The A-Bomb the determining factor?
- Thread starter bobbysocks
- Start date
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I think that dropping A-bomb(s) and Potsdam Declaration should be discussed as a set.
Hirohito did not say "We surrender" through radio to his people on August 15, 1945.
He said "I let my government accept the joint declaration (Potsdam Declaration) for the world peace".
Hirohito and his government needed a plausible reason to end the war.
Potsdam Declaration had not been enough by itself but A-bomb would not have been enough by itself either even if it may have been dropped three or more when Japanese people were already familiar with the bombings of large scale and ready to die since end of 1944.
If there had not been the declaration, the war would have been continued.
He and his men needed an instrument to keep his/their face.
Hirohito did not say "We surrender" through radio to his people on August 15, 1945.
He said "I let my government accept the joint declaration (Potsdam Declaration) for the world peace".
Hirohito and his government needed a plausible reason to end the war.
Potsdam Declaration had not been enough by itself but A-bomb would not have been enough by itself either even if it may have been dropped three or more when Japanese people were already familiar with the bombings of large scale and ready to die since end of 1944.
If there had not been the declaration, the war would have been continued.
He and his men needed an instrument to keep his/their face.
I'm afraid that it wouldn't have been. The scientists of the Manhattan Project of course knew in a theoretical sense that radiation and radio active material would be released into the atmosphere. They did not however have any concept of what we call "fall out" or its effect on a large human population. This was only revealed by the intensive research carried out in Japan AFTER the nuclear weapons had been used.
The British,and I suspect every other nuclear power,was still deploying service men in positions which were unsafe at nuclear tests well into the 1950s. This was more through ignorance than malice.
The real deterrent must surely have been the German ability to hit back at both the UK mainland and Allied (including Soviet) formations in Europe with chemical agents,particularly the nerve gases with which we are now familiar.
If the Germans didn't surrender after most of their major cities had been so heavily bombed that Harris deemed them not worth bombing anymore,why would they surrender after the deployment of an atomic weapon? The only conceivable reason would be the psychological effect of such a weapon,something very much in the minds of the US targeters for the Japanese bombs.
Steve
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Gixxerman
Senior Airman
It's also unavoidable recognising the huge section of the German public who (too late) recognised the sickening true nature of the nazi's 'national socialist state' at home, where constant surveilance, routine denunciation, petty brutality and even public murder execution - at the merest fickle whim of an armed nutter - were a daily constant towards the end.
Not forgetting political courts justice.
Many in Germany gave a huge sigh of relief that the barbaric crazyness was over, even if it did mean defeat in the war.
I know its not in the spirit of this thread, but I can't really see that happening on the Eastern Front. The Soviet Union had a far larger population to throw at the Germans, so we have to consider where the Soviets were by this time. They were occupying Berlin by end of April 1945, so even if there were numerically larger forces available to the Germans, that would have put the Berlin occupation back by a month or so, maybe less. Had there been fewer Allied forces in Western Europe, then it would have fallen to the Soviets. Stalin and Marshall Zukhov made a lot of the fact that had the Americans/Allies not been there his troops would have continued to Paris.
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It is also unavoidable recognizing the conditions at the time that led to those false hopes...
windswords
Airman
Although they were the largest group singled out, there were many people of German and Italian descent in the US that were interned/interrogated/observed during the war.
German American internment - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Neither have I...
Edgar Brooks
Senior Airman
That could have caused a bit of an upset with the Russians, French and British, as well, since they didn't know that the thing worked until the first test on July 16th., 1945, over two months after the end of the war in Europe.
fubar57
General
I would like to see it as well as it goes against what I have read
michael rauls
Tech Sergeant
- 1,679
- Jul 15, 2016
Yes, Please post a link. I would like verry much to see that to.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
General Groves and Secretary Stinson had the discussion with Roosevelt in December '44 about the idea of using an A-Bomb on Germany, as the Battle of the Bulge had unsettled Rossevelt a great deal.
General Groves explained to Roosevelt the logistics favored Japan (the intended target at the time was the IJN base in Truk) over Germany and that the war in the Pacific was far from over, whereas the European war was most likely to be over before a bomb was ready.
Not sure how Tibbets would have been privvy to such high-level discussions at the time, as Tibbets and the rest of the 509th pilots would have only been on a "need to know" basis.
General Groves explained to Roosevelt the logistics favored Japan (the intended target at the time was the IJN base in Truk) over Germany and that the war in the Pacific was far from over, whereas the European war was most likely to be over before a bomb was ready.
Not sure how Tibbets would have been privvy to such high-level discussions at the time, as Tibbets and the rest of the 509th pilots would have only been on a "need to know" basis.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
"Ryan: Oh, you mentioned Germany a moment ago and I understand Germany was a potential target during this time. How so? I mean for the atomic bomb.
Tibbets: Yes, that's correct. When I was given my assignment in September 1944, one of my directives or "terms of reference" using military terminology was that I would have a capability to perform a split operation. In other words, half of my unit could go to the European theater and bomb Germany, and half could do Japan because they wanted simultaneous bomb drops, if that took place.
Ryan: Had they ever selected a city in Germany?
Tibbets: No, no, no, they never got to it. Because like I said, April of '45 was when the first targets were selected for an A-bomb. By that time, Germany was whipped, and everybody knew it. There was no use thinking about it."
General Paul Tibbets – Reflections on Hiroshima
Tibbets: Yes, that's correct. When I was given my assignment in September 1944, one of my directives or "terms of reference" using military terminology was that I would have a capability to perform a split operation. In other words, half of my unit could go to the European theater and bomb Germany, and half could do Japan because they wanted simultaneous bomb drops, if that took place.
Ryan: Had they ever selected a city in Germany?
Tibbets: No, no, no, they never got to it. Because like I said, April of '45 was when the first targets were selected for an A-bomb. By that time, Germany was whipped, and everybody knew it. There was no use thinking about it."
General Paul Tibbets – Reflections on Hiroshima
