US strategy and tactics for Midway if IJN has radar, CIC and radios in the Zeros

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The A6M2 hate a rate of climb of roughly 3,150 fpm and the SBDs were coming in over 12,000 feet from two different directions.
I'd like to hope that the IJN radar operators can radio the Zeros so that they have at least a four min warning to get to 12,000 feet. Of course many of the Zeros were already at HA on CAP but broke ranks and dove down onto the TDBs. Radar on the carriers detecting the SBDs at at least a dozen miles combined with radios in the fighters and operational discipline in the cockpits will ensure that most of the Zeros assigned to HA CAP will remain there.
 
I'd like to hope that the IJN radar operators can radio the Zeros so that they have at least a four min warning to get to 12,000 feet. Of course many of the Zeros were already at HA on CAP but broke ranks and dove down onto the TDBs. Radar on the carriers detecting the SBDs at at least a dozen miles combined with radios in the fighters and operational discipline in the cockpits will ensure that most of the Zeros assigned to HA CAP will remain there.
Even if the Japanese radar were able to give altitude, you still had the torpedo bombers attacking as the SBDs approached, so what do you propose they do with the 50 (or so) CAP elements?
The Akagi, Soryu and Kaga were also gyrating, trying to evade the attacking TBDs and TBFs, creating a hot mess as far as the CAP's chasing the torpedo bombers.
Add to that, the SBDs were approaching from two different directions: from the west and from the south.

And finally, the CAP had been in the air for a considerable amount of time, expending both fuel and ammunition, how effective would they be if vectored in time?
 
Of course many of the Zeros were already at HA on CAP but broke ranks and dove down onto the TDBs.
Add to that, scattered to broken cumulus clouds at SBD approach altitudes hindered CAP's scanning visibility, and a large percentage of the SBDs came from a direction the CAP pilots had not been briefed to expect.
 
Even if the Japanese radar were able to give altitude, you still had the torpedo bombers attacking as the SBDs approached, so what do you propose they do with the 50 (or so) CAP elements?
The Akagi, Soryu and Kaga were also gyrating, trying to evade the attacking TBDs and TBFs, creating a hot mess as far as the CAP's chasing the torpedo bombers.
Add to that, the SBDs were approaching from two different directions: from the west and from the south.

And finally, the CAP had been in the air for a considerable amount of time, expending both fuel and ammunition, how effective would they be if vectored in time?
What radar gives the IJN is informed asset allocation. True their fighters can't be everywhere and need fuel and (in some cases) ammunition. So, have the existing LA Zeros combat the TBDs. The IJN knows that dive bombers are deadly, and that they're approaching enmasse. The IJN has proven thus far to be able to dodge torpedo strikes, but dive bombers are another story. I'm also not sure if the HA Zeros (those that we're not sending to LA) had fired a shot yet, so they should have some ammunition. Taking this into account, I'd leave all the HA Zeros in place, vectoring them onto the SBDs, it's the greater threat.

With radar alerting of the coming strike the carriers can also make some rush preparations. Such as securing fuel lines, closing watertight doors, preparing damage control, and launching any aircraft on deck. I'm not suggesting the IJN survives the day, but radar, radios and teamwork (rather than army of one thinking) will make for an interesting day.
 
But the IJN's radar doesn't give altitude, only an indication that there are inbound contacts.
They can prepare, yes, but for what?
More B-26s, torpedo bombers, B-17s, fighters or more level bombing Marine SBDs?

So far that morning, the Japanese were attacked by everything but the kitchen sink - they had no way of known just exactly what was coming until visual confirmation, radar or not.
 
With radar alerting of the coming strike the carriers can also make some rush preparations. Such as securing fuel lines, closing watertight doors, preparing damage control, and launching any aircraft on deck. I'm not suggesting the IJN survives the day, but radar, radios and teamwork (rather than army of one thinking) will make for an interesting day.

This would likely be the most valuable service performed by the hypothetical IJN radar that day. I have no doubt Akagi could have survived a single 1000-lb strike (and another near-miss) with hangars and fuel-lines secured. The near-miss disabling the rudder would have been easier to fix without an inferno going on above-decks.

Soryu as well might have survived given secured hangars and fuel-lines, but 3x1000-lb bombs is gonna hurt no matter what.

Kaga as well may have been badly hurt but sailable -- 1x1000-lb, 3x500-lb bombs into an unarmored deck stinks, but if the machinery ain't hit you've got good odds, especially on a battleship hull.

Advance warning of the DB strike would, I think, have meant more to the ships than the CAP, given that the CAP would have been necessarily split no matter what. I don't think the Americans would have suffered more, but I suspect the Japanese would have suffered less.
 
The aircraft belowdecks of the three carriers were fueled and armed.
Even if the crews had enough time to drain and stow the fuel lines plus ventilating the hangar area AND secure the bombs and torpedoes that had been strewn about, there is still the issue of the SBDs' bombs setting off the aircraft that were crammed into the carrier's hangars.
There is also the issue if IJN fire-control measures. The USN had an "everyone hands-on" training for fire-control, where the Japanese Navy relied on a special team to manage fire aboard a ship.
If any of the members of that team were hurt/killed in an attack, there was no one to take his place. If most the team were hurt/killed, then it was literally amateur night at the bonfire by any personnel that could be rounded up to man the fire hoses.
 
Even if the crews had enough time to drain and stow the fuel lines plus ventilating the hangar area AND secure the bombs and torpedoes that had been strewn about, there is still the issue of the SBDs' bombs setting off the aircraft that were crammed into the carrier's hangars.

True that airplanes are themselves fire hazards, but with fuelies and ammo crews being separate, I don't see much issue with the two crews mitigating much of the hazard, albeit with a lot of elbow-grease.

There's also the design issues of routing water mains and such on the Japanese carriers that no tactical decision can change. Forgive my quoting Wiki:

The 1000-pound bomb hit amidships and penetrated the flight deck to explode on the upper hangar. The explosions ruptured the ship's avgas lines, damaged both her port and starboard fire mains and the emergency generator powering her fire pumps, as well as knocking out the carbon dioxide fire suppression system.[63]


I think those problems could have been ameliorated by draining fuel lines and stowing ammo, which radar-warning might have prompted.
 
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The aircraft belowdecks of the three carriers were fueled and armed.
Even if the crews had enough time to drain and stow the fuel lines plus ventilating the hangar area, there is still the issue of the SBDs' bombs setting off the aircraft that were crammed into the carrier's hangars.

True that airplanes are themselves fire hazards, but with fuelies and ammo crews being separate, I don't see much issue with the two crews mitigating much of the hazard, albeit with a lot of elbow-grease.
I find that a bit hard to swallow, given that IJN carriers generally had fully enclosed hangar decks without the large side openings our flattops had. Part of the reason there was so much excess ordnance about was that handling it was limited by lift capacity. There was no other way. No provision for rapid emergency jettison from the hangar deck.
As for defueling aircraft for hazard mitigation, "no way, Jose"! I've worked as an aircraft fueler/defueler, and for a muti-tank gravity fueled aircraft, it's a slow and arduous process, and when you're done, what have you got? An FAE bomb consisting of unusable and irretrievable fuel in an air and vapor-filled closed container. And there's no plumbing to jettison the removed fuel overboard, so it's likely still there waiting to be set off. Good luck with that.
 
I find that a bit hard to swallow, given that IJN carriers generally had fully enclosed hangar decks without the large side openings our flattops had. Part of the reason there was so much excess ordnance about was that handling it was limited by lift capacity. There was no other way. No provision for rapid emergency jettison from the hangar deck.
As for defueling aircraft for hazard mitigation, "no way, Jose"! I've worked as an aircraft fueler/defueler, and for a muti-tank gravity fueled aircraft, it's a slow and arduous process, and when you're done, what have you got? An FAE bomb consisting of unusable and irretrievable fuel in an air and vapor-filled closed container. And there's no plumbing to jettison the removed fuel overboard, so it's likely still there waiting to be set off. Good luck with that.

Yeah, I wasn't imagining draining tanks in airplanes -- that's clearly too laborious to manage in battle. I was thinking much more about draining the fuel lines in the ship itself. As noted, the aircraft will themselves remain a fire hazard. I think that'd be better than fueled planes sitting in and amongst wet fuel lines and ammo rolling around, was my point. Kaga apparently had some forty tons of bombs and torpedoes slopping around the hangar-deck from the order-counterorder-disorder process between the strike return and the decisive attack. That could have possibly been cleared up with a little notice.

If the Japanese had 20-minutes notice by radar, and if they'd been of a defensive mindset, I think they could have drained fuel lines and stowed at least some ammunition. That's the what-if here, after all.

I think that's the only benefit radar on a Japanese ship could perhaps provide. Not saying it would; just saying that it could have done so.
 
Yeah, I wasn't imagining draining tanks in airplanes -- that's clearly too laborious to manage in battle. I was thinking much more about draining the fuel lines in the ship itself. As noted, the aircraft will themselves remain a fire hazard. I think that'd be better than fueled planes sitting in and amongst wet fuel lines and ammo rolling around, was my point. Kaga apparently had some forty tons of bombs and torpedoes slopping around the hangar-deck from the order-counterorder-disorder process between the strike return and the decisive attack. That could have possibly been cleared up with a little notice.

If the Japanese had 20-minutes notice by radar, and if they'd been of a defensive mindset, I think they could have drained fuel lines and stowed at least some ammunition. That's the what-if here, after all.

I think that's the only benefit radar on a Japanese ship could perhaps provide. Not saying it would; just saying that it could have done so.
Yo' Thumpster,
Military Aviation History Channel just put out a video "In Defense of the Worst Plane of WW 2, The Brewster Buffalo". Tell buffnut if ya' see him.
 
Can I ask, why did the IJN change ordinance?, the aircraft were loaded with land bombs to attack Midway, why didn't they just use them against the carriers, the carriers are unarmored, a 500Lb bomb hitting a wooden deck is going to cause a lot of damage, just launch and attack and have torps and AP bombs ready for the next strike.
 
Can I ask, why did the IJN change ordinance?, the aircraft were loaded with land bombs to attack Midway, why didn't they just use them against the carriers, the carriers are unarmored, a 500Lb bomb hitting a wooden deck is going to cause a lot of damage, just launch and attack and have torps and AP bombs ready for the next strike.

Particularly with the Kates, changing bombs out for torpedoes meant something. The Kates couldn't dive-bomb, and I think we all know how useless level-bombing ships is open water is.

Even with the Vals, against ships SAP bombs are preferable to HE, in order to get to the innards.

I agree that a quick strike may have been more useful than a proper strike, if you get my drift. But the Kates would either need rearming, or need to be sent for Midway's second strike. Armed with bombs, they wouldn't be very useful against ships at sea.
 
Can I ask, why did the IJN change ordinance?, the aircraft were loaded with land bombs to attack Midway, why didn't they just use them against the carriers, the carriers are unarmored, a 500Lb bomb hitting a wooden deck is going to cause a lot of damage, just launch and attack and have torps and AP bombs ready for the next strike.
Bear in mind, the Japanese tended to think of armored flight decks as the norm, as per their mentors, the British. Doctrine said land bombs for land targets, antiship bombs for ship targets, so that's what they did. Genda and Fuchida were both "under the weather" medically and not at the top of their game, and Nagumo was not an air minded admiral, despite being the most combat experienced carrier commander in the world at the time. So doctrine wasn't subject to ad hoc second guessing.
 
Kaga apparently had some forty tons of bombs and torpedoes slopping around the hangar-deck from the order-counterorder-disorder process between the strike return and the decisive attack. That could have possibly been cleared up with a little notice.
The ordnance lifts were designed to expeditiously deliver their cargo to the hangar deck. Sending ordnance "down the up staircase" was not part of the original plan, and required jury rigging and innovating, which was not going to happen quickly. Besides, a bomb hit with downloading in progress would provide an ignition path straight down to the magazines. Guy Faulkes would be amazed!
 
Besides, a bomb hit with downloading in progress would provide an ignition path straight down to the magazines. Guy Faulkes would be amazed!

Yeah, but I'm not sure that'd be any worse than the alternative we saw play out. Guy Fawkes actually woke up, looked around, and said "holy crap!" on 4 June 1942. Trust me; he tweeted me a few weeks ago about this.

A lot of the magazine was actually not in the magazine. That's a problem. Best to address it ASAP, I reckon.
 
Yeah, but I'm not sure that'd be any worse than the alternative we saw play out. Guy Fawkes actually woke up, looked around, and said "holy crap!" on 4 June 1942. Trust me; he tweeted me a few weeks ago about this.

A lot of the magazine was actually not in the magazine. That's a problem. Best to address it ASAP, I reckon.
Punch through the compartments lining both sides of the hangar deck, and dump it all overboard.
 

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