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The failure of Hitler's Germany to field a strategic bomber force keeps coming back to me as a primary cause of the Third Reich's demise.
Altea said:Anyway bombing Russia, in 41-42 no?
With what kind of navigation devices and maps would you use, e-net with satellite images and GPS something like that?
You want to attack the big factory n° 153 in Novosibirsk?
So if you please,
distance from Berlin to London: 926 km.
Berlin to Novosibirsk: 4387 km
About 4 800 km to hit Lavotchkin factory in Ulan Ude
About 7 500 km to strike on strategic wooden stocks at Komsomolsk on Amur
Good luck
I think Altea has already shown (in the 1st try at this, the closed thread) that what we are really talking about here is the German need for an ultra long range strategic bomber (with reliable ultra long range flying navigation aids) beyond anything possible at that time.
The sort of global strike aircraft which took another decade or 2 to become an everyday reality.
Considering the 1, 2, 5,16, 17th VA more than 5 500 front-line airplanes were available in Kursk aera.Total Availability is 2782, of which 1206 are Fighters.
ADD had 740 planes in june 1943. 26 from the 34 ADD regiments participated to the Kursk battle.From Hardesty approximately 300 airframes from ADD and PVO must be added to this total. So my best estimate based on Bergstrom and Hardesty is about 3100 iniitally available to the Soviets.
Not inclueded by Bergstrom, i already gave mention of independent regimentsBergstrom does not give numbers of individual types, , but types include Yak-1, Yak-7, Yak-9, Yak7B, La-5, Aircobra, Boston III, Pe-2, Il-2, Boston (not the III), and U-2. Either the Soviets do not have liason and recon types, or they ar3e not included in the OB.
ADD? Only Li-2 and C-47 used as night bombers.No transports are included in their OB, perhaps these were controlled by the ADD organization, or they simply did not have any