KrazyKraut
Banned
- 337
- Apr 21, 2008
Utilizing the fuel requires substantial logistical effort and modifications on the aircraft.
Duh.
Duh.
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Exactly, he is saying that the operational stations that he wishes. or wants, or expects in the first instance to be equiped with the fuel are.
You have to remember that there is a difference between asking for something to be done, and it being able to be done. He knows that he is asking a lot but doesn't know if the person he is asking can do it.
You know that at the next meeting they passed on the offical thanks of the Air Ministry as to how well this task was undertaken.
'Next meeting'? We have a memo from a Group Captain to the HQ of Fighter Command and a summary of a meeting of the Oil Committee in May 1940.
The two are totally unrelated, apart from their subject.
You also know that at later meetings permission was given for the fuel to be issued to other commands.
Yes, in August, but we all know and in fact agreed on that for almost certain it was not realized.
And according to everythng that I have read 'all units' is all Hurricane and Spitfire Units.
Because you appearantly only read the rather 'liberal' interpretation of a paper by Mikey Williams, who writes:
The Co-ordination of Oil Policy Committee noted in the conclusions of their 18 May 1940 meeting with regard to the "Supply of 100 Octane fuel to Blenheim and Fighter Squadrons" that Spitfire and Hurricane units "had now been stocked with the necessary 100 octane fuel". 35
The original text says something different. Note that the text was altered, it doesn't say "that Spitfire and Hurricane units" (ie. implying that all of them), but that
http://www.spitfireperformance.com/18may40-100octane.jpg
This is the summary of the 7th meeting of the Oil committee.
'The Committee took note of the fact that the position with regard the use of the fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire engines had been made clear to Fighter command, and satisfaction was expressed that the units concerned had now been stocked with the neccesarry 100 octane fuel'
Note the difference between the two texts. I do wonder what position 'was made clear' to Fighter Command on the 6th Meeting.
Our Australian source's summary of 'Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.' in the Australian Archieves, again:
'By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.
Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.
I am pretty sure this is what has been detailed in the 6th Meeting of the Oil Committee, but for obvious reasons, it is not shown on the Mike Williams site.
The solution is pretty easy, AVIA 10/282 is publicly available at the National Archives in Kew, it contains all the meetings on the 100 octane subject. Only a copy is needed, and that can be obtained for free with a digicam everybody has nowadays. Or, a copy can be ordered from the NA itself.
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Think it through, why would they give it to a Blenhiem Unit and not a Spitfire Unit when all a Blenhiem Unit is, is basically target practice for the Luftwaffe?
Because the Blenheim was a fighter, well at least it was designated as such. Anyway, I don't know the why, I know it was just decided that way (also the May summary of the 7th meeting notes 'bombers and fighters'). The Blenheim certainly could use a boost.
We have
(i) the actual stocks of Fuel,
Yep.
(ii) The order authorising it to be issued to all Hurricane and Spitfire Units
(iii) the paper containing the list of stations to be so equipped in the first instance
Can I see these papers of 'authorization'? All I have seen so far is a letter from RAF *Group Captain* King (hardly in the position to authorize anything or make the calls) who asks for information as to when and where 100 octane was supplied, and notes it would be very nice if it could be supplied to active fighter stations.
(iv) the paper passing on the thanks of the Air Ministry for the way this was carried out
Nope, its actually a summary of the 7th Oil Committee meeting which expressed satisfaction that the *'units concerned'* (ie. making it rather obvious that it was not *all* units) were stocked with 100 octane fuel, and notes that on the previous meeting the Committee's position with regard the use of the fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire engines 'had been made clear to Fighter command'.
Whatever that position was can be understood if we would have a copy of the 6th Meeting summary itself, but it looks awfully like that this position was to limit 100 octane use to the units already converted, while all others (75% of FC) would keep using 87 octane.
(v) the paper authorising the fuel to be released to all other commands./QUOTE]
Yes, in August, along with an Appendix that shows they expect ~90 000 tons of fuel being required for it in the 3rd and 4th Quarter for that goal, and from other sources we know this did not materialized, with only 22 000 tons being issued in the 3rd quarter, at the height of operations, practically the same as in the 2nd quarter, which saw much less operations. This is much less than the 90 000 in the August plan.
(vi) The Pilots reports on the use of the extra boost from a number of squadrons including its use in France.
This definiately proves the use of 100 octane fuel for those Squadrons/Stations in the given timeframe.
The only problem being that this only concerns about a half a dozen or so Stations out of the 50+ that were used during the Battle. And your claim is that *all* of these 50+ stations were having 100 octane fuel...
You have Gavin Bailey. As I said if you could point me to a copy of this source I would appreciate it so I can study it.
See previous posts.
I do find a lot of things odd with Wood and Dempster. They categorically state for example that there were 4 gunned Spitfire MkIs, while the eight gunned ones were designated 'MkIA',
ponsford nobody tell that the 100 octane was not in use in Bob, and also before, kurfust and i agree with him that was not in use for all fighter squadrons
Hello Juha,And why for ex Price and RRHT claimed that FC changed to 100 oct if only 1/4 of it changed as Kurfürst claims? Why Wood Dempster have no interest on the fuel situation of 3/4 of FC as would has the case if KF's claim is true? I have not seen any proof of KF's claim yet. A plan made ½ year before the beginning of war doesn't proof anything on situation 1 1/3 year later. I doubt that US MC had many plans for Guadalcanal landing in May 41, but that doesn't proof that Guadalcanal landing was only American fiction, fantacy or whatever terms KF has used on 100 oct conversion.
Juha
The evidence trail is very clear
12 December 1939
Permission is given to use 100 Octane in Hurricane Spitfires and Defiants.
18th May 1940
The Committee took note that the use of 100 Octane had been made clear to Fighter Command re the use in Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft
and that the Units involved had been so equipped.
Again the meaning is clear, in December they had been given permission to use the 100 Octane and deliveries would start,
7th August as previously stated permission that it could be used in all operational aircraft and the Commands were so authorised, i.e. not just the Fighters.
Nowhere on any of these notes does it refer to certain squadrons, units or areas.
Your main evidence is Gavin Bailey quote
RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939
No doubt in March 1939 well before war broke out it would have taken until September 1940 to build up war stocks at a peace time rate of import. But as has been mentioned, war changes things.
No doubt in March 1939 the UK didn't have many plans to purchase all the equipment from the USA, that they did. However that doesn't mean that they were not purchased or delivered, clearly they were.
I read only the pages posted here and while they make it clear that 100 octane fuel was available in time for the battle of Britain (and before), they also leave certain room for speculation as to how widespread that fuel was used by fighters. So either the underlying primary sources were not that completely conclusive (or at least left a certain possibility that there were still fighters running on 87 octane fuel) or the authors simply forgot to mention that. I personally would assume the former. Most likely the authors would agree with you, that, to the best of their knowledge, all fighters were converted. But I find it unlikely that, if they had ultimate proof, they would not have said so explicitly in their articles. But that is speculation on my part.Hello KrazyKraut
I happened to have university degree on history and can say that the burden of proof is clearly on KF because acknowledged authors like Richards and Price in their books give info that FC front line sqns changed from 87 oct to 100oct in the spring of 1940 and Wood and Dempster gave only info how much 100 oct was issued and how the stock situation of it developed and didn't say a word on 87 oct. I don't say that it is certain all those specialists got it right but probably they got it right. To proof otherwise one needs to produce some concrete proofs, more concrete than that someone in some discussion board had wrote something.