, 356th 5.7:1, 359FG 6.8:1, 339th FG 9.1, 352FG 12.3, 357FG 10:1. W/O belaboring the higher ratios of 339th, 352nd, 355th, 357th than 479th P-38 record, the other four flew most of their missions in P-51.
Other P-38 Groups, extracting only P-38 (like 479th above) 20th 3.8:1, 55th 2.4:1 364th 1.8:1 - all others except 56th (P-47), 339th (P51) and 357th (P-51) flew with mixed types. Additionally the 479th achieved 122 for loss of 7 in P-51 for 17:4 ratio.
My Point? Not all P-38 combat records sucked.
No, just marking it as proven false. The outnumbered P-38 comment was one reason I decided to post some data. My statement was noting the reality.If you are looking to me for comfort or rebuttal re: "P-38 fought consistently heavily outnumbered".
Pointblank directive of 14 June 1943 was a target list, which the air forces were working to, each in their own way. The conclusion as of late 1943 was the Luftwaffe day fighter force needed to be negated in order to continue day bombing. Whether that was lots of escorts near the bombers or allowing other tactics giving the escort fighters more operational flexibility became the topic of debate. Doolittle made it clear hunting Luftwaffe fighters was the priority.Expressed another way, the destruction of the Luftwaffe by USSTAF (8th and 15th AF) took first priority prior to Overlord - and subsequently got what Spaatz demanded to achieve the expected result. The 9th AF XI FC did not 'loan' their Fighter Groups - they were ordered to subordinate their P-47s,then P-51s and finally their P-38s - over Leigh Mallory's strenuous objections. Thus they were not 'loaned' they were assigned to operate under 8th AF HQ through end of May.
Interesting given 42-76449 is listed as a D-20. 8th AF P-47D-15 losses to 10 April 1944 from the loss list I haveI'm sorry, the first ID loss date I have for a -15RA MIA is 42-76449 - 360FS/353FG near Dummer Lake. April 11, 1944.
D-15RA #1 was 42-76119. Which Block serial are you using?
Not true that only belly tanks could be carried prior to -15RA/RE delivery to ETO as noted above. Depot Mod pylon/plumbing equipped P-47C through D-11 used 108 on pylons, and C/L in February 1944. The P-47D-6RA was first type released with strong wing and pylon as production feature - but no wing plumbing.
Agree. And the first goal stated by Ira Eaker when he requested (appealed) both P-38s and P-51s in June 1943 from Arnold. The destruction of the Luftwaffe as number one priority for 8th AF emerged in January 1944 and prosecuted by Doolittle.If the objective was destruction of the Luftwaffe then the P-38 was not better than the P-47, given the number of kill claims lodged, even as a percentage of sorties. If the objective was to allow day bombers to strike at more distant targets with acceptable losses then the P-38 was better at least until mid 1944, after which the P-51 took over anyway.
Given what I have read about the 9th Air Force being continually short of fighters, including the need for 1 P-51 group to convert to P-47 for a while in late 1944, the shortage of fighters was present. Then comes the 9th AF units being used for long range escort meant those units had less ability to prepare for their main purpose, the support of the armies, something that showed up post D-Day. Not just doing strikes but training with the ground forces and learning the new army support doctrine coming from the Mediterranean.
If you say so. The 479th made major strides in P-38 air to air ratios under Zemke, when most of the 32 air to air victories occurred - a stark contrast in ratios to 20th, 55th, and 364th FG comparable success. When you dwell in data without context, subtle information can be overlooked.For the same time period, 4FG 132 kill claims, 56FG 172, 78FG 87.5, 353rd 107, 355th 123, 356th 57, 359FG 110, 339th FG 144, 352FG 213, 357FG 232.5. Which makes even the 356th about twice as robust an indicator of performance as an air superiority fighter. Given all the tactical variables involved in air combat the idea 32 kill claims versus 4 losses over 13 combat days, 6 of which were for 1 claim supports almost any claim is incorrect, beyond such figures could occur.
Leaving IX FC out of the discussion for the moment (with 354FG by far the dominant contributor ) Using USAF Study 85 and Dr. Frank Olynyk's and USAFHRC, the total number of Victory Credits for VIII FC from January 1944 through May 1944 was 2041 Victory Credits. P-38H/J (141), P-47C/D (752), P-51B/C (1,146).Using the USAAF Statistical Digest ETO fighters claimed 2,610 kills in the time period.
I'm not sure that you understand that in 'reality', at the point of attack, the LW could put up a fighter intercept on either weakly defended escorted bombers with fewer fighters in that volume - or attack a single box of bombers with only a squadron in immediate vicinity. So, typically (vs Rarely) all types (P-38, P-47 and P-51) could be outnumbered. So, what? The 'deficiency' of results for the P-38 in context of air to air victories wasn't 'being outnumbered' because they were no different in this respect. The differences were a.) easy to see and consequently plan an attack, b.) out dive for evasion purposes, and c.) complex cockpit operations causing engine/turbo failures - not experienced by P-51 or P-47 fighter groups.No, just marking it as proven false. The outnumbered P-38 comment was one reason I decided to post some data. My statement was noting the reality.
General Lawrence Kuter alerted Arnold on October 29th, 1943 that intelligence reports indicated that Pointblank goal achievement was impossible prior to D-Day without major shift in priority. The result was issuance of priority focus on LW industry and Day Fighter Force resulting in Doolittle 'destroy in air and ground' orders and planning for Big Week. The destruction of day LW threat to D-Day beach heads was considered 'essential'. Continuing 'day bombing' was considered essential to draw the LW into a war of attrition.Pointblank directive of 14 June 1943 was a target list, which the air forces were working to, each in their own way. The conclusion as of late 1943 was the Luftwaffe day fighter force needed to be negated in order to continue day bombing. Whether that was lots of escorts near the bombers or allowing other tactics giving the escort fighters more operational flexibility became the topic of debate. Doolittle made it clear hunting Luftwaffe fighters was the priority.
Spaatz via Arnold, prevailed on Portal the necessity of 'all hands on deck' to highest 8th/15th AF (USSTAF) priority - namely destruction on LW prior to D-Day. The pissing contest with Leigh-Mallory was 'won' by Spaatz and 8th AF collected IX FC TDY until invasion, beginning December 1, 1943 when 354th started combat ops, followed by trade of 357FG Mustangs for 358FG P-47s as well as diverting the inbound 363rd P-51B FG. Later disagreements did not always go Spaatz's way during Oil Campaign when Eisenhower ordered 8th AF toward more D-Day support objectives,The 9th AF deserves a place in the list of units given what its fighters were doing, while the 15th AF was facing limited Luftwaffe units plus axis allied forces and suffering for a time a higher bomber loss rate than the 8th. So who ordered the 9th to subordinate their fighter units to 8th AF? I use borrow as that is the term I remember from one of the air war histories. Along with the disagreement over Eisenhower gaining control of the heavy bombers and then what the bomber commanders pitched as their best way to do invasion support, often involving targets in Germany.
See above for 'first priority date' via Kuter memo to Arnold Oct 29th 1943. The asset reduction for aircraft other than day fighters was focused on industry base for airframes, engines and repair facilities - as well as Oil/Chemical plants on May 12.SHAEF gained control of Bomber Command and the 8th Air Force on 27 March 1944, staying that way until 16 September. The 17 April SHAEF directive noted priorities of Luftwaffe, particularly fighters, and Luftwaffe facilities and rail communications, particularly in France. I presume this is where the USAAF first priority destruction of Luftwaffe comes from. The destruction of the Luftwaffe would need to include the bomber, night fighter, reconnaissance and ground attack arms as well as the day fighters and in fact the day fighter force largely grew in numeric terms in 1944 and average equipment performance. What it did suffer was a major drop in pilot quality in the first 5 to 6 months of 1944 and it kept going down.
You are correct, I used Bodie instead of John Andrade "US Military Aircraft Designation and Series". So, he result is that the data I used wa for the 3rd block of P-47D-RE (and also looked to -15-RE for which there were no losses) which began at 42-75615, ending at 42-76384 with 254 P-47D-16-RE imbedded in 2nd Block.Interesting given 42-76449 is listed as a D-20. 8th AF P-47D-15 losses to 10 April 1944 from the loss list I have
21 January 1944, 42-75658, MACR 1849, Sqn 61 Gp 56
22 February 1944, 42-75647, MACR, 2671, Sqn 351 Gp 353
22 February 1944, 42-75653, MACR, 2673, Sqn 351 Gp 353
22 February 1944, 42-75814, MACR, 2701, Sqn 376 Gp 361
4 March 1944, 42-75850, MACR, 2793, Sqn 351 Gp 353
6 March 1944, 42-75635, MACR, 2714, Sqn 377 Gp 362
8 March 1944, 42-75672, MACR, 2734, Sqn 379 Gp 362
8 March 1944, 42-75697, MACR, 2844, Sqn 62 Gp 56
27 March 1944, 42-76249, MACR, 3443, Sqn 63 Gp 56
Model designation Army Aircraft, 11th Edition, January 1945.
According to Bodie, the D-5-RE incorporated the wing structural improvements, and fixed external tank system for 165 gallon tanks to ferry to UK were jury rigged for several airframes. Curious regarding wing structural beef up for earlier blocks as they should be necessary for 500 # bomb or 108 gal combat tanks. Simply stated, the factory may have approved the pylon weight for earlier models given sufficient margins for max stress conditions on critical load paths.The D-4-RA has redesigned main and auxiliary fuel tanks, G-9 booster pumps for external tanks, bomb shackles for 75 to 150 gallon external belly tank, elimination of provisions for 200 gallon belly tank.
D-6-RE Same as P-47D-5-RE except as follows: Redesigned preheater and access door; frameless gunsight; carburettor air thermometer covered in Spec. AN-GG-I-552, Dwg, AN5790-6, in lieu of the Type F-8 thermometer.
Freeman states wing pylons for -15 but Depot mods were made to -5 and subsequent (IIRC Burtonwood) to introduce the Pylon and plumbing. External combat tanks were slaved from instrument vacuum system. I have not found records of wing rack/pylon mods for P-47C through D-2.D-5, 7, 10 and 11 no mention of wing racks.
D-15-RA combat wing tank, pressurised fuel system for external tanks.
D-15-RE same as D-10-RE except for a lightened canopy, jettisonable in flight.
D-16-RE same as D-15-RA except type A-13 turbo regulator instead of A-17.
Roger Freeman says wing racks on the D-15.
As he has stated repeatedly...
HE IS NOT TRYING TO MAKE A POINT!!!!!!!
Given what I have read about the 9th Air Force being continually short of fighters, including the need for 1 P-51 group to convert to P-47 for a while in late 1944, the shortage of fighters was present. Then comes the 9th AF units being used for long range escort meant those units had less ability to prepare for their main purpose, the support of the armies, something that showed up post D-Day. Not just doing strikes but training with the ground forces and learning the new army support doctrine coming from the Mediterranean.
The party had a Spitfire III commissioned and it got the final tuning and test flights at Fighter Rebuilders in Chino.