Yep, got it there Glixxerman; it was pie-in-the-sky. Political will accounted for most of the dumb ideas the Germans had, and some of the smart ones too, I guess.
I think that you guys are missing the point behind attacking radar sites. There's no doubt that disrupting the system would be achieved momentarily by bombing them, but the point of doing so is that it is part of the bigger picture of destroying the enemy's ability to fight back. You're taking one isolated area and hinging your entire argument for carrying out the exercise on it. Yes, in reality the LW did not succeed in knocking out the radar sites, but that is no excuse in a war game scenario not to continue attacking them. In reality Germany did not have the means nor the inclination to invade the UK - wasn't gonna happen.
Yes, your bombers are going to be shot down; in reality the RAF lost more bombers attacking high threat sites like Peenemunde, but that wasn't going to stop them continuing to do so if need be. In this kind of scenario the entire place needs to be levelled to the ground (not possible in reality - that is why we pretend); "Bombed back into the Stone Age" is how the Americans put waging war against the Trail in Laos. It's the only way.
Isn't there a story about a German Zeppelin cruising the channel North sea just before the war looking for various radio emissions (including radar) but looking for at the wrong frequencies?
The airship was Hindenburg's sister LZ 130 Graf Zeppelin II (not to be confused with LZ 127 Graf Zeppelin, which circumnavigated the Globe in 1927) and it was indeed sent out to clandestinely monitor British radio transmissions from radio towers erected along the British coast in late 1938 and throughout 1939 until just before war broke out. The excuse was route surveying flights, although LZ 130 never carried a single fare paying passenger. Off the coast of Scotland British aircraft were sent from RAF Dyce (now Aberdeen Airport) to keep an eye on it; the British never rose to the bait and radio transmissions were not recorded.
As for the 'beams'; Knickebein was successfully jammed in August 1940, but X-Gerat, which had been in operation since 1939 was not identified by the British as a seperate system until September 1940. By the time of the attack on Birmingham in October 1940 the British were aware of what the Germans were up to with this new device, although they had yet to establish its exact frequencies and wavelengths; they did this by using info from enigma decrypts, a KGr 100 He 111 that ran out of fuel over Britain and from examining the Graf Spee, which is pretty much all the British had on German radar until the BoB broke out - that line of thought (the Graf Spee's radar) yielded surpisingly useful information.
The Germans had gotten clever by November 1940 and X-Gerat was sufficiently arrayed that two raids could be launched in a single night; in the early days of November, Birmingham, Coventry and Liverpool were attacked, often on the same night. On the night of 14/15 November, the Germans enacted 'Moonlight Sonata'; this was the attack on Coventry that grabbed headlines around the world; the Brits knew about Moonlight Sonata, but didn't know the target; as I said earlier it was a fifty/fifty choice between Wolverhampton and Coventry. The other issue was that that day's enigma decrypts hadn't been decoded in time for the raid, so the vital piece of intel decifering which city was going to be bombed wasn't found out until afterwards.
Of course, the British sent out a jamming signal, but its strength was too weak (1500 MHz) and the bombers got through; the German signals worked on 2000 MHz. After Coventry the Brits got the measure of X-Gerat and used the ground stations broadcasting erroneous signals to do so, thus misleading the German pathfinders. The Germans continued using Knickebein and X and Y-Gerat into 1941 as their bombing efforts intensified, despite British efforts to jam them. More stations were set up throughout Europe to aid its campaign.
The Germans were aware that something was up, however, as reconnaissance aircraft had photographed increased AA around Wolverhampton - the next target, so, on the night that the British expected Wolves to be bombed, the Germans did not. At no time did they suspect that the British had broken their enigma codes, so they continued sending everything by this means.
By February 1941, the British had the measure of all three systems and used their countermeasures accordingly, which included decoy sites and false fires to deceive the raiders, thus the bombing raids over the next three months did not rely on accurate radio guidance as previously. The Germans placed high hopes on these systems; the LW described them in a contemporary publication as "enormously important and hardly replaceable" (I don't know the publication, this book doesn't list its name) - as the chappie who designed them, Dr Plendl was given a high commendation from Goering himself.