Pearl Harbor Attack

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An couple of interesting inaccuracies in TTT. When the Japanese are flying near Pearl, there is a large cross on the hill. That was erected after the war. There is another scene where you see nurses running on base. Look closely, there is the Arizona Memorial! Not to nit-pick, the rest of the facts were well done, just some Hollywood ****-ups that happen.

Yea, just production goofs, every movie has got them, even the great ones. But the historical stuff about the actual attack is pretty much right on.

TO
 
Love the scenes of the Zeros strafing the P40's that are trying to get airborne. Some of the finest action scenes ever filmed IMO.

Wildcat,

Love that scene as well. The "action" was very real.

The P-40 crashing in the flight line was an unplanned accident - it was a life-sized mockup powered by a gasoline engine turning the propeller and steered by using the wheel brakes, just like real airplanes, but was specifically designed not to fly. The aircraft shown was loaded with explosives which were to be detonated by radio control at a specific point down the runway. Stunt actors were strategically located and rehearsed in which way to run. However shortly after the plane began taxiing down the runway it did begin to lift off the ground and turn to the left. The left turn would have taken it into a group of other mockups which had also been wired with explosives, but weren't scheduled to be destroyed until later. The explosives in the first P-40 were detonated on the spot in order to keep it from destroying the other planes, so the explosion occurred in a location the stunt men weren't prepared for. When it looks like they were running for their lives, they really were. This special effect was filmed with multiple camera so that it could be reused in other shots in the film, as were all the major special effects.

TO
 
Pg 13, "Pearl Harbor Betrayed" by Michael Gannon. "The Army, which was officially charged with the defense of the fleet and naval station at Pearl, was, in the Navy's view, woefully unequipped to perform that task." " By joint agreement between the War and Navy departments, and by provision of the Navy's war plan (WPL-46), protection of the fleet was the core reason for the Army's considerable presence on Oahu." From the Chief of Staff George Marshall to Lt Gen Walter Short on 7 Feb, 1941 "The fullest protection for the Fleet is THE rather than A (Marshall emphases) major consideration for us." When one thinks about it, it makes sense since the Navy did not man the coast defense guns, the Navy had no troops except for a few Marines to repel invasion, the Navy had no fighters(except one squadron on each carrier and a few Marine AC) to defend against bombers, No bombers except for the Vts and Vsbs on the carriers to bomb an invasion fleet. It was accepted doctrine in the US military at that time that the heavy bomber(mainly B-17s) would be able to bomb enemy warships and transports and repel an invasion. That was the reason the B-17s were in Hawaii and the Philipines, not for strategic bombing purposes.
 
The primary responsibility for the protection of the bases at Pearl Harbor belonged to the US Army.

Almost all of the 29 japanese aircraft lost were from Flak, was the Navy AA more effective than the land-based?

{from Wikipedia}

The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to deter sabotage, guns unmanned (none of the Navy's 5"/38 AA and only a quarter of its machineguns, and only four of 31 Army batteries got in action).
 
According to this source, after April 29, 1941, each BB had two 50 cal MGs with two cases of ammo continuously manned with two 5 inch AA guns with 15 rds of ammo each also manned. No guns in destroyers or cruisers were manned but by Kimmels orders ammo was in the ready boxes at the guns and the crews normally lived near the guns. The reason the guns on dds and Cas, Cls werent continuously manned was because the crews were too small versus large crews of BBs.
 
According to this source, after April 29, 1941, each BB had two 50 cal MGs with two cases of ammo continuously manned with two 5 inch AA guns with 15 rds of ammo each also manned. No guns in destroyers or cruisers were manned but by Kimmels orders ammo was in the ready boxes at the guns and the crews normally lived near the guns. The reason the guns on dds and Cas, Cls werent continuously manned was because the crews were too small versus large crews of BBs.

"Wiki" references quoted-

The defenders were very unprepared. Ammunition lockers were locked, aircraft parked...., guns unmanned....

<refrences>Parillo, Mark, "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin, and Harris

Stephen, ''Why Air Forces Fail: The Anatomy of Defeat'' (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006),

Do you suppose the references mean "unmanned" as in when the first wave hit, but got into action later?

I know the MG's were used, do you have any specific info on the 4" 5" guns getting into action on the ships?

If the Navy BB guns were manned and the DD CL guns had "ammo ready", it doesn't sound like Kimmel was unprepared. Rather it seems like Short would get most of the blame, ie Army AA guns not alert, radar not vigilant, early reports (from US aircraft) not forwarded to the Navy base, etc.

What's your take, was it mostly the Army's failing?
 
freebird, I don't know how credible this book that I am reading now is. It is footnoted and has references and is relatively new(2001) I feel sure the direct quotes are accurate but some of it's inferences may be off base. The early part of the book(I am only a third of the way finished) indicates that Kimmel and Short communicated often and were close to the extent they played golf many Sundays together. I have quite a number of other books that address Pearl but they are packed. I don't give Wikipedia a lot of credibility because of it's superficiality and because I think it just reflects the current popular opinions and you know about opinions. My personal opinion(for what it is worth) is that the US was unprepared from a material point of view for war. The Pacific fleet had already been weakened by sending a number of ships to the Atlantic to help Britain. One interesting fact this book points out that Adm King on Nov. 5, 1941 sent Task Force 1 comprising 2 old BBs, 2 CAs and 3 DDs to the Denmark Strait to intercept Admiral Scheer or possibly Tirpitz, that British intelligence predicted would sortie(Ultra) As it turned out probably luckily for the US it was Scheer that was supposed to sortie but a mechanical kept her in port.(probably those dratted diesels) If Scheer had sortied the fat would have been in the fire because if the US ships had sunk her, Hitler would almost certainly have declared war on the US and Japan would have done the same and Pearl would have been on full alert Dec 7 if the IJN carried out it's plans. Just think about what would have happened if Tirpitz had come out. Anyway the USN and Army was stretched thin everywhere with not enough men and guns to do a decent job anywhere in the Pacific and I believe that Kimmel and Short were just scapegoats.
 
The problem was both Short and Kimmel were still in peace time mode of thinking.

Why didnt Kimmel have the PBY's searching all points of the compass?

Why didnt Short have a squadron or two on ready alert from a couple of dispersal fields?
 
According to Gannon reports by gunnery officers indicated that West Virginia returned fire immediately with mgs and all batteries within 5 minutes. No log is availble for Arizona. California ready mgs immediately, her mgs in the foretop and maintop in 3 to 4 minutes and the 5 inchers in about two minutes. Other BBs similar times. Here is the fly in the ointment. The 50 cal mgs have somewhat limited knockdown power and range. The 1.1 quads heated up jammed and had feed problems. My uncles were CGMs on CAs and at that stage of the war they had to estimate the range of the AC and it's bearing and course, set the fuse on the shell, slam it into the breech, fire it and the projectile either had to hit the target directly or else the fuse would set off the charge when the estimated range was reached. Duh, have you ever tried to shoot doves with a 22 rifle? There were no 20 mm Oerlikons or 40 mm Bofors until later in the war.
 
According to quotes from Richmond Kelly Turner and Nimitz there were only enough planes with the range to conduct a full compass sweep for a period of time of only several days in November and December. Prior to that time there were not enough planes period. Kimmel had been promised an additional 100 PBYs but they were allocated to Britain instead.
 
Couple of other interesting facts. Prior to and during December 1941, Kimmel was not receiving "Magic" intercepts. Of course when Nimitz relieved Kimmel he began receiving "Magic" which enabled him to plan for Midway. On Dec. 7, 1941, Hickam Field had only six B17s in operating condition while Clark Field in the PI had 35, the largest concentration in the world. This was a result of a belief in the US High Command that a strengthening of our forces in the PI could keep Japan from striking south to Malaysia.
 
I don't give Wikipedia a lot of credibility because of it's superficiality and because I think it just reflects the current popular opinions and you know about opinions. My personal opinion(for what it is worth) is that the US was unprepared from a material point of view for war. The Pacific fleet had already been weakened by sending a number of ships to the Atlantic to help Britain. Anyway the USN and Army was stretched thin everywhere with not enough men and guns to do a decent job anywhere in the Pacific and I believe that Kimmel and Short were just scapegoats.

Probably just as well not to have been in port that day anyways....

I don't trust Wiki that much either, but if the give specific numbers cite references I would take that as more valuable than "opinions" (the Navy could have done this, the Army should have done that...)

It seems that very few of the 29 destroyers or CL were hit, are they docked some distance from Ford Island?
 
Yes, most of the cruisers and DDs were moored in different locations from the BBs. The CL Helena(torpedoed) was moored where a BB had been before moved to a drydock. The CL Raleigh(torpedoed) was moored in front of BB Utah which was torpedoed. The only DDs destroyed were in a drydock with a BB, Pennsylvania.
 
Since the US had broken the Japanese diplomatic code(Magic) they were reading all messages to and from Jap consulates. A short time before 7 Dec the Japanese Consulate was asked to report if the US had in place barrage balloons over PH and whether they were using torpedo nets on the BBs. The answer was negative on both questions. The US decoded those messages but since Kimmel was not in on the secret of "Magic" he was not informed about those messages. Of couse they were prime indicators of a bombing and or torpedo attack on the fleet.
 
Didn't the British inform the U.S about a future attack on Pearl Harbour by the Japanese?

Agent Tricycle was sent to discover information on torpedo netting etc by the Germans to give to a Japanese diplomat.

If this is corect, surely ignoring a trade partner was a stupid thing to do and possibly the American mentality that they would not be attacked?
 
The British were as clueless about the attack on Pearl Harbor as the US was.

The mentality at that time was an attack on pearl was possible. But it made more sense for the main thrust of a potential attack to be made on the Philipines.

Two things the RN and USN intel personell were sure of:
a) The Japanese carriers were "missing".
b) There was a Japanese invasion fleet that had departed from Vietnam and was enroute "somewhere".

Everything pointed to an attack on the PI.
 
The British were as clueless about the attack on Pearl Harbor as the US was.

The mentality at that time was an attack on pearl was possible. But it made more sense for the main thrust of a potential attack to be made on the Philipines.

Two things the RN and USN intel personell were sure of:
a) The Japanese carriers were "missing".
b) There was a Japanese invasion fleet that had departed from Vietnam and was enroute "somewhere".

Everything pointed to an attack on the PI.

Agreed, it was quite a surprise that pearl was attacked. Am I correct that the "Magic" intercepts indicated that Japan was planning for war, but not specific targets? In any event, the warnings that Short got earlier shold have prompted better preparation.
 

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