The Best Bomber of WWII: #4

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Youre ignoring the fact that most of the refineries in Germany were using synthetic means to produce their POL's.

It was the heavy bombers disrupting the production of fuel that enabled the allies to win the war.
 
drgondog, you are absolutely right. The RAF recognised the oil targets as the ultimate target to force the Luftwaffe into combat. Using bombers as bait to force the Luftwaffe away from the front. Even with that recognised in 1940 the Allied strategic bombing didn't make any more attempts on the oil production until spring '44... it's a wonder why.
 
This is from the USSBS....

"With the reduction of German air power, oil became the priority target in the German economy. The bomber force for several months had been adequate for the task. A preliminary attack was launched on May 12, 1944, followed by another on May 28; the main blow was not struck, however, until after D-day. In the months before D-day and for a shorter period immediately following, all available air power based on England was devoted to insuring the success of the invasion.

Virtually complete records of the German oil industry were taken by the Survey. In addition, major plants that were subject to attack and their records were studied in detail.

The German oil supply was tight throughout the war, and was a controlling factor in military operations. The chief source of supply, and the only source for aviation gasoline, was 13 synthetic plants together with a small production from three additional ones that started operations in 1944. The major sources of products refined from crude oil were the Ploesti oil fields in Rumania and the Hungarian fields which together accounted for about a quarter of the total supply of liquid fuels in 1943. In addition, there was a small but significant Austrian and domestic production. The refineries at Ploesti were attacked, beginning with a daring and costly low-level attack in August 1943. These had only limited effects; deliveries increased until April 1944 when the attacks were resumed. The 1944 attacks, together with mining of the Danube, materially reduced Rumanian deliveries. In August 1944, Russian occupation eliminated this source of supply and dependence on the synthetic plants became even greater than before.

Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output.

The Germans viewed the attacks as catastrophic. In a series of letters to Hitler, among documents seized by the Survey, the developing crisis is outlined month by month in detail. On June 30, Speer wrote: "The enemy has succeeded in increasing our losses of aviation gasoline up to 90 percent by June 22d. Only through speedy recovery of damaged plants has it been possible to regain partly some of the terrible losses." The tone of the letters that followed was similar. "
 
You're right Syscom,

I did some research on the synthetic production which I did ignore as you said. I must admit the destruction of the plants seriously crippled the German army and thus shortened the war considerably. Do you think the Allieds would not have been victorious if these plants had not be bombed?
 
Allies would of still won hands down, bombing the plants just helped to shorten the war.

Nothing short of a nuke (more like 20+ nukes) could of stopped the massive advantage the Allies had in numbers of every type.

Between Russia, USA and Commonwealth they produced more then Germany could ever hope to stop with conventional weapons.
 
The Luftwaffe was in no position to rebuild or rearm in the final 8 months of the war whether they had fuel or not. The movement of the Red Army through the Eastern oil production centres and factories led to the destruction of the German war machine. By the time the Allied air force made the effort against oil production (after the invasion) the days of Germany were numbered.

I'm not denying that the attack on Germany's oil made any difference - it was the best course of action. I am merely stating that it's being inflated here as the war was already won. If the RAF had sunk the Tirpitz in '42 or '43 it would have been impressive and useful, but when it happened in '44 it was merely a circus act. Just like the oil strikes - too late to make a massive impact.
 
plan_D said:
The Luftwaffe was in no position to rebuild or rearm in the final 8 months of the war whether they had fuel or not. The movement of the Red Army through the Eastern oil production centres and factories led to the destruction of the German war machine. By the time the Allied air force made the effort against oil production (after the invasion) the days of Germany were numbered.

I'm not denying that the attack on Germany's oil made any difference - it was the best course of action. I am merely stating that it's being inflated here as the war was already won. If the RAF had sunk the Tirpitz in '42 or '43 it would have been impressive and useful, but when it happened in '44 it was merely a circus act. Just like the oil strikes - too late to make a massive impact.
Click to expand...

I felt like it (Strategic Oil Campaign) was by far the most effective strategy and execution of the airwar during WWII. Absent the attacks and success the Germans may have been able to continue to feed the strategic reserves - even without Ploesti.

The consequence to that would have been better training opportunity in summer and fall of 1944 for LW pilots, making the airwar not only more painful but also capable of more sorties against Allied armies, and possibly have enough fuel to go to Antwerp and exploit the breakthrough at the Bulge.. we will never know what the thinking or actions would have been.

Possibly Bodenplatte a month earlier with much better pilots could have really hurt TAC for both RAF and USAAF and made it possible for Germany to succeed.

It is always a little iffy to predict that the Allies could have cut them off had they been able to drive to Antwerp - and achieved the same or better results. If not we are looking at a different Europe with Russians maybe stopping at Rhine instead of Elbe.

I agree your thesis that the days were numbered, and agree that the oil campaign has zero effect on the invasion or the Russian advance from the east..

My impression is that the Oil campaign was hugely important.
 
Were not only talking about av gas here.

If the Panzers had enough fuel to go limited offensives, then they could very well have held up the allies for additional months.

And it wasnt untill the last 2 months of the war that the factories were occupied.
 
What are we bombing so as a proper comparison can be made...if it is Torpedo's then the Kate with retractable gear, and able to carry the Vaunted type91 torpedo....
Fighter-bomber...some might argue the Junkers 88, but the Mosquito could carry 4000 lbs of bombs to anywhere in Germany, mark targets, destroy doodlebugs, fly over 400 mph and mounted cannons to partol over air-field hampering night fighters from re-fueling and a second sortie.
Tonnage was the B-29...
Biggest single bomb was the lanc grand slam 22,000
Dive bomber for accuracy was the JU87 or tank busting, as done on the eastern front...lack of speed made them a death trap in the western conflicts..
German overall was the JU88..a dive-glide bomber...night-fighter...daylight fighter over Germany...some say the HE111, but low payload, slow speed left many wishing they where posted to Junkers instead...
 
The oil campaign was by the far the best course of action, I would never disagree; accompany an attack on the oil system with an attack on Germany's power stations and you've crippled the entire war machine. I'm not disputing the effectiveness of the oil campaign; I'm disputing it's importance in the war.

The German oil production didn't start to drop drastically until after the summer of 1944 (September seems to be the worst month, and it then began to recover during the winter). Germany had reserves to train new pilots but they didn't have the airspace. I don't think that the Luftwaffe could have produced an airforce in a few short months that was in anyway capable of halting the Allied air onslaught.

The Germans failed to breakthrough in the Ardennes Offensive because they lacked reserves, not fuel. I'm not denying that the German forces suffered from a shortage and many tanks were abandoned, but the German attack lacked the rear echeleons required to achieve any kind of serious threat to the Allied war plans. If the German forces had reached Antwerp they would have stretched their lines too thinly and could have been cut to pieces - all the fuel in the world wouldn't have given them victory.

I do admit that the Allied losses were probably less in the air and on the ground because of Germany's fuel shortage, but I don't believe it was an important part of the war effort. If the Allies began their offensive in late 1943 or even early 1944 then I would be the first to agree, but late 1944... no, not in my opinion.

The German factories and oil production plants were being overrun in late1944 all the way up 'til May 1945. Ploesti was overrun in August '44 while the Zeiss plant wasn't taken until April '45.
 
If Mr Speer says that the destruction of the oil refineries (or damage, disruption, whatever) was a debacle for the German war machine, then I am going to believe him.
 

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Very roughly, (I am not going to attempt to match you guys in this debate), I think I read somewhere the bombing offensive is estimated to have sucked out about 10% of German production in 1943, rising to about 35-40% in 1944, and climbing to over 50% in 1945. These are very rough figures, and I am not going to die in a ditch if people have better stats.

As the voice in the wilderness, I am going to be the bunny and say I am not so sure that oil was the magic bullet that you all say it is. Sure, it was effective, even vital, but the day in day out attacks on the transport network sure did a lot of harm to both the german military AND the economy. The German rolling stock and loco situation started terribly, and just got worse as the war progressed. And Germany absolutely depended on her rail network
 
syscom3 said:
Look for it in the USSBS documents or the fischer-tropsch archives.

United States Strategic Bombing Survey


CONTENTS

http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt_reports/MofFP/ger_syn_ind/mof-sectef.pdf

BIOS 1697 - Synthetic Oil Production in Germany Interrogation of Dr. Butefisch
Click to expand...

Thanks for the links, Syscom.


I would say the main reason the Germans lost was because they were fighting against the rest of the world, losing men they couldn't replace (especially on the eastern front). I agree with PlanD that the Germans already lost before the allies started to bomb the oil factories. I do however believe the bombing of the factories helped shortening the war. Just like the atomic bomb on Japan, it didn't change the outcome, so it wasn't decisive in that sense, but it did make the end come quicker.
 
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