Hurricane vs.Bf-110

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According to 'the history of Aircraft Lubricants' which can be found on google quite easily, page 12 states that Fighter Command converted to 100 octane as standard on all Spitfires and Hurricanes in March 1940. This matches with the editorial of Flight magazine from March 28th 1940 which is entitled 'hundred octane'.

I'm not sure why not all Spits and Hurri's in the Command are thought to have the fuel by some? The only instance I have read of 'lesser' fual being used is in another 1940 article that talks of the Blenheim using 100 octane for take off and switching to 87 for the rest of the flight (not sure about that myself) but as far as the Spit and Hurri go it seems to be 100 octane all the way.

Also, is it too much of a stretch to read 'all applicable squadrons' as meaning 'all Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in Fighter Command'?

Good stuff Waynos.

Excerpted from Flight, March 28, 1940:

Flight_March28_1940pg293.jpg


Flight-March28_40_pg295.jpg


1940-0897.jpg


Full pdf of the article for the reading pleasure of the board membership:
Fighter Station with the Spitfires in Scotland

Anyone care to venture a guess as to the squadron? I'm thinking either 602 or 603, both based at Drem.

Excerpt from: W.G. Dudek and D. R. Winans, AIAA Paper No. 69-779, Milestones in Aviation Fuels, Esso Research and Engineering Company, New York 1969.

Page_16_from_AIAA-42363-319.jpg
 
It seems both Glider and Juha are infinitively capable of arguing the facts but not capable of bringing facts to their arguements. Until they do, there is no reason to waste any more time on this.

Now, all the decisions are appearantly there in AVIA 10/282, publicly available at the National Archives in Kew.

Facts are what we are after Kurfurst, and facts are the one thing you have not brought into the debate.

My earlier post listed a number of questions that have been raised a number of times and never replied to, not one.
You make statements and refuse to support them. The fact that you have not replied to any of them says it all, which is a shame, as I thought that you were better than that.

I will look up AVIA 10/282 when I am next in Kew but it isn't something that I can do at the drop of a hat.
 
Facts are what we are after Kurfurst, and facts are the one thing you have not brought into the debate.

I wonder what you were arguing about the last 7 pages then I wonder...?

My earlier post listed a number of questions that have been raised a number of times and never replied to, not one.

Your questions were largely irrevelant to the discussion and were basically refusing to accept the facts stated by Gavin Bailey about Blenheim squadrons etc. They were not material to the question, and ask Bailey anyway.

You make statements and refuse to support them. The fact that you have not replied to any of them says it all, which is a shame, as I thought that you were better than that.

Again, I wonder, was it another Glider who were arguing those facts that hasn't posted in the last 7 pages...?

I have already supported my statements with the summary of referenced archive materials. You on the other hand were unable to provide any sort of primary reference material that would clearly and without doubt would say: 'All Fighter Command Squadrons and Stations use and are supplied with 100 octane fuel'.

Until then, ponder on this:

"The first bulk shipment of 100 octane fuel had arrived in Britain in June 1939 from the Esso refinery in Aruba. This and subsequent tanker shipments from Aruba, Curacao and the USA were stockpiled while the RAF continued to operate on 87 octane petrol. Having secured what were considered reasonably sufficient quantities of 100 octane, Fighter Command began converting its engines to this standard in March 1940, allowing boost (manifold) pressures to be raised without the risk of detonation in the cylinders. This initial increase in maximum boost from 6 lb to 9 lb delivered a useful power growth of around 130hp at the rated altitude.

By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.

The first Middle East shipment of 100 octane fuel arrived in Portsmouth on 12th August, with a further two deliveries in September and four in October. Although too late to allow widespread conversion for the use of the fuel the deliveries did ensure that from this point on Britain would not be lacking in 100 octane fuel levels. With the newfound supply RAF Fighter Command again embarked upon a Merlin II and III conversion to 100 octane use from late September, finally achieving 100% conversion of it's fighter force by the end of November in 1940.


Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. /
Australian War Memorial Archives.

I will look up AVIA 10/282 when I am next in Kew but it isn't something that I can do at the drop of a hat.

Well, that would be very constructive to the discussion! Let us know what you find there, but I am fairly certain you will find the same as in the paper of AWMA.
Until then, I really see no point to run the same circles over and over again. Hopefully, you will also find answer to the question of which and where those 16+2 Squadrons were, and what precisly happened in March-May 1940.
 
Not taking any sides here, but I found this (apologies if it's already posted):
BATTLE OF BRITAIN
The Royal Airforce had used 87 octane fuel until March 1940 when fighter command converted all it's Spitfire and Hurricane Rolls-Royce Merlin powered fighters to 100 octane (i.e., grade 100/130)
From: History of Aircraft Lubricants - Google Book Search

In fact, it was only a few months before the Battle of Britain
that all fighters were changed over from 87- to 100-octane
fuel,.
From the pdf below.
 

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Intresting read Marcel, from what they are saying is that they all did have 100 octane fuel at the battle of britain. I like this part in the article.


Nevertheless, let us not forget that between the fuel and the
airscrew there are also many other links in the chain, any one
of which, had it failed, could have vitally affected the issue,
while all the technical superiority in the world would, of course,
have been of no avail at all without the efficient training, skill,
and courage in combat of the Battle of Britain pilots.
 
Your questions were largely irrevelant to the discussion and were basically refusing to accept the facts stated by Gavin Bailey about Blenheim squadrons etc. They were not material to the question, and ask Bailey anyway..
These are the same facts you based your whole position on and hey presto, when they are questioned, they become irrevelant. An interesting approach it has to be admitted.
 
Waynos: According to 'the history of Aircraft Lubricants' which can be found on google quite easily, page 12 states that Fighter Command converted to 100 octane as standard on all Spitfires and Hurricanes in March 1940.

Not taking any sides here, but I found this (apologies if it's already posted):

From: History of Aircraft Lubricants - Google Book Search

BATTLE OF BRITAIN
The Royal Airforce had used 87 octane fuel until March 1940 when fighter command converted all it's Spitfire and Hurricane Rolls-Royce Merlin powered fighters to 100 octane (i.e., grade 100/130)

In fact, it was only a few months before the Battle of Britain that all fighters were changed over from 87- to 100-octane fuel,. From the pdf below.


Nice!

aircraft-lubricants-pg12.jpg


flight-january6-44.jpg
 
Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War. /
Australian War Memorial Archives.

I have tried to find this paper but it seems hard to find. Other people have followed the information that you gave and the following is a reply one of them had from the AWMA.

Thank you for your inquiry. Yes this appears to be a mysterious item! The reference should have included a series and item number if the report came from our official records. I cannot find any publication in our books database with this title. Wikipedia should be contacted to request the writer provide a more precise reference.

As I know that you are the writer in question can I ask you to supply the detail so we can check up on what you are claiming, or better still the paper in question?
 
These are the same facts you based your whole position on and hey presto, when they are questioned, they become irrevelant. An interesting approach it has to be admitted.

Lately I have this feeling that your responses are being increasingly detached from the realities of discussion, probably a result of desperation as the evidence becomes clearer. You don't seem to be able to decide wheter you should completely deny and dismiss the primary source material presented, simply doctor and manipulate their meaning, or develop a sudden amnesia about the whole discussion and the documents presented and ultimately resort to strawmen arguments, as in your last post.

Feel free to 'question' primary sources which contain the actual decisions taken in 1939 and 1940 by the British Goverment, while having to offer no alternative that would support your view. Doubt is a very good thing, unless its just irrational partisanship that fanatically sticks to a preconceived dogma. The dogma, which in this case appears to be the religious conviction that each and every Spitfire and Hurricane had been fuel with 100 octane fuel, no matter what, and as a dogma, it doesn't need proof or evidence, becoming a fact in the same moment it has been declared.

The historical evidence, on the other hand, has been gathered from reliable primary sources, and it is that Britain decided in March 1939 to convert 16 single engined and 2 Blenheim Squadrons to 100 octane fuel use. In March 1940 they begun to converting aircraft to be able to take advantage of 100 octane fuel. In May 1940 it become clear that stocks are inadequate, and 87 octane fuel was designated as the primary fuel, while the Squadrons already converted would be allowed to use 100 octane. Circumstantial evidence from AVIA 10/282 also support these facts. With the supply situation easing in August and September 1940, they could continue with the conversion, which achieved 100% conversion by the end of November 1940.

Feel free to have your doubts of course, but I must say I find them irrational, and so far they are unsupported. You have not been able to refute the record of the events detailed in Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War and the additional information about the 16+2 Sqadrons provided by Gavin Bailey, University of Dundee, in his work 'The Narrow Margin of Criticality: The Question of the Supply of 100-Octane Fuel in the Battle of Britain'.

As noted before, until you are not able to refute or question the documented facts with documented facts of similar weight, there's no point in repeating the same hollow chatter and partisan arguments advancing what would seem to be irrational beliefs and dogmatic denial, and generally speaking, a waste of time.
 
As I know that you are the writer in question can I ask you to supply the detail so we can check up on what you are claiming, or better still the paper in question?

Glider,

The source was already given in this thread. It also made clear where it comes from (not me). I do have to wonder why you are asking things you already know.

But then of course you can always get AVIA 10/282 or just ask ponsford to give you a copy.
 
I don't know the link. I do know that you were the original writer and I do know that the AWMA found the detail to be insufficient to find it. I have tried various searches on the AWMA and not found it.

So can I have the link to enable me to check this source.
 
Well, this has been discussed a couple of years ago in 2004 on butch's board, and the material was researched by an Australian member of that board, not me.

You can find the discussion here: Board Message

As a matter of fact, both Mike Williams and Neil Stirling are aware of it for years. ;)
 
Well the overwhelmlng amount of evidencence supports the widespread use of 100 oct fuel in Fighter command during the BoB. The March 1939 document must be regarded as irrelevant due to the outbreak of the war. At best it is a prewar plan for the introduction of said fuel.

One key piece of evidence supporting widespread use, would have to be Dowdings memo of Aug 1st 1940, where he complains of the over use of 12lbs boost by Spitfires , Hurricanes and Defiants. This memo was sent to 10,11,12 ,13 and 14 fighter groups.

I've got another book, Battle of Britain Illustrated, written by two extremely over qualified American writers, Robert Lightsey and Paul Jacobs[ the book is very nicely illustrated by Jacob's drawings] On page 131-132 they explain how Shell could not make enough 100 oct fuel for the RAF so the RAF turned to Esso for their supply, quote:

"initially there were some problems clearing Esso to sell 100 oct fuel to Britain
because of the American Neutrality Act,but Roosevelt worked an arrangement that allowed the sale to proceed in time for its use in the Battle of Britain"

Slaterat
 
Some people have the tendency not to stay polite during these kind of discussions. That's what makes it annoying, I think.
It's the argument about what a dead british commander really meant in a memo about high octane gas that kills me. Barring new evidence, we just don't know.
 

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