"The case for the P-47 Thunderbolt being the greatest fighter of the Second World War " (1 Viewer)

[Greg Boeser]

The P-47 using almost half the amount of fuel as a B-17 is interesting. One engine in a smaller plane against a four engine bomber. That Pratt and Whitney must have been cranking out some mad power. I have read the posts discussing engine output stats but that's a statistic puts it into reality. That's a lot of gas.

For this reason P-47s were found not suitable for use in China. They couldn't get enough fuel over the Hump to keep them supplied.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

Did the R2800 use fuel for evaporative cooling under max power?

All aero engines do to some degree at maximum power (i.e. put in more fuel than can be chemically burned), its always more with air cooled as they`re running hotter and need help to avoid detonation.

 

[Deleted member 68059]

Here is the chart >

NB, dont look at barrels per day because that accounts for the planned flying hours. (although that is peripherally also interesting)
For fuel consumption rate you need "Gallons per Hour per Aircraft"

 

[drgondog]

I've already posted evidence showing the P47M couldn't do what it claimed it could do, the engines failed.

Yet the 56th soldiered on with them after engine problems were solved.

 

[drgondog]

Without interdiction operations by all the other forces including the light two engined bombers groups the Luftwaffe would have been able to attack at their convenience, it was Galland himself who said that. Having fuel ladened P51's cross the channel without the allies having control of the skies would have resulted in the same situation the Luftwaffe had in 1940, ''peeling away'' the escorts as Park put it. The bombing offensive was a joint effort by all the forces involved.

The LW did attack at their convenience. That said, all the 2nd TAF and 9th were engaging cross channel were LF3 save some LF Reich units sent to Invasion Front for several weeks.

Luft Reich, and earlier Lwbh Mitte, were certainly attacking 'at their convenience'. Further, you seem to labor under the impression that when LW appeared, there was a mass ejection of exteral stores. Not true. SOP was to direct flights and then sections and then squadrons while the rest of the escort plugged on eastward.

Neither Galland nor Schmidt had the discretionary latitude to go after the fighters. Some commanders ignored the 'imperative to go only after the bombers' in face of severe disciplanary actions.

Of course the bomber offensive was joint effort - as every other major endeavor. That said, Your comment was that Mustangs could not have performed escort without P-47 plus combined actions by 2nd TAF/9th AF - not true. Eighth and 15th AF marched on from D-Day forward happily with declining P-38 and P-47 groups in favor of P-51 without missing a beat.

 

[EwenS]

For this reason P-47s were found not suitable for use in China. They couldn't get enough fuel over the Hump to keep them supplied.

But not true.

81st FG moved from the Med to India in Feb/Mar 1944 where it converted to the P-47D before moving to the Kwanghan area in southern China in May 1944 to begin flying operations in June. The 93rd FS was withdrawn to India in Oct to provide combat training for pilots of the other two squadrons for the next 9 months. The 81st remained in China until the end of the War with the 91st & 92nd FS ending up at Hsian.

The 33rd FG also transferred from the Med to the CBI and spent time in China between April & Sept or Dec 1944 during which time it had P-47Ds as well as P-38s. It then moved back to Burma and then India.

Had the War continued the 14th AF in China would have been joined by the 10th AF moving over from India and taking with it the 33rd FG noted above and the P-47D equipped 80th FG.

 

[Greg Boeser]

But not true.

81st FG moved from the Med to India in Feb/Mar 1944 where it converted to the P-47D before moving to the Kwanghan area in southern China in May 1944 to begin flying operations in June. The 93rd FS was withdrawn to India in Oct to provide combat training for pilots of the other two squadrons for the next 9 months. The 81st remained in China until the end of the War with the 91st & 92nd FS ending up at Hsian.

The 33rd FG also transferred from the Med to the CBI and spent time in China between April & Sept or Dec 1944 during which time it had P-47Ds as well as P-38s. It then moved back to Burma and then India.

Had the War continued the 14th AF in China would have been joined by the 10th AF moving over from India and taking with it the 33rd FG noted above and the P-47D equipped 80th FG.

Thanks for the correction.

 

[drgondog]

And this gets to the heart of the problem...you're speculating. You're also making a false equivalency between US and UK production approaches. The US had 2 big factories because they weren't under risk of enemy attack. The UK had a much more distributed approach because factories had been attacked.

Informed speculation based on knowledge and hands on re: Airframe design, Change Order processes, Production Control, airframe manufacturing techniques, Tooling, Jigs and Purchasing processes. Never made an equivalency comment other than to hightlight specifically the NAA Model and why it served the delivery pace with minimum disruption for bespoke considerations. Fine, the UK had a more distributed approach. Did that philosophy achieve equivalency to NAA Model?

Bottom line, though, is that Spitfires were ordered in distinct batches, just as were P-51s and every other aircraft type. Each batch had modifications but, generally, were internally consistent. There wasn't a need for "all factories" to be on the same page because they were delivering different batches to different modification standards. Again, I think you're overstating the impact of changes on the Spitfire and underestimating the extent of changes in the P-51.

Am I? NAA built 550 A-36, 310 P-51A, 2078 P-51B, 8300 P-51D from November 1942 through Aug 1945 plus 1400+ B-25G/H and a 'bunch of AT-6/SNJ' - haven't looked up either the B-25C or the AT-6 production at Inglewood. The design, toolng and producion processes for Common models built at different facories, were indeed 'same standard' - to same Model - with model/block effectivity applying to different plants but clearly stated wrt serial no.- but same drawing and production standard. Engineering change orders for P-51B-1 were equally applied to P-51C-1 at Dallas. Ditto B-25C at Inglewood and B-25D at Dallas, Ditto AT-6J at Ingelwood applying to AT-6J at Dallas.

Did I mention that Inglewood is two time zones and 1200 mi from Dallas and OkCity?

Explain to me the superiority of version and change controls of UK based Spitfire production with specifics on enhanced production rates to match just the Mustang production, let alone AT-6 and B-25?

The 'batches' at NAA Inglewood, Kansas City (B-25), Dallas (AT-6, B-24 and P-51) co-ordinated design, engineering change orders, production article insertion to Maintain commonality. The closest discussions to 'bespoke' were such line items as Photo Recon mods, Aeroproduct propeller/spinner, A-36 dive flaps, and 85 gal fuselage tanks. Some were addressed After acceptance by AAF (85 gal/recon kits) until such articles were inserted into production.

It's funny how, when others have argued that the Spitfire could have been adapted into a decent long-range escort, the response is often "couldda, wouldda, shouldda" from the P-51 crowd. Americans keep banging on about long-range, daylight bomber escort and yet that was not a role that the RAF wanted to take on. Similarly, AFAIK, the F-6 was not used for long-range, high-altitude PR. However, you want me to accept that the P-51 could do it? Why not accept that the Spitfire's range could have been significantly extended if there was an operational need?

To get out of speculation mode, though, let's take a look at the internals of the P-51. Installing a vertical camera with a long focal-length lens aft of the cockpit was considerably complicated by the ducting and fuel tank that sat there. Pushing the camera further aft limits the length of the lens that can be fitted....and the lens size is VITAL for high-altitude PR work. It was bad enough in the high-back P-51B/C but the P-51D fuselage got really small aft of the fuel tank. The big issue was the air intake trunking that forced any vertical camera well aft of the cockpit. You literally can't fit a vertical camera further forward than the aft-most point of the pink shaded area in the diagram below:

View attachment 714801

Putting large, heavy cameras with long lenses into a single-engine airframe is never a piece of cake and the P-51 was not a good choice for the role. Sorry to say anything negative about the Mustang but I'm afraid it simply wasn't up to the job. It was fine as a tac recce asset but not for strategic reconnaissance

Appropriate comment if Strategic Recon is limited to Only F52 camera? Why is that sole criteria? You may argue 'better' but exclusive?

Perhaps you should identify and define Strategic Recon as contrast to Tactical Recon with respect to objectives? BDA, target id, ??

And this brings us back to my original point. You're assuming that the changes that the Spitfire underwent significantly impacted production, field servicing and delivery. Over 20,300 Spitfires were produced and it remained in service for 15 years. That's growth potential and growth in fact.

I'm assuming that single point manfacturing production of basic model, with Depot mod for specials or non-standard, achieves superior production delivery to customer.

 

[Snautzer01]

Good discussion.

 

[buffnut453]

Perhaps you should identify and define Strategic Recon as contrast to Tactical Recon with respect to objectives? BDA, target id, ??

Starting with the easiest question...I did. I specifically identified high-altitude, long-range PR.

If you want more specific details, let's say cruising altitude in excess of 30,000ft, max altitude in excess of 40,000ft, cruising speed in excess of 390mph, max speed in excess of 410mph at an altitude above 22,000ft, and capable of carrying cameras and lenses to image targets at NIIRS 6.5 or better from the defined operating altitudes over a range of, say, 1200 miles. Those figures are for early 1943. By mid-1944, improve top speed performance to 440mph, max altitude of about 48,000ft and range to 1500 miles.

Fine, the UK had a more distributed approach. Did that philosophy achieve equivalency to NAA Model?

Sorry to answer a question with a question but how are you measuring "equivalency"? If you're simply looking at production numbers, then that's not a good metric for a whole host of reasons: different population sizes between US and UK, different availability/costs of land for new factories, different priorities for land-use (UK turned every patch of unused dirt into a vegetable plot), different operational environments (I know I've brought this up before but distributed production imposes costs...the UK had to disperse production, the US didn't).

Spitfire production was geared to meet the needs of the front line. The only time it failed to meet those needs was when the main Supermarine factory was wiped out in 1940. Please show me where poor version/change controls resulted in front-line shortages of Spitfires?

Oh, and Vickers Supermarine (to give the company its full title) also produced over 11,000 Wellington bombers.

Explain to me the superiority of version and change controls of UK based Spitfire production with specifics on enhanced production rates to match just the Mustang production, let alone AT-6 and B-25?

Please show me where I said that version and change controls of UK based Spitfire production were superior? You made the claim that P-51 production was standardized whereas every component in the Spitfire changed. I'm simply refuting that assertion.

Look at the table G Geoffrey Sinclair kindly provided at Post #222. There was overlapping, simultaneous production of multiple Sptifire variants across different factories. Is there a significant loss of production when a new variant starts to be produced? I'm certainly not seeing it...and we have no way of knowing whether any production losses were due to retooling or to other external factors (e.g. follow-on contracts not being in place on time).

I'm assuming that single point manfacturing production of basic model, with Depot mod for specials or non-standard, achieves superior production delivery to customer.

And if you can manage to do that, it's a great model. The UK couldn't for the reasons already explained (distributed production requirements). The RAF still had MUs that were capable of extensive modifications for one-off "specials" or to meet local needs (e.g. adding cameras to make local PR platforms - this was done, for example, on Hurricane and Buffalo airframes in Africa and the Far East respectively).

I may be drawing an incorrect inference from your "specials or non-standard" comment but it seems like you're suggesting that UK factories built one-offs that disrupted production. Are we back to elves hand-fettling Merlin engine components again? Spitfire production runs were standardized within the scope of the variant being produced across multiple factories. There were some false starts, like the MkIII, but every decision was made to maximize production to meet the needs of the front line...and, with the exception of Supermarine's factory being bombed in 1940, those front-line needs were met (including Reverse Lend Lease to the US and USSR).

 

[Deleted member 68059]

Starting with the easiest question...I did. I specifically identified high-altitude, long-range PR.

If you want more specific details, let's say cruising altitude in excess of 30,000ft, max altitude in excess of 40,000ft, cruising speed in excess of 390mph, max speed in excess of 410mph at an altitude above 22,000ft, and capable of carrying cameras and lenses to image targets at NIIRS 6.5 or better from the defined operating altitudes over a range of, say, 1200 miles. Those figures are for early 1943. By mid-1944, improve top speed performance to 440mph, max altitude of about 48,000ft and range to 1500 miles.




Sorry to answer a question with a question but how are you measuring "equivalency"? If you're simply looking at production numbers, then that's not a good metric for a whole host of reasons: different population sizes between US and UK, different availability/costs of land for new factories, different priorities for land-use (UK turned every patch of unused dirt into a vegetable plot), different operational environments (I know I've brought this up before but distributed production imposes costs...the UK had to disperse production, the US didn't).

Spitfire production was geared to meet the needs of the front line. The only time it failed to meet those needs was when the main Supermarine factory was wiped out in 1940. Please show me where poor version/change controls resulted in front-line shortages of Spitfires?

Oh, and Vickers Supermarine (to give the company its full title) also produced over 11,000 Wellington bombers.




Please show me where I said that version and change controls of UK based Spitfire production were superior? You made the claim that P-51 production was standardized whereas every component in the Spitfire changed. I'm simply refuting that assertion.

Look at the table G Geoffrey Sinclair kindly provided at Post #222. There was overlapping, simultaneous production of multiple Sptifire variants across different factories. Is there a significant loss of production when a new variant starts to be produced? I'm certainly not seeing it...and we have no way of knowing whether any production losses were due to retooling or to other external factors (e.g. follow-on contracts not being in place on time).




And if you can manage to do that, it's a great model. The UK couldn't for the reasons already explained (distributed production requirements). The RAF still had MUs that were capable of extensive modifications for one-off "specials" or to meet local needs (e.g. adding cameras to make local PR platforms - this was done, for example, on Hurricane and Buffalo airframes in Africa and the Far East respectively).

I may be drawing an incorrect inference from your "specials or non-standard" comment but it seems like you're suggesting that UK factories built one-offs that disrupted production. Are we back to elves hand-fettling Merlin engine components again? Spitfire production runs were standardized within the scope of the variant being produced across multiple factories. There were some false starts, like the MkIII, but every decision was made to maximize production to meet the needs of the front line...and, with the exception of Supermarine's factory being bombed in 1940, those front-line needs were met (including Reverse Lend Lease to the US and USSR).

This may assist to a certain extent.

 

[GregP]

Lets us know when it completes the 7 1/2 hour type test.

The R-2800 completed the type test and ran extremely well for a LONG time. Ours isn't EVER going to get a standard type test, as I'm sure you know. No museum aircraft ever gets run that hard, especially since all we run these days is 100LL gasoline.

Can't make WWII-rated power on 100LL.

 

[drgondog]

Starting with the easiest question...I did. I specifically identified high-altitude, long-range PR.

If you want more specific details, let's say cruising altitude in excess of 30,000ft, max altitude in excess of 40,000ft, cruising speed in excess of 390mph, max speed in excess of 410mph at an altitude above 22,000ft, and capable of carrying cameras and lenses to image targets at NIIRS 6.5 or better from the defined operating altitudes over a range of, say, 1200 miles. Those figures are for early 1943. By mid-1944, improve top speed performance to 440mph, max altitude of about 48,000ft and range to 1500 miles.

I challenge your defnition as 'Must image target at NIRS 6.5 or better' as a requisite for strategic recon. How was the mission carried out in 1940?, for example? ou can argue successfully that it would be impossible to insert an F52 system within aft fuselage of P-51B or D. You can argue quality for lesser optics installable in a P-51B/D but not the mision of high altitude long-range PR. By your definition no nation existed in WWII, save UK, that was capable of Strategic recon..

Sorry to answer a question with a question but how are you measuring "equivalency"? If you're simply looking at production numbers, then that's not a good metric for a whole host of reasons: different population sizes between US and UK, different availability/costs of land for new factories, different priorities for land-use (UK turned every patch of unused dirt into a vegetable plot), different operational environments (I know I've brought this up before but distributed production imposes costs...the UK had to disperse production, the US didn't).

Well, yes - production numbers from designated manufactring centers are quite a good metric to measure efficiency of design combined with production processes when considering multiple models with significant enough variation as to have different block/model numbers. As to dispersal how many Spitfire assy plants were 1200 miles from each other? Ditto subcontractors like Packard or Hamilton Standard or Goodyear? Whether the Japanese or German meace actually delivered a threat is irrelevant. You may recall that BAM/RAF was sufficiently impressed with NAA qualty in 1939 to approach NAA to build Spitfires.

Spitfire production was geared to meet the needs of the front line. The only time it failed to meet those needs was when the main Supermarine factory was wiped out in 1940. Please show me where poor version/change controls resulted in front-line shortages of Spitfires?

Didn't state such - although I impled feasibility of delays/slower production due to changes implemented at factory site in middle of production block.

Oh, and Vickers Supermarine (to give the company its full title) also produced over 11,000 Wellington bombers.

At one factory? Plus how many Spitfires in 11-42 to 9-45?

Please show me where I said that version and change controls of UK based Spitfire production were superior?

I don't recall stating that. If I did so, it would have been silly as I am clueless regarding either Spitfire design standards, Change control standards, or Production control across plants.

That said I am VERY familiar with NAA processes, and Bell and Vought and GE. To a lesser degree, but substantially, I am quite familiar with General Dynamics, Lockheed and Boeing - as their design to manufacturing standards, including tools and plant floor standards, process plans etc., were under my purview as GE program mgr for AFCAM in 70's. If you wish to discuss preliminary design, spec delivery, aero, structures,performance analysis - we can talk. When I exited airframe biz in 80s I had also dabbled in CAD/CAM and CFD.

You made the claim that P-51 production was standardized whereas every component in the Spitfire changed. I'm simply refuting that assertion.

I made no claim that every, or even most components in the Spitfire changed. I did mke a claim that many parts designed and assemblies tooled for remained the same from NA-73 in 1941 through NA-109 in 1944. I did question that so many variations in wing would have slowed production. It certainy would have been a Major issue for NAA.

Look at the table G Geoffrey Sinclair kindly provided at Post #222. There was overlapping, simultaneous production of multiple Sptifire variants across different factories. Is there a significant loss of production when a new variant starts to be produced? I'm certainly not seeing it...and we have no way of knowing whether any production losses were due to retooling or to other external factors (e.g. follow-on contracts not being in place on time).

I blocked Sinclair years ago.

I didn't say a loss of production occurred. Production is a function of many variables, especially resources applied - not the least are the labor hours (direct/indirect) per unit produced for a defined model or block, the care in planning future prouction breaks to accomodate block or model changes, the number of Temporary Engineering Orders to be incorporated into a block, before becoming a part/assembly continuation or discarded/replaced, successive increases in units produced, etc., etc.

That said, nothing in WWII analysis IMO stand under scrutiny when looking for unit costs. I was a child of DoD 7002 upon which accounting down to CLI/WBS as required by DCASR - and later (AFCAM) down to the level of machine tools. For example, General Dynamic IIRC had 'costed' their 5-axis NC to the dollar base of a jeweler lathe to be ultra competive on the Backplane structure of shipboard 20mm M-61 based air defense systems. Tricky.

And if you can manage to do that, it's a great model. The UK couldn't for the reasons already explained (distributed production requirements). The RAF still had MUs that were capable of extensive modifications for one-off "specials" or to meet local needs (e.g. adding cameras to make local PR platforms - this was done, for example, on Hurricane and Buffalo airframes in Africa and the Far East respectively).

NAA factories for Mustang summed total of two. I didn't ask, or care to listen to, reasons for distributed production requirements. I don't care. Each Mustang factory (inglewood/Dallas) had co-residing production lines (continuous) of Mustangs and Texans. Inglewood also supported B-25, Dallas also supported B-24, although that tapered out in 1943. Net it out - take your most productive Spitfire factory and compare against either Dallas or Inglewood from November 1942 to EOW.

I may be drawing an incorrect inference from your "specials or non-standard" comment but it seems like you're suggesting that UK factories built one-offs that disrupted production. Are we back to elves hand-fettling Merlin engine components again? Spitfire production runs were standardized within the scope of the variant being produced across multiple factories. There were some false starts, like the MkIII, but every decision was made to maximize production to meet the needs of the front line...and, with the exception of Supermarine's factory being bombed in 1940, those front-line needs were met (including Reverse Lend Lease to the US and USSR).

Nope. I did contrast however, the NAA approach toward standardized unit delivered, which then were sent to various Base Depots to accomodate changes desired by customer (recon, early 85 gal fuse tanks) - rather than divert within Inglewood or Dallas, re-train labor force, create blocks within production line disruptive of main flow. NAA Field Service was the focal point to co-ordinate design with NAA engineering and NAA Production to produce kits, train contracted Base Depots (like Curtiss Buffalo or BAD2 Warton) to accept the NAA aiframe, install thekits and ship to Newark or Long Beach for verseas destinations - or fly directly to assigned AAF base within US.

Buffnuts - I have a significant respect for you and your thought processes. I suspect we are at the level of argument for argument's sake. Let me close by saying I think the Spitfire is at the top of discussion for Best Fighter - but not necessarily Most Important.

 

[buffnut453]

I challenge your defnition as 'Must image target at NIRS 6.5 or better' as a requisite for strategic recon. How was the mission carried out in 1940?, for example? ou can argue successfully that it would be impossible to insert an F52 system within aft fuselage of P-51B or D. You can argue quality for lesser optics installable in a P-51B/D but not the mision of high altitude long-range PR. By your definition no nation existed in WWII, save UK, that was capable of Strategic recon..

My point was that you claimed the P-51 could undertake any role that the Spitfire could. I stated, with reference to camera installation etc, that the P-51 could not undertake strategic, high-altitude, long-range reconnaissance. I don't really care what other nations were doing. Simple fact is that the Spitfire met or exceeded all the criteria I set out. If there's another aircraft that could do similar, that's fine...but it wasn't the P-51.

BTW, I picked 1943 to give the P-51 a fighting chance because it didn't even exist in 1940.

By all means, come up with another definition of strategic reconnaissance. However, even in the 1980s and early 1990s, strategic reconnaissance meant high-altitude and long range (SR-71, U-2) while tactical reconnaissance meant low-level and, relatively, shorter range (RF-4).

You may recall that BAM/RAF was sufficiently impressed with NAA qualty in 1939 to approach NAA to build Spitfires.

Again, I never said there was anything wrong with NAA's build quality or processes. Not once have I attacked them or claimed they weren't a great manufacturer. I have said, repeatedly, that the P-51 was an amazing design that was translated from drawing board to operational airframe exceptionally quickly. I also haven't criticized centralized production methods which, obviously, make sense if space and conditions permit.

I did question that so many variations in wing would have slowed production. It certainy would have been a Major issue for NAA.

Well, it rather depends what you mean by "so many" wing variations. There were 6 total variations but they were spread out in time and, by 1942 most wing production was standardized to one of two types. The various wings comprised:

• The A wing was the original with 4x303 machine guns as per the Battle of Britain. The B wing carried 1x20mm cannon and 2x303 machine guns. The A and B wings were not used after the Spitfire MkV.
• The C, or "universal" wing appeared in October 1941. It could accommodate multiple armament configurations comprising 4x303s, 2x 20mm cannon or 1x20mm cannon and 2x303s...all using the same wing design.
• The D wing was the PR "bowser" wing with no guns but lots of extra fuel tankage to get the required operating range.
• The E wing was a development of the C wing to provide 2x20mm cannon or 1x20mm cannon and 2x50cal machine guns, and to carry bombs as well.
• Finally, there was the Spitfire Mk21 wing which was an entirely new shape and only came in very late in WW2.

NAA factories for Mustang summed total of two. I didn't ask, or care to listen to, reasons for distributed production requirements. I don't care. Each Mustang factory (inglewood/Dallas) had co-residing production lines (continuous) of Mustangs and Texans. Inglewood also supported B-25, Dallas also supported B-24, although that tapered out in 1943. Net it out - take your most productive Spitfire factory and compare against either Dallas or Inglewood from November 1942 to EOW.

From your "I don't care" comment, it seems you're only interested in proving American superiority. The US had about three times the population of the UK in 1941. It clearly has far more land mass available for industrial use. It also wasn't under threat of attack. You are free to ignore those factors but they drive decision-making for all forms of industrial production. Comparing the most productive Spitfire factory to Dallas or Inglewood is neither a useful nor a fair comparison because of differing constraints and opportunities. Dallas and Inglewood were massive factories that could bring in a critical mass of people into centralized locations to accelerate production. That doesn't mean that Spitfire production was excessively inefficient given the circumstances under which it was operating.

Buffnuts - I have a significant respect for you and your thought processes. I suspect we are at the level of argument for argument's sake. Let me close by saying I think the Spitfire is at the top of discussion for Best Fighter - but not necessarily Most Important.

I tend to agree. Let's call it evens...although I will say that the Spitfire (and the Hurricane were the most important fighters in the world in 1940!

 

[Greg Boeser]

My point was that you claimed the P-51 could undertake any role that the Spitfire could. I stated, with reference to camera installation etc, that the P-51 could not undertake strategic, high-altitude, long-range reconnaissance. I don't really care what other nations were doing. Simple fact is that the Spitfire met or exceeded all the criteria I set out. If there's another aircraft that could do similar, that's fine...but it wasn't the P-51.

BTW, I picked 1943 to give the P-51 a fighting chance because it didn't even exist in 1940.

By all means, come up with another definition of strategic reconnaissance. However, even in the 1980s and early 1990s, strategic reconnaissance meant high-altitude and long range (SR-71, U-2) while tactical reconnaissance meant low-level and, relatively, shorter range (RF-4).




Again, I never said there was anything wrong with NAA's build quality or processes. Not once have I attacked them or claimed they weren't a great manufacturer. I have said, repeatedly, that the P-51 was an amazing design that was translated from drawing board to operational airframe exceptionally quickly. I also haven't criticized centralized production methods which, obviously, make sense if space and conditions permit.



Well, it rather depends what you mean by "so many" wing variations. There were 6 total variations but they were spread out in time and, by 1942 most wing production was standardized either to one of two types. The various wings comprised:

• The A wing was the original with 4x303 machine guns as per the Battle of Britain. The B wing carried 2x20mm cannon and 2x303 machine guns. The A and B wings were not used after the Spitfire MkV.
• The C, or "universal" wing appeared in October 1941. It could accommodate multiple armament configurations comprising 4x303s, 4x 20mm cannon or 2x20mm cannon and 2x303s...all using the same wing design.
• The D wing was the PR "bowser" wing with no guns but lots of extra fuel tankage to get the required operating range. The E wing was a development of the C wing to provide 4x20mm cannon, 2x20mm cannon and 2x50cal machine guns, and to carry bombs as well.
• Finally, there was the Spitfire Mk21 wing which was an entirely new shape and only came in very late in WW2.

From your "I don't care" comment, it seems you're only interested in proving American superiority. The US had about three times the population of the UK in 1941. It clearly has far more land mass available for industrial use. It also wasn't under threat of attack. You are free to ignore those factors but they drive decision-making for all forms of industrial production. Comparing the most productive Spitfire factory to Dallas or Inglewood is neither a useful nor a fair comparison because of differing constraints and opportunities. Dallas and Inglewood were massive factories that could bring in a critical mass of people into centralized locations to accelerate production. That doesn't mean that Spitfire production was excessively inefficient given the circumstances under which it was operating.




I tend to agree. Let's call it evens...although I will say that the Spitfire (and the Hurricane were the most important fighters in the world in 1940!

You left out the Bf 109. Better than the Hurricane, at least as good as the Spitfire.

 

[buffnut453]

You left out the Bf 109. Better than the Hurricane, at least as good as the Spitfire.

Ahhh.....but nowhere near as important. Hurricane and Spitfire....defenders of democracy and liberty in 1940!!!

 

[Greg Boeser]

Ahhh.....but nowhere near as important. Hurricane and Spitfire....defenders of democracy and liberty in 1940!!!

But the Messerschmitt was the tip of the spear ushering in a New World Order led by the Aryan race. A world of scientific efficiency, unbridled by the chaotic clammering of the decadent and unwashed masses. If only their Anglo-Saxon cousins had seen the light.

 

[buffnut453]

But the Messerschmitt was the tip of the spear ushering in a New World Order led by the Aryan race. A world of scientific efficiency, unbridled by the chaotic clammering of the decadent and unwashed masses. If only their Anglo-Saxon cousins had seen the light.

Glad I'm still fumbling around in darkness.

 

[SaparotRob]

Glad I'm still fumbling around in darkness.

You and me both, Brother!

 

[buffnut453]

You and me both, Brother!

I am NOT fumbliing around in the darkness with you!!! Just being crystal clear on that point!!!

I love you, brother...just not in that way.