pbfoot
1st Lieutenant
It 's mentioned in the thread a great deal
The Best Bomber of WWII: #4
- Thread starter syscom3
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Marcel,
I am asking respectfully, please explain these two lines better and explain your point more. I am interested in hearing your explanation.
ToughOmbre
Senior Master Sergeant
Don't forget Nagasaki. And that four engine bomber saved millions of lives. And if the fortunes of war were different the B-29 would have eventually been flying over Germany. Remember, the Atomic bomb was designed with Hitler in mind.
But it was the only bomber that could deliver the bomb, so I would say that was a feat of the bomber.
TO
- Thread starter
- #404
syscom3
Pacific Historian
The heavy bombers of the allies crippled the Germans with the oil offensive.
That was done by B17's, B24's and Lancasters.
Now what were you saying?
That was done by B17's, B24's and Lancasters.
Now what were you saying?
Hi,
I should indeed have used the term IMHO as it is of course my opinion.
TO, you're right, it was the combined attack of Hirosima and Nagasaki.
Why do I think strategic bombing is overrated? One reason is that the damage done to industry was usually not as big as one might expect. The buildings are usually destroyed, but the all important machines not as much. One example, during Big Week, the USAAF targeted the german a/c industry. While it did decrease the output of a/c for a little while, the germans simply moved the production underground. The output went down a little, but at the end of 1944, the output of planes had hugely increased, so at best we you could say the bombing slowed the increase a little. This of course contributed to winning the war, but didn't have a decisive influence.
I don't want to start a discussion about carpet bombing, but only would say that their impact is still questionable, considering what happened for instance in London during the Blitz.
Sys mentions the bombing of the Romanian oilfields. This is a good point. This had a major impact, but also happened when allied forces were already on the mainland and germany was virtually beaten. It didn't force the germans to surrender like the A'bomb, it only hastened the end. But so did tactical support of thousands of medium bombers.
I could give more examples of smaller bombers having impact on the outcome of the war, Midway and the Doolittle raid and many others coming in mind.
I'm not saying the strategic bombing useless, I'm only saying it was just a part of the whole, the bombing of the oil wouldn't have had such an impact if the Russians wouldn't have prevented the Germans from taking the Russian oilfields (while being supported by medium bombers and fighter bombers). My final point: Bombers should be judged on how they performed their role, not by the payload or range they had.
I should indeed have used the term IMHO as it is of course my opinion.
TO, you're right, it was the combined attack of Hirosima and Nagasaki.
Why do I think strategic bombing is overrated? One reason is that the damage done to industry was usually not as big as one might expect. The buildings are usually destroyed, but the all important machines not as much. One example, during Big Week, the USAAF targeted the german a/c industry. While it did decrease the output of a/c for a little while, the germans simply moved the production underground. The output went down a little, but at the end of 1944, the output of planes had hugely increased, so at best we you could say the bombing slowed the increase a little. This of course contributed to winning the war, but didn't have a decisive influence.
I don't want to start a discussion about carpet bombing, but only would say that their impact is still questionable, considering what happened for instance in London during the Blitz.
Sys mentions the bombing of the Romanian oilfields. This is a good point. This had a major impact, but also happened when allied forces were already on the mainland and germany was virtually beaten. It didn't force the germans to surrender like the A'bomb, it only hastened the end. But so did tactical support of thousands of medium bombers.
I could give more examples of smaller bombers having impact on the outcome of the war, Midway and the Doolittle raid and many others coming in mind.
I'm not saying the strategic bombing useless, I'm only saying it was just a part of the whole, the bombing of the oil wouldn't have had such an impact if the Russians wouldn't have prevented the Germans from taking the Russian oilfields (while being supported by medium bombers and fighter bombers). My final point: Bombers should be judged on how they performed their role, not by the payload or range they had.
- Thread starter
- #406
syscom3
Pacific Historian
You never heard of the oil offensive against the German refineries? Have you read the statistics from the USSBS that showed that while German production of material was going up, fuel supplies were going down at an alarming rate?
evangilder
"Shooter"
There were several raids on Ploesti, with the first on August 1, 1943, before the allies were on the European continent soil.
In the spring and summer of 1944, US Fifteenth Air Force hammered Ploesti. A raid on June 23, 1944, sent 761 bombers against Rumanian oil targets. 60,000 airmen eventually flew against Ploesti, dropping 13,000 tons of bombs, eventually knocking out the oil fields and accelerating Germany's defeat.
In the spring and summer of 1944, US Fifteenth Air Force hammered Ploesti. A raid on June 23, 1944, sent 761 bombers against Rumanian oil targets. 60,000 airmen eventually flew against Ploesti, dropping 13,000 tons of bombs, eventually knocking out the oil fields and accelerating Germany's defeat.
- Thread starter
- #408
syscom3
Pacific Historian
The AAF and BC raids on the oil complexes in SE Germany in the second half of 1944 were among the deadliest and most contested bomber raids of the war.
Yep, but you're missing my point. As I said heavy bombing did their share, but it was one factor amongst others.
my bad, forgot that when I made my remark, thanks for reminding me Eric.I mentioned that, didn't I? I never said it didn't help, not even said it didn't help a lot, but it's just one factor amongst others.
evangilder
"Shooter"
Yep, you mentioned it, but I was just adding some info to it. It's hard to imagine 60,000 men for one target, much less having that many air crewmen available.
drgondog
Major
Actually, the first raid on Ploesti was on June 11, 1942 and IIRC it was the first raid by USAAF on a Eurpean target, preceeding the 8th AF by two months.
Halvorson led the 12 B-24s on the attack - code named "Halpro".. scared the bejeesus out of the Germans leading them to heavily fortify Ploesti in time for Avalanche.. There is no way to know how much more effective the August 1 mission could have been if not for the ability of the Germans to deveote a fucused 14 months building up the defenses.
I used to have film taken from one of the B-24s in which it was 'dueling' with a flak train running parallel to them and you would swear the gunners are shooting uphill as they could not have been more that 10 feet off the deck.
- Thread starter
- #412
syscom3
Pacific Historian
You are missing the point.
The heavy bomber offensive against the German petroleum industry did more to defeat Germany than any single cause.
Marcel is right, the strategic bombardment was not as effective as originally thought. German war production increased throughout the war until 1945 when factories were being lost to ground forces. However, it's hard to imagine Germany's production figures without the Allied bombing campaign.
The single factor that did more than any other to defeat Germany was the ground troops sweeping the Wehrmacht back to Berlin. And tactical air support was much more important to them than any strategic campaign.
The strategic campaign would have had more effect if the Allies had concentrated on the oil production facilities much sooner. As it was the USAAF did not make a real effort to destroy Germany's oil production until May '44. Instantly the results were impressive but Germany was already defeated.
For some statistics, in March '44 Germany produced 927,000 tons of Petroleum, in May '44 they produced 715,000 tons and 472,000 tons in June. Luftwaffe supplies of aviation spirit dropped from 180,000 tons in April to 50,000 in June and 10,000 in August.
The claims of the USAAF throughout 1943 however had led the U.S Chiefs of Staff to be a little less than disappointed and they came close to abandoning the U.S strategic campaign unless it promised that every raid would diminish German fighting power. During the summer of '44 the oil raids slowed and then again in the winter.
The USAAF did recognise the significance of their find in 1944 but by that time the war was in moving rapidly toward Germany's defeat, and the winter weather didn't help. The Germans could repair an oil facility within two weeks and the production centers were often overcast so repeat visits were difficult.
The effort made by the USAAF in 1944 cannot be understated, they certainly played a large part in strangling the Wehrmacht but the true impact on Germany's war effort was the capture of her eastern factories and production plants by the Red Army.
The Allied campaign against Germany's oil targets would have been greater if 'Bomber' Harris had given them more attention. Many leading RAF members wanted to divert all attention to the destruction of German transportation and oil production but Harris gave them 11% of British efforts between July and September '44 and 14% between October and December. In the same time period 20% 58% of British sorties went against cities (time periods respectively). In November '44 Bomber Command did drop more tonnage on oil targets than the 8th Air Force but this was still only 24.6% of the British sorties and no where near enough.
Even though I have said it myself it is too easy to state that more effort should have been made against the oil production facilities early on. It's worth remembering what the Allied (really, the RAF) had in its air war against Germany's production. Hampdens, Blenheims and Wellingtons were not capable of effectively striking at Germany's oil in 1939 - 1941, and the Allied air effort dropped 60% the entire tonnage of the war between September 1944 and April 1945. In the first four months of 1945 Bomber Command dropped 181,740 tons, in the whole of 1943 Bomber Command dropped 157,367 tons!
The first mention of oil production attacks I know of is in June 1940 when 2 Group was ordered to attack oil refineries at Hamburg, Gelsenkirchen, Sterkrade, Holten, Wanne Eickel, Kamen, Dortmund, Emmerich, Hanover, Bremen, Ostermoor, Salzbergen, Homberg, Dusseldorf, Monheim and Reisholtz. These targets were spread apart to spread the Luftwaffes fighter force, it was obvious that the oil targets would attract a heavy defence but the aim wasn't to destroy them - it was simply to draw the Luftwaffe from France.
The oil attacks were delayed as the forces in France called for close support from the Blenheims. Once France had fallen the oil attacks were cut back once again when the Blenheims were ordered to attack the airfields in France. The baiting attacks did continue until March 1941 and took great courage.
And drgondog is absolutely right; 13 B-24Ds of the Halverson Detachment attacked Ploesti on the 12th June (they took off 2230 and 2300 hours of 11th June). They took off from Fayid, Eygpt and proceeded individually toward their target. Ten bombed the Astra Romana Refinery at Ploesti, one attack the port of Constanta and two dropped on unidentified targets. Col.Halverson and three others landed at Ramadi, Iraq. Three others reached other parts of Iraq, one crashed on landing, 2 made it to Aleppo, Syria but 4 had to land and were interned in Turkey. An oil depot was destroyed and some port facilities were damaged, but overall the attack was morale booster.
The single factor that did more than any other to defeat Germany was the ground troops sweeping the Wehrmacht back to Berlin. And tactical air support was much more important to them than any strategic campaign.
The strategic campaign would have had more effect if the Allies had concentrated on the oil production facilities much sooner. As it was the USAAF did not make a real effort to destroy Germany's oil production until May '44. Instantly the results were impressive but Germany was already defeated.
For some statistics, in March '44 Germany produced 927,000 tons of Petroleum, in May '44 they produced 715,000 tons and 472,000 tons in June. Luftwaffe supplies of aviation spirit dropped from 180,000 tons in April to 50,000 in June and 10,000 in August.
The claims of the USAAF throughout 1943 however had led the U.S Chiefs of Staff to be a little less than disappointed and they came close to abandoning the U.S strategic campaign unless it promised that every raid would diminish German fighting power. During the summer of '44 the oil raids slowed and then again in the winter.
The USAAF did recognise the significance of their find in 1944 but by that time the war was in moving rapidly toward Germany's defeat, and the winter weather didn't help. The Germans could repair an oil facility within two weeks and the production centers were often overcast so repeat visits were difficult.
The effort made by the USAAF in 1944 cannot be understated, they certainly played a large part in strangling the Wehrmacht but the true impact on Germany's war effort was the capture of her eastern factories and production plants by the Red Army.
The Allied campaign against Germany's oil targets would have been greater if 'Bomber' Harris had given them more attention. Many leading RAF members wanted to divert all attention to the destruction of German transportation and oil production but Harris gave them 11% of British efforts between July and September '44 and 14% between October and December. In the same time period 20% 58% of British sorties went against cities (time periods respectively). In November '44 Bomber Command did drop more tonnage on oil targets than the 8th Air Force but this was still only 24.6% of the British sorties and no where near enough.
Even though I have said it myself it is too easy to state that more effort should have been made against the oil production facilities early on. It's worth remembering what the Allied (really, the RAF) had in its air war against Germany's production. Hampdens, Blenheims and Wellingtons were not capable of effectively striking at Germany's oil in 1939 - 1941, and the Allied air effort dropped 60% the entire tonnage of the war between September 1944 and April 1945. In the first four months of 1945 Bomber Command dropped 181,740 tons, in the whole of 1943 Bomber Command dropped 157,367 tons!
The first mention of oil production attacks I know of is in June 1940 when 2 Group was ordered to attack oil refineries at Hamburg, Gelsenkirchen, Sterkrade, Holten, Wanne Eickel, Kamen, Dortmund, Emmerich, Hanover, Bremen, Ostermoor, Salzbergen, Homberg, Dusseldorf, Monheim and Reisholtz. These targets were spread apart to spread the Luftwaffes fighter force, it was obvious that the oil targets would attract a heavy defence but the aim wasn't to destroy them - it was simply to draw the Luftwaffe from France.
The oil attacks were delayed as the forces in France called for close support from the Blenheims. Once France had fallen the oil attacks were cut back once again when the Blenheims were ordered to attack the airfields in France. The baiting attacks did continue until March 1941 and took great courage.
And drgondog is absolutely right; 13 B-24Ds of the Halverson Detachment attacked Ploesti on the 12th June (they took off 2230 and 2300 hours of 11th June). They took off from Fayid, Eygpt and proceeded individually toward their target. Ten bombed the Astra Romana Refinery at Ploesti, one attack the port of Constanta and two dropped on unidentified targets. Col.Halverson and three others landed at Ramadi, Iraq. Three others reached other parts of Iraq, one crashed on landing, 2 made it to Aleppo, Syria but 4 had to land and were interned in Turkey. An oil depot was destroyed and some port facilities were damaged, but overall the attack was morale booster.
- Thread starter
- #414
syscom3
Pacific Historian
And has been discussed before, the oil situation made it impossible for the LW to train pilots and expand their AF.
All that production managed to do was to ensure surviving pilots were never short of aircraft.
The oil offensive in 1944 was the deciding factor in the air war.
All that production managed to do was to ensure surviving pilots were never short of aircraft.
The oil offensive in 1944 was the deciding factor in the air war.
evangilder
"Shooter"
Yep, spot on, drgondog. I forgot about Halpro. IIRC, there was also a raid by P-38s on Ploesti.
In the spring of 1944 the Luftwaffe was already suffering as a result of constant bombardment to their airfields and slaughter of their pilots in the sky. The 'oil situation' which became dire after May '44 was not a sole result of the Allied bombing campaign, nor did it decapitate the Luftwaffe.
More to the point, the sharp decrease in oil production and refining was not because of the Allied bombing campaign it was because of the capture of German refineries by the Red Army. On the 29th August, 1944, the Red Army captured Ploesti which produced one third of the Axis oil supplies. I should have placed more emphasis on that fact in my last post.
I do make clear that the oil campaign cannot be understated, but it's just as important not to overstate it. The real impact on the German economy, and it's ability to fight was made by the men on the ground rather than those in the air.
Also, the German production peaked in September '44 so the Luftwaffe would have been running out of aircraft as each factory was captured by the advancing Allied armies.
More to the point, the sharp decrease in oil production and refining was not because of the Allied bombing campaign it was because of the capture of German refineries by the Red Army. On the 29th August, 1944, the Red Army captured Ploesti which produced one third of the Axis oil supplies. I should have placed more emphasis on that fact in my last post.
I do make clear that the oil campaign cannot be understated, but it's just as important not to overstate it. The real impact on the German economy, and it's ability to fight was made by the men on the ground rather than those in the air.
Also, the German production peaked in September '44 so the Luftwaffe would have been running out of aircraft as each factory was captured by the advancing Allied armies.
Great two posts PlanD and very well put what I wanted to say.
No, I did not miss the point, I just don't agree that this means the heavy bomber was exclusively decisive.
drgondog
Major
There was. I would have to research date and units but IIRC it was 82nd and 14th, one flying top cover for the other, and the bomb aiming done by a Droop Snoot 38... strictly from an aging memory.
I think there are strong elements of truth on both sides of the oil campaign debate.
One they were the most important strategic class of targets, and you have to mention Oil/Chemical in the same context. The Chemical plants were key also for simple reasons of ammunition/ordnance as well as fertiler for food production. IIRC Speer basically authorized fertilizer runs to detriment of gunpowder becuase he didn't want German people to starve.
Two, they were the Luftwaffe magnet and the 8th and 15th were the 'bait'. The LW was largely tring to avoid day by day clashes after April, 1944 - trying to hoard resources for the invasion - but the Oil/Chemical campaign forced their hand and enabled 8th and 15th AF fighters to take another big chunk of skills out of the Luftwaffe in May
Three, it took the Luftwaffe capability to rebuild and re-train to a point of no return.. It didn't really matter that German aircraft production continued through March, 1945. In many examples of allied strafing attacks on airfields in March and April, the aircraft were accorded 'damaged' awards simply becuase the a/c would not ignite with empty tanks.
Four, the RAF was more effective in the late fall and winter of 44 as US blind bombing techniques were not as effective at RAF methods.
Plan_D is correct that the ultimate 'stop' of production at any facility was only achieved when that plant/refinery was over run, and contextually correct that allied bombing didn't completely stop oil/chemical production. The Germans were masters of damage control and operations management.
The USSR was amazed at the damage they found at Ploesti, given that American 'capitalists' had joint ownership of the facilities before Axis takeover.
That being said, on or about September 1944 the reserves that Speer had carefully hoarded was on the downhill path, never to recover.
- Thread starter
- #419
syscom3
Pacific Historian
Marcel, if you dont have fuel for your tanks, what are they going to do?
If you dont have fuel for your airplanes, what are they going to do?
If you dont have fuel for your airplanes, what are they going to do?
I know syscom and agree that it was important. But as PlanD already pointed out, this fuel shortage was only really felt after the Germans were in fact already defeated. Furthermore, the fuel shortage was not just caused by bombing, but manly because they were captured on the ground, read Plan's post:
So this somewhat counters your claim about strategic bombing.
So I state again, strategic bombing was important and contributed a lot to the defeat of the axis, but it was not as effective as might expected.
I first said the A-bomb was the only time strategic bombing was decisive, but there's a problem with that, too. Although very valuable to the allied cause, the event was not decisive in that it changed the outcome of the war, it only hastened the inevitable. Japanese defeat was by the marines on Guandalcanal and the little dive bombers at Midway. After that, the war for them could only end in one way.
