Still if the P-47 wasnt part of any planned interception, imagine how many P-47s you need to have floating over the English Channel to come across enough V1s to shoot 15 of them down Goering would be livid.
I said that P-47s were involved in anti V1 diver operations and you have just confirmed it,
Actually you were trying to imply the USAAF had so many surplus P-47 they could sent lots on V-1 patrols, now comes the attempt to change the claim.
I am well aware of the numbers.
If that was correct the claims would not be made, including the one about the 9th AF being short of aircraft in May 1945.
if you think training flights just happened in the corridors where V1s were being sent and squadrons just happened to see V1s and be at the correct altitude and speed to attack one, then I beg to differ. If you are flying towards France you are aborting your mission, if you are flying from France they are coming from behind.
Alternatively I can read the Diver book and note where the pilot's own words are used to describe what they were doing. Apart from encounters that resulted in shoot downs it is clear there was bending of the rules for things like training if only to see what the V-1 looked like. Is the idea the US fighter units withdrawing from France did not keep a look out behind? As an aside 9th AF P-47 flew 475,052 hours on operations, 134,029 hours on training, November 1943 to May 1945.
In any case it doesnt change the point I was making, that the USA even by May 1944 had a huge surplus of planes and pilots,
So now it is time to change the claim, go from fighters to planes and pilots. So essentially as of end April 1944 the US could have shut down pilot training and aircraft production, the 105,794 aircraft the USAAF Statistical Digest says were built May 1944 to August 1945 inclusive were totally unnecessary? Were the 42,964 USAAF crews that graduated May 1944 to August 1944, out of 80,744 trained since 1942 (15,424 fighter crews out of 36,795)? USAAF Statistical Digest, table 52. Or does huge surplus not cover the remainder of the war requirements, including replacements for tour expired personnel? After all 7,176 out of 10,297 P-47 and 1,789 out of 2,360 P-51 pilots graduated in May 1944 or later. The 9th AF had 1,769 fighter pilots killed, missing or wounded.
The USAAF had 9,459 heavy bombers end April 1944 and 8,839 losses May 1944 to end August 1945. Medium bombers 4,399 on hand, 4,288 losses
The reason I was comparing the 9th airforce to the whole of the L/W was because the 9th Airforce both before and after Operation Bodenplatte outnumbered the LW in every way.
Except in the records of the 9th AF and Luftwaffe quartermaster of course and by anyone else who can count. To come to the conclusion either the size of the 9th is doubled or more, or the size of the Luftwaffe is halved or more. Then comes the idea a force dedicated to tactical support of a growing army field force should have its capacity measured by how well it outnumbers the enemy air force, not how well it can fill air support requirements. Still given the 9th AF is reported to be outnumbering the Luftwaffe by itself, and the 8th AF easily outnumbered the 9th AF, by around 2 to 1 at times post June 1944, then throw in the RAF, those P-38s must have been fighting a well outnumbered enemy, And even if there were indeed more Luftwaffe fighters near some P-38 over Germany just count all those P-38 in the US, France and Britain and there is no shortage of P-38 over Germany.
The RAF Air Historical Branch used the captured Luftwaffe Quartermaster records to create Translation VII/107 Luftwaffe Strength and Serviceability Tables August 1938 to April 1945. Available not only in most good archives (AIR 20/7706 in UK) but given the report's circulation no doubt in other repositories, I have not checked if a copy is available on the web. The tables start off weekly but move to 3 times per month. These records are clearly where Alfred Price was drawing some data from. However Price seems to be only using strength in operational units, the tables are all units except training ones, so below is date, Price, AHB VII/107
31 May 1944 4,928 (719 transports), 6,967 (934 transports)
10 January 1945 4,566 (269 transports), 6,936 (488 transports)
9 April 1945, 3,331 (10 transports), (13 April) 5,072 (no transport, twin engined fighter or fighter bomber figures reported)
Any discussion of shortages in the 9th Airforce in the period December 1944 to January 1945 is utterly absurd. Same with shortages of tanks and ammunition, US and allied forces had huge numbers of both, not having them exactly where you want isnt a shortage it is a logistics problem and logistics has won many battles and wars.
So now a new time period 2 months, why exactly was that time period chosen?
Your appreciation is very Washington of you, in the disputes over supplies to the ETO Washington would at times include those in the US allocated to the ETO.
Interesting logic that if someone else has the item desired even a hemisphere away followed by a unilateral the declaration they obviously do not need it therefore there cannot be a shortage. Piled on top of this is we won therefore we had enough, ignoring the trade off between sending a machine or shell versus a person. Your boat might be leaking but you have no problem, plenty of pumps and plugs are available around the world.
Extracts from US Army supply histories.
On 15th of August 1944 there are no reserves of Shermans, tanks earmarked as replacements for units arriving later are issued.
End September 1944 First army was down to 85% of authorised tanks and so reorganised its tank units, 2nd and 3rd armoured gave up 32 Shermans, the other armoured divisions 18, tank battalions gave up 4 Shermans. Some 50 to 60% of the trucks in the Omaha beach port area are not working. Some of the provisional truck battalions raised to cope with the emergency are by now nicknamed Truck Destroyer Battalions.
By the end of November 1944 there are 3,344 tanks in theatre versus the authorised strength of 3,409 plus 937 in reserve. By now there are German PoWs in French coal mines and logging camps.
During December 1944 US forces in Italy will release 150 tanks for the forces in France and 21st Army group will transfer 351 Shermans to US forces. The
US cancels further shipments of Shermans to the British until the US tank situation in Europe is corrected, probably around April 1945, rather than attempt to transfer more of the British reserves, the Shermans from 21st Army Group are considered transferred, not loaned
So I suppose the US Army decided ex British meant they could plug into British roadside assistance? The Italian Shermans were the sports model?
During February 1945 the armies were back to full Sherman tank strength 5,255, plus 179 in reserve, there were another 940 in the "theatre pipelines", this was still 721 tanks short of authorised strength.
The theatre had upped ammunition requirements in January 1944, then in March and again in May. Washington agreed to try and meet the requirements but noted predicted shortages by D+30 in most major types with some of these shortages persisting to D+60. The problem was the US had cut ammunition production in 1943, even closing plants in the winter of 1943/44, in response to the accumulation of excess stocks in North Africa in early 1943, it would take time to wind the production system back up again. In January 1944 the watchwords were retrenchment and no over production. Ammunition plants were shut down or switched to things like fertiliser, synthetic rubber and avgas production. In March 1944 increases in 240 mm howitzer ammunition were authorised, in April this was extended to the 8 inch and 155mm gun and howitzers and the 4.5 inch gun. In May the War Department authorised expansions in medium artillery production, guns and ammunition and assigned the highest priority to additional ammunition manufacturing capability, but this would for the most part take until 1945 to increase production. Heavy artillery ammunition production was to be doubled in 7 months and tripled in 13 months. In June and July substantial increases in bomb production were added to the expansion plan, later including Tallboy and Grand Slam bombs. Plants that had been shut down a few months or even weeks before had to be reopened. Positions in plants were opened to women for the first time to overcome the labour shortages. The heavy artillery expansion program required new facilities costing around $203,000,000.
Ammunition variation was a problem that needed careful attention. Mass produced ammunition at multiple plants often has different ballistic qualities within but especially between batches, "lots". It is best to keep the lots together. The greater the uncertainty over relative performance the greater the safety margins needed, and the harder it was to pre register artillery. It took until the third quarter of 1944 to largely eliminate lots being split up by the transport system.
Almost no heavy artillery ammunition was shipped to Europe between October 1943 and June 1944, despite the theatre being around 20% below authorised levels in May. Light and Medium artillery ammunition shipments had also been effectively stopped between January and May 1944, despite the theatre having 75% or authorised levels in May.
On 21st September 1944 First army replies to a request on ammunition consumption by pointing out it has never been supplied at the authorised rate and so the army is not able to determine whether the rate is adequate.
22nd November 1944 Eisenhower transmits Bradley's response to the ammunition situation word for word to Marshall. The 12th Army group could attack until 15th December exhausting most reserves, the lack of 105 and 155mm howitzer ammunition would force static operations assuming no enemy attacks.
During November 21st Army group releases 100 25 pounders and 60 days ammunition supply to 12th Army group, they are divided up amongst the three US armies. The loan is renewed for another 60 days in January. This comes at a time when British consumption of 25 pounder ammunition exceeds supply by around 1.5 million rounds per month.
The US army decided the 25 pounder was superior?
Also the US forces in Europe are using in 10 days the ammunition expected to last 35 days, and more mortar shells in a day than used in a month in North Africa.
The significant lack of 8 inch ammunition means less than half the guns in theatre are used in action in 1945.
17 August 1944, to give an idea of the shipping situation a ship, presumably loaded with medical supplies arrives in Europe on this day, it finally begins unloading on 10th December.
During November 1944 the supply system deliberately creates, or rather, deliberately does not fix a cigarette shortage. Authorised US army stocks of winter clothing in the UK go to zero, units in the UK are directed to return overcoats and arctics so they can be sent to the front line troops.
On 27th November supply stocks of cigarettes are down to 3 days with the armies and none in the rear areas. There is the anticipated reaction, with visiting congress members becoming involved. The supply people promise to send more cigarettes as soon as the winter clothing is shipped to the units. Apparently as an extreme example one ship containing 1,200,000 blankets had been docked 7 times at Le Havre without being unloaded. Winter clothing is airlifted from the ports to the armies, bypassing the intermediate depots. With winter gear in short supply the US buys 300,000 blankets from Spain originally made for the German army. Portugal sells large numbers of blankets, towels and so on to the US. "front line troops fought through a large part of the winter inadequately clothed".
During February 1945 a proposal to raise 25 gasoline supply companies using German PoWs with US officers is approved. By the end of April there were 260,000 German PoWs used as labourers on the continent.
During March 1945 US Army men in sedentary jobs will be ordered to take 10% cut in rations because of the food situation. Articles appear in the French press about the food situation including a claim the allies are taking the food. The actual balance is 280,000 tons in aid versus purchase of 70,000 tons.
At Liege is the company Fabrique Nationale des Armes de Guerre, which holds the Browning patents, enabling it to manufacture much US army equipment. Also at Liege is Englebert and Company, for tyre manufacture, recap and repair, initially aided by 50 tons of Buna (synthetic rubber) and 2 tons of natural rubber captured at Malmedy. Belgian industry will supply around 1,000 different types of items before the war is over. This includes 200 complete 60 mm mortars and modifications to 60 and 81 mm mortars.
French industry will also be used. Early September First army Ordnance section negotiates a contract with Gnome-Rhone to overhaul tank engines, starting with 200 unserviceable engines brought to France, due to a lack of overhaul capacity in England. After a test batch the company does all 200 engines by late September, and provides 1st Army with its only replacement engines in 4 months of campaigning. This supply is very welcome given over 200 engines had already been sent to England for rebuilding and another 170 awaited the journey. Third Army follows the precedent and also sends tank engines to Gnome-Rhone. A lack of spare parts prevents a full overhaul of most engines leading to a high failure rate until parts can be provided for full overhauls.
November 1944, In the 5 months since D-day 1st Army has received 562 truck engines, including 400 it had given back to COMZ in July, versus the planned 4,000 engines. Engines are so precious they are sent back under armed guard at times, the one to be reconditioned not released until a good engine is presented.