If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific.
Yamamoto was also against dragging the U.S. into a war. He warned against it and when told to do draw up plans to strike a hard blow against the U.S., he said the attack may be a success, but it will only be a matter of time before the U.S. strikes back. However, the war cabinet was pretty sure of themselves and ignored Yamamoto, feeling confident that they would be able to lure the USN into one great victorious showdown.
If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it.
There were three attack waves planned. the first wave went remarkably well, the second seemed to falter.
One of the reasons for the second wave's diminished success, was that the U.S. defenses were far stronger than they had anticipated.
Add to that, the few USAAC aircraft that had managed to get airborn were unexpected and while not sweeping the skies of the invaders, did cause them great concern.
So the furious response from the defenders coupled with the fact that the carriers and their support ships were out to sea with no known location, the third wave was withdrawn.
GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable.
To give an idea of the density of shipyards on the west coast, here is a list of prewar sites:
California - Alameda, Long Beach, Los Angeles, San Fransisco, San Pedro, Sausalito, Wilmington.
Oregon - Astoria, Goble, Marshfield, Portland, Rainier.
Washington - Anacortes, Bellingham, Everette, Hoquiam, Longview, Port Angeles, Port Blakely, Seattle, South Bend, Suguamish, Winslow.
As far as aircraft companies listed, on the west coast, there were also Hughes, Avco/Vultee, Ryan and Interstate.
To complicate matters a little more, consider the US Navy, US Marine, US Coast Guard and USAAC installations spread all the way from Alaska to the Mexican border. And let's toss in the RCN and RCAF assets in the British Columbia area, too.
To effect a successful assault, it would take a great deal of planning and quietly shifting a vast amount of assets without alerting the U.S.
If the Japanese weren't successful in eliminating the US Pacific fleet in that concentrated area, they would most certainly have their hands full trying to take and hold the north american west coast.
I'm not saying it couldn't be done, but I remain highly skeptical of it's success in light of Imperial Japan's historical strategic blunders.
If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.
This was Germany's major Faux Pas, too. When Germany rolled into the Ukraine and Russian proper, the civilians lined the streets, showering the German troops with flowers, hailing them as liberators. Red army soldiers defected to the Germans in droves, ready to take up arms against Uncle Joe and the Communists.
*HAD* Hitler seized on this opportunity and played on the sentiments of the people and played the "great savior" instead of crushing them with his hatred, the taking of the Soviet Union would had been very well within his grasp.