Hurricane vs.Bf-110

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Utilizing the fuel requires substantial logistical effort and modifications on the aircraft.

Duh.
 
From my perspective, it would help to end the debate if not only the amount of 100 oct. fuel would be considered (to which a lengthy discussion has evolved) but in addition to this the quantity of 87 oct. grade fuel would have been included. Was there really no 87 grade fuel beeing issued to the fighter command in between august and oct. 1940?
If that question can be answered negative we might find solid grounds that 100 oct. fuel was used exclusively.
 
Exactly, he is saying that the operational stations that he wishes. or wants, or expects in the first instance to be equiped with the fuel are.
You have to remember that there is a difference between asking for something to be done, and it being able to be done. He knows that he is asking a lot but doesn't know if the person he is asking can do it.

You know that at the next meeting they passed on the offical thanks of the Air Ministry as to how well this task was undertaken.

'Next meeting'? We have a memo from a Group Captain to the HQ of Fighter Command and a summary of a meeting of the Oil Committee in May 1940.

The two are totally unrelated, apart from their subject.

You also know that at later meetings permission was given for the fuel to be issued to other commands.

Yes, in August, but we all know and in fact agreed on that for almost certain it was not realized.

And according to everythng that I have read 'all units' is all Hurricane and Spitfire Units.

Because you appearantly only read the rather 'liberal' interpretation of a paper by Mikey Williams, who writes:

The Co-ordination of Oil Policy Committee noted in the conclusions of their 18 May 1940 meeting with regard to the "Supply of 100 Octane fuel to Blenheim and Fighter Squadrons" that Spitfire and Hurricane units "had now been stocked with the necessary 100 octane fuel". 35

The original text says something different. Note that the text was altered, it doesn't say "that Spitfire and Hurricane units" (ie. implying that all of them), but that

http://www.spitfireperformance.com/18may40-100octane.jpg

This is the summary of the 7th meeting of the Oil committee.

'The Committee took note of the fact that the position with regard the use of the fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire engines had been made clear to Fighter command, and satisfaction was expressed that the units concerned had now been stocked with the neccesarry 100 octane fuel'

Note the difference between the two texts. I do wonder what position 'was made clear' to Fighter Command on the 6th Meeting.

Our Australian source's summary of 'Fuel Supplies to The British Empire And It's Commonwealth; Outlook, Ramifications and Projections For The Prosecution Of The War.' in the Australian Archieves, again:

'By the time of the invasion of the Low Countries by Germany in May 1940 the RAF had converted approximately 25 % of it's total fighter force to 100 octane fuel use. The subsequent escalation in air activity and demands placed upon Fighter Command over the next two months put great strain on both the 100 octane fuel stockpiles and aircraft modified to use the fuel. Against the backdrop of total war the RAF found that it's reserves of 100 octane fuel was well below the level considered necessary for widespread use, for any sustained length of time.

Two actions were immediately undertaken by the British War Cabinet in May to resolve the looming crisis. Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply). The second action was for the British Government to contract the Shell Oil Refining Company to assist the British-controlled Iraqi Petroleum Company at Kirkuk to produce 100 octane fuel. This arrangement proved quite successful as production was quickly converted to 100 octane fuel.


I am pretty sure this is what has been detailed in the 6th Meeting of the Oil Committee, but for obvious reasons, it is not shown on the Mike Williams site.

The solution is pretty easy, AVIA 10/282 is publicly available at the National Archives in Kew, it contains all the meetings on the 100 octane subject. Only a copy is needed, and that can be obtained for free with a digicam everybody has nowadays. Or, a copy can be ordered from the NA itself.

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Think it through, why would they give it to a Blenhiem Unit and not a Spitfire Unit when all a Blenhiem Unit is, is basically target practice for the Luftwaffe?

Because the Blenheim was a fighter, well at least it was designated as such. Anyway, I don't know the why, I know it was just decided that way (also the May summary of the 7th meeting notes 'bombers and fighters'). The Blenheim certainly could use a boost.

We have
(i) the actual stocks of Fuel,

Yep.

(ii) The order authorising it to be issued to all Hurricane and Spitfire Units
(iii) the paper containing the list of stations to be so equipped in the first instance

Can I see these papers of 'authorization'? All I have seen so far is a letter from RAF *Group Captain* King (hardly in the position to authorize anything or make the calls) who asks for information as to when and where 100 octane was supplied, and notes it would be very nice if it could be supplied to active fighter stations.

(iv) the paper passing on the thanks of the Air Ministry for the way this was carried out

Nope, its actually a summary of the 7th Oil Committee meeting which expressed satisfaction that the *'units concerned'* (ie. making it rather obvious that it was not *all* units) were stocked with 100 octane fuel, and notes that on the previous meeting the Committee's position with regard the use of the fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire engines 'had been made clear to Fighter command'.

Whatever that position was can be understood if we would have a copy of the 6th Meeting summary itself, but it looks awfully like that this position was to limit 100 octane use to the units already converted, while all others (75% of FC) would keep using 87 octane.

(v) the paper authorising the fuel to be released to all other commands./QUOTE]

Yes, in August, along with an Appendix that shows they expect ~90 000 tons of fuel being required for it in the 3rd and 4th Quarter for that goal, and from other sources we know this did not materialized, with only 22 000 tons being issued in the 3rd quarter, at the height of operations, practically the same as in the 2nd quarter, which saw much less operations. This is much less than the 90 000 in the August plan.

(vi) The Pilots reports on the use of the extra boost from a number of squadrons including its use in France.

This definiately proves the use of 100 octane fuel for those Squadrons/Stations in the given timeframe.

The only problem being that this only concerns about a half a dozen or so Stations out of the 50+ that were used during the Battle. And your claim is that *all* of these 50+ stations were having 100 octane fuel...

You have Gavin Bailey. As I said if you could point me to a copy of this source I would appreciate it so I can study it.

See previous posts.
 
Kurfürst
You don't find it odd that Wood and Dempster, writing on BoB mentioned only 100 oct and its amount and how much of it was issued but didn't mentioned at all 87 oct, which according to you, was the fuel used by 75% of FC's sqns? Only indirect mentionof 87 oct came a couple line later "With other grades of aviation spirit total stock available on Oct 10th, 1940 was 666,000 tons." A bit odd, isn't it. No mentions on 87 oct, how much of it was issued, how much of it was in stock. And the grade in question was the one which 75 % of FC fighters used, according to you, and I must admit that only to you in my knowledge.

Juha
 
I do find a lot of things odd with Wood and Dempster. They categorically state for example that there were 4 gunned Spitfire MkIs, while the eight gunned ones were designated 'MkIA', or that the Bf 109E had an engine cannon, and of course the Bf 109F did not participate in the Battle (dissing a contemporary German intel report mentioning the type!).

As far as why mentioning 100 octane fuel only, I guess they worked from the same AVIA 10/282 which appears to be about 100 octane fuel only.

I leave it to you to speculate on other possibilities.
 
Hi Juha: There are scans to be found online from various authors that are in agreement with conventional wisdom, the majority viewpoint and with what you've read:

Wood Dempster
wood-dempster-pg87.jpg


Rolls Royce Heritage Trust
rolls-royce-100oct.jpg


David Ross
603-ross-pg125.jpg


Alfred Price
price-pg74.jpg
 
ponsford nobody tell that the 100 octane was not in use in Bob, and also before, kurfust and i agree with him that was not in use for all fighter squadrons
 
According to 'the history of Aircraft Lubricants' which can be found on google quite easily, page 12 states that Fighter Command converted to 100 octane as standard on all Spitfires and Hurricanes in March 1940. This matches with the editorial of Flight magazine from March 28th 1940 which is entitled 'hundred octane'.

I'm not sure why not all Spits and Hurri's in the Command are thought to have the fuel by some? The only instance I have read of 'lesser' fual being used is in another 1940 article that talks of the Blenheim using 100 octane for take off and switching to 87 for the rest of the flight (not sure about that myself) but as far as the Spit and Hurri go it seems to be 100 octane all the way.

Also, is it too much of a stretch to read 'all applicable squadrons' as meaning 'all Spitfire and Hurricane squadrons in Fighter Command'?
 
I do find a lot of things odd with Wood and Dempster. They categorically state for example that there were 4 gunned Spitfire MkIs, while the eight gunned ones were designated 'MkIA',

I don't want to disappoint you, Kurfurst but the Original Spitfire design did only have 4 x 303 mg and that is one of the differences between the Mk1 and the Mk1A.
There were a number of other differences probably the most surprising of which was that the Mk1 was designed with a larger fuel tank.

No Mk 1 Spitfires were built. The four gun design was in the mock up and rejected by the RAF as they wanted 8 x LMG's. Changes were made and the production versions were the Mk1A with 8 x LMG and the smaller fuel tank.
 
Thanks Ponsford
we seems to have lot of same books.
Narrow Margin but clearly a different edition
RRHT book I don't have
Ross's excellent "The Greatest Squandron of Them All" Vol I the page is 125.

Vincenzo
maybe Gladiators and Blenheims didn't use it but I doubt at least the Blenheim case, bacause Blenheim IV's Mercuries could be modified to 100 oct.
And what first line fighter sqns didn't use 100 oct during the BoB? And why for ex Price and RRHT claimed that FC changed to 100 oct if only 1/4 of it changed as Kurfürst claims? Why Wood Dempster have no interest on the fuel situation of 3/4 of FC as would has the case if KF's claim is true? I have not seen any proof of KF's claim yet. A plan made ½ year before the beginning of war doesn't proof anything on situation 1 1/3 year later. I doubt that US MC had many plans for Guadalcanal landing in May 41, but that doesn't proof that Guadalcanal landing was only American fiction, fantacy or whatever terms KF has used on 100 oct conversion.

Juha
 
ponsford nobody tell that the 100 octane was not in use in Bob, and also before, kurfust and i agree with him that was not in use for all fighter squadrons

That's fine Vincenzo, you're perfectly entitled to hold and share your opinion, however, we will remain in disagreement as I find your position singularly unconvincing and it's apparent you are likely too invested in your view to change it no matter the evidence. That said, I promise not to ridicule, smear, slander you or subject you to verbal abuse and character assassination because our views differ. We will simply have to agree to disagree on this subject.
 
And why for ex Price and RRHT claimed that FC changed to 100 oct if only 1/4 of it changed as Kurfürst claims? Why Wood Dempster have no interest on the fuel situation of 3/4 of FC as would has the case if KF's claim is true? I have not seen any proof of KF's claim yet. A plan made ½ year before the beginning of war doesn't proof anything on situation 1 1/3 year later. I doubt that US MC had many plans for Guadalcanal landing in May 41, but that doesn't proof that Guadalcanal landing was only American fiction, fantacy or whatever terms KF has used on 100 oct conversion.

Juha
Hello Juha,

I don't really want to join this lengthy debate as clearly others involved here are more knowledgable (though biased) on this subject. But surely you would agree with me that scientifically, the burden of proof is the one who wants to prove his theory not on the one who challenges it. If Wood Dempster disagree they surely list their primary source which should be available somewhere. I still have books claiming that Thundebolts regularly took out Tiger tanks by shooting .50 calibre bullets at roads which then deflected and penetrated the soft belly of the tank.
 
Kurfurst
Lets look at your argument

The paper you refer to was some months before the BOB in which case things change.

18 Squadrons you keep saying this but when asked Which Squadrons? - I believe you don't know
Where are they based? _ I believe you don't know
What happens when they change base? - I believe that you don't know
Do they take the fuel with them? - I believe you don't know
Why supply 2 x Blenhiem Squadrons at the expense of Spitfire Squadrons? - You don't know
Why leave many thousands of tons of fuel unused? - You don't know.
You say that the authorised conversions didn't happen - Yet you don't have any evidence.


The evidence trail is very clear
12 December 1939
Permission is given to use 100 Octane in Hurricane Spitfires and Defiants. Note that it specifically mentions that Supplies in Bulk should be available before it is issued to the relevant stations.
There you are, the phrase you love to misquote Relevant Stations. What you always leave out of your quote is the specific mention of 'Non Operational Stations'. The meaning is clear, Relevant Stations are those with Spitfire Hurricane and Defiant aircraft. Non Operational Stations will not be stocked with 100 Octane until later.

18th May 1940
The Committee took note that the use of 100 Octane had been made clear to Fighter Command re the use in Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft and that the Units involved had been so equipped. Again the meaning is clear, in December they had been given permission to use the 100 Octane and deliveries would start, in May 1940 this had been made available.
The Board even passed on that the Air Ministry had been impressed with how well this had been undertaken.

7th August as previously stated permission that it could be used in all operational aircraft and the Commands were so authorised, i.e. not just the Fighters.

Nowhere on any of these notes does it refer to certain squadrons, units or areas.

To this can be added quotes from :-
Wood and Dempster
Rolls Royce Heritage Trust
David Ross
Alfred Price
The History of Aircraft Lubricants

This is your favourite quote
What is known that 16 (out of 50-60) RAF fighter Squadrons and two Blenheim Squadrons used 100 octane fuel in the Battle, a wider use was proposed in August but as evidenced by the unchanging level of actual fuel consumption, none of that was realized, and remained just that, a plan.
All we are asking you to do is support it, if its known then you shold be able to find something, or it isn't known, its unknown. Can you find any reference anywhere that shows that Hurricane and Spitfire Pilots didn't have 100 Octane fuel in the BOB. You state that only a quarter of the RAF Fighter squadrons had 100 Octane so you should be able to find sme reference somewhere.

Your main evidence is Gavin Bailey quote
RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939

No doubt in March 1939 well before war broke out it would have taken until September 1940 to build up war stocks at a peace time rate of import. But as has been mentioned, war changes things.
No doubt in March 1939 the UK didn't have many plans to purchase all the equipment from the USA, that they did. However that doesn't mean that they were not purchased or delivered, clearly they were as were the fuel stocks which clearly outstripped demand.
 
There does not seem to be a disagreement between authors. Though vaguely referred to, they all agree that the introduction of 100 octane fuel actually occurred at around March 1940.

None of them state however that 87 octane was removed from issue, or that 100 octane was the only fuel used and issued. Juha is simply 'interpreting' those vaguely constructed sentences in his own curious manner.

Luckily we have also primary material which gives more detail on the matter, stating that 16 + 2 Squadrons were in the RAF's plans, and that the supplies were seen inadequate in May and conversions were stopped, and 87 octane was designated to the primary fuel.

We also know they used 18k tons in the Q2 of 1940 (when the RAF FC had around 30 Sqns as Hop tells us), and ca 22k in Q3 1940, when they had about twice the amount of fighters around than in Q2, and flying much more sorties. We also know that in 1944 for ca. 30 Squadrons of Spitfires, the RAF estimated 20 000 tons of fuel being required per month.

Juha of course simply ignores it while cheerfully pursuing his own fantasies, as he has always been.
 
The evidence trail is very clear
12 December 1939
Permission is given to use 100 Octane in Hurricane Spitfires and Defiants.

No, already discussed. Its a memo from a Group Captain, and nowhere it states 'permission', and neither does it 'authorize' anything.

18th May 1940
The Committee took note that the use of 100 Octane had been made clear to Fighter Command re the use in Spitfire and Hurricane aircraft

The text actually says:

'The Committee took note of the fact that the position with regard the use of the fuel in Hurricane and Spitfire engines had been made clear to Fighter command....'

We also know archieve materials what was this 'position' :

'Firstly 87 octane fuel was deemed the primary fuel source to be used until further supplies could be discovered and delivered in sufficient quantities to allow the Merlin conversions to again take place. Those existing fighters already so converted (approximately 125) would continue to use what supplies of 100 octane were available, but all other fighters that had not been modified to continue with the use of 87 octane (of which there was more than adequate supply).'

and that the Units involved had been so equipped.

Which alone makes clear not all units were issued with 100 octane fuel, so there goes your main argument that *ALL* Squadrons were supplied with the fuel.

Again the meaning is clear, in December they had been given permission to use the 100 Octane and deliveries would start,

Even if you keep repeating that, no such permission was given in December according to the available documentation.

7th August as previously stated permission that it could be used in all operational aircraft and the Commands were so authorised, i.e. not just the Fighters.

This has been already discussed too, that in they also estimated the requirements for this and those were in the order of 90 000 tons.

Then they issued only 22 000 tons in the Q3 of 1940, woefully inaduquate to fullfill these plans.

Nowhere on any of these notes does it refer to certain squadrons, units or areas.

Of course they do, they say, in May 1940:

'the units concerned had now been stocked with the neccesarry 100 octane fuel'


The units concerned, pretty clear isn't it.

Your main evidence is Gavin Bailey quote

RAF tests with 100-octane had begun in 1937, but clearance for operational use was withheld as stocks were built up. In March 1939, the Air Ministry decided to introduce 100-octane fuel into use with sixteen fighter and two twin-engined bomber squadrons by September 1940, when it was believed that the requirement to complete the war reserve stock would have been met, with the conversion of squadrons beginning at the end of 1939

No doubt in March 1939 well before war broke out it would have taken until September 1940 to build up war stocks at a peace time rate of import. But as has been mentioned, war changes things.
No doubt in March 1939 the UK didn't have many plans to purchase all the equipment from the USA, that they did. However that doesn't mean that they were not purchased or delivered, clearly they were.

This is just speculation. We can all speculate all day, but that does not bring facts to the table.

You are the one who is claiming that there was a change in the number of Squadrons effected from the March 1939 plans and not 18 but ALL Squadrons were supplied with 100 octane fuel.

Just like that, without any evidence to it, you say that all of them were converted.

Trouble is, you are the one making a positive claim, so you will have to prove that *ALL* Squadrons/Stations were issued with this fuel, against documentary evidence which says they were not. Why don't you just go the National Archieves in Kew, find that AVIA folder that has all the 25 meetings in it, and see for your own eyes? You live right there, after all...
 
Kurfurst
You need to support your statements with some facts.

18 Squadrons you keep saying this but when asked Which Squadrons? - no reply
Where are they based? _ no reply
What happens when they change base? - no reply
Do they take the fuel with them? - no reply
Why supply 2 x Blenhiem Squadrons at the expense of Spitfire Squadrons? - no reply
Why leave many tens of thousands of tons of fuel unused? - no reply.
You say that the authorised conversions didn't happen but when asked to support that - no reply
You say that the plan remained a plan and was not achieved but supply no evidence.
When asked if you can find any reference anywhere that shows that Hurricane and Spitfire Pilots didn't have 100 Octane fuel in the BOB. You cannot
You state that only a quarter of the RAF Fighter squadrons had 100 Octane so you should be able to find some reference somewhere but can find no reference.
You would think that of all the hundreds of books written about the BOB one of them would mention the practical problems of only having 18 squadrons equipped with the 100 Octane fuel, both tactically and strategically but nothing, not one. All I am asking you to do is find one reference.

The centre of the argument is that I beleive that all the papers mentioned above refer to all the Spitfire and Hurricanes. You believe that they refer to the 18 unknown squadrons on the unknown bases that were in the original plan of March 1939 before war broke out.
None of the papers refer to the 18 squadrons and at least the list of stations to be stocked in the first instance would be expected to list where those 18 squadrons are based, but they don't.

Re speculation about the imports. War changes things that is a fact to continue to plan on a prewar basis for such a strategic item is unheard of, can you find another from any country, on any strategic item? I suspect the reply will be no.
 
Hello KrazyKraut
I happened to have university degree on history and can say that the burden of proof is clearly on KF because acknowledged authors like Richards and Price in their books give info that FC front line sqns changed from 87 oct to 100oct in the spring of 1940 and Wood and Dempster gave only info how much 100 oct was issued and how the stock situation of it developed and didn't say a word on 87 oct. I don't say that it is certain all those specialists got it right but probably they got it right. To proof otherwise one needs to produce some concrete proofs, more concrete than that someone in some discussion board had wrote something.

Until KF produce some proof that 66 000 tons of 87 oct was issued to FC between 10th July and 10th Oct 40, or if we assume that those sqns using 87 oct flew fewer sorties say 55 000 tons. Simple as that. And I'll wait if KF is capable produce the proof.

KF
not surprisingly you behaved as usual. Now if FC has changed to 100 oct authors of course didn't say anything on 87 oct, they said nothing on 72 oct either or other low oct fuels because they are irrelevant to FC front line fighters. As we know from Goebbels, repeating something many times doesn't make it a truth. Produce evidence! And at least up to now it has been you who is living in his fantasy world being unable to proof his case. Till you produce concrete proofs and not only try to hide lack of them behind arrogance and aggressive abuses.

Juha
 
It seems both Glider and Juha are infinitively capable of arguing the facts but not capable of bringing facts to their arguements. Until they do, there is no reason to waste any more time on this.

Now, all the decisions are appearantly there in AVIA 10/282, publicly available at the National Archives in Kew.
 
Hello KrazyKraut
I happened to have university degree on history and can say that the burden of proof is clearly on KF because acknowledged authors like Richards and Price in their books give info that FC front line sqns changed from 87 oct to 100oct in the spring of 1940 and Wood and Dempster gave only info how much 100 oct was issued and how the stock situation of it developed and didn't say a word on 87 oct. I don't say that it is certain all those specialists got it right but probably they got it right. To proof otherwise one needs to produce some concrete proofs, more concrete than that someone in some discussion board had wrote something.
I read only the pages posted here and while they make it clear that 100 octane fuel was available in time for the battle of Britain (and before), they also leave certain room for speculation as to how widespread that fuel was used by fighters. So either the underlying primary sources were not that completely conclusive (or at least left a certain possibility that there were still fighters running on 87 octane fuel) or the authors simply forgot to mention that. I personally would assume the former. Most likely the authors would agree with you, that, to the best of their knowledge, all fighters were converted. But I find it unlikely that, if they had ultimate proof, they would not have said so explicitly in their articles. But that is speculation on my part.
 

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