Japanese air power in a hypotetical invasion of the USSR in 1941

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Attention all WWII air forces, bomb the spammer!
 
The most advanced tank Japan had in service in 1941 was their Type 97 Chi-Ha Medium tank. It sported a 57mm main gun and 2 x 7.7mm. Armor was 25mm, had a crew of 4 and a speed of 24mph.

Facing them would be Over 1,000 tanks [After the German Invasion Stalin left 19 Reserve Divisions with 1,200 tanks in Mongolia (World War II magazine, Jul 2003)] including the T-34 which was first deployed in the Far-East sporting a 76.2mm cannon, 2 x 7.62mm MGs 47-65mm armor a crew of 4 and a speed of 25mph.

The best tank Japan had was almost an equal to the Soviet BT-7 Light Tank (45mm 2 x 7.62mm MG, 22mm armor and a speed of 53mph). There would be no contest.
 
Now here has been a bit overstatements of Soviet strength
Actually they had:
2 Rifle/Infantry divisions (57. and 82.)
1 Motorized Rifle Div (36.)
2 Tank Brigades (6. and 11.)
3 Motor Armoured/Mechanized Brigades (7., 8. and 9., the last one was transferred from reserve on 21 Aug)
1 Machine Gun Brigade
2 Mongolian Cavalry Divisions (6. and 8., at least the 6. had only two Cav.Rgts)

In Reserve
1 Airborne Br. (212.)

When the Soviet counter attack began on 20 Aug on Japanese side the badly mauled 1. Tank Corps (in fact it had been only a size of a weak tank regiment) was withdrawn but Japanese had committed instead a Artillery Corps of four heavy artillery regiments and a mortar regiment.

Also a border guard infantry regiment had arrived as reinforcement to the reinforced 23. Infantry Div. And because the Mongolian troops have been counted on the other side, its worth to mention that on Japanese side there were four Manchuoko cavalry regiments. And the rest of the elite 7. Division, one of its regiments had already attached to 23. Div, began to arrive just as the Soviet offensive began and was thrown against the Soviet spearheads.

The strength numbers in Wiki article are right so Soviet side had 1½ more troops than Japanese side, overwhelming superiority in tanks and a slight superiority in numbers in artillery pieces (Soviet counted also their medium (82mm) mortars into their arty pieces) but Japanese had clearly more heavy pieces.

Juha
 
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IIRC SU won if not all then almost all of those border clashes. And on Khalkhin Gol, in fact Soviet kept it local, they didn't began the conflict and didn't attack clearly Manchurian areas, on the other hand Japanese began the conflict and also tried to invade areas in Mongolia proper. And Kwantung Army committed almost every means they had to spare, they committed them peacemeal, yes, but they sent there their tank regiment, that attack didn't went well and their HQ heavy artillery units. Plus of course one regiment fron 7th Div and sundry other units.

Juha

Not really. Most of the clashes were inconclusive with a rather big one occuring in Eastern Manchuria in which after very bloody fighting the Japanese retook the contested position (a commanding height of course). Casualties were secondary to objectives there as in Nomanhan. In re: Nomanhan, there's no disputing some of the qualitive edges the Russians had in equipment but tanks in particular are not the magic bullet they are often portrayed. Despite outnumbering the Japanese 8:1 in that dept the Russian AFV force didn't distinquish itself in particular anymore than the Japanese force did save that given the few 100 or so they brought, the Japanese tank force didn't do terribly either. Casualties again at the end of the Nomanhan conflict were comparable so Soviet postwar claims of "crushing" victories i take with a serious grain of salt. Coxx is more precise on Japanese casualties which he estimates at 16,640. According to Krivosheev, Soviet casualties amounted to about 15,925. The Russians as mentioned "won" by their committment and clearer objectives, not to mention holding the contested ground at the end. But they hardly "crushed" their opponents conveying images of helpless Japanese troops being mown down by a superior armored and mechanized force. Didn't happen that way. The Russians continued to take the threat of IJA intervention seriously enough to maintain strong forces in the Far East even after the German invasion though they tapped it for experienced troops replacing them with conscripts.
 
Hello Nikademus
Yes I had forgotten the Amur River Incident in 1937 and the Changkufeng Incident in 1938, which Japanese "won"

Yes Soviet exaggerated the Japanese losses, IIRC in his memoirs Zhukov wrote that his forces almost annihilated Japanese 6th Army when in essence they almost annihilated their main opponent, 23rd Div (it lost ¾ of its strength) and badly mauled 7th Div (lost appr. 1/3 ), 8th BGU suffered amost as badly but other units much less. On Soviet armour, while I don't appraise much Japanese "human bullit" tactics, I do appraise the use of petrol filled soda bottles by 26th Inf.Rgt of 7th Div. In fact it was a more crude form of the more sophisticated Molotov Cocktails used by Finns during the Winter War as their main infantry A/T weapon. Even I got training how to make and use them during my compulsory military service. SU kept troops not only in Siberia but also along whole of its long Southern border, Stalin remained as suspicious as ever during WWII.

Juha
 
The cocktails were used becase the units didn't have much AT guns. But the IJA was not stupid. They would provide the necessary AT guns if they did have an idea of what was coming to them. It's because things like those that I disagreed with the hiistorians that say the IJA proved so inferior in Nomonhan and therefore Japan didn't attacked the USSR in 1941.

Another question I launch for those historians is that the IJA himself belived that the main theater would be in Eastern Manchuria, in a well covered terrain suitable to IJA infantry tactics. I don't know why people talk so much of the Soviet tanks in the Mongolian plains.

I don't want to praise the IJA as a high tech army, which surely it wasn't, but neither it was composed by a bunch of idiots just launching Banzai charges against their enemies like some say. Critics to the IJA like Coox did in this book are just critics. Every Army, Air Force and Navy has defects, which would appear more or less depending on the situation the force be employed.
 
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Hello Jenisch
The cocktails were used becase the units didn't have much AT guns. But the IJA was not stupid. They would provide the necessary AT guns if they did have an idea of what was coming to them. It's because things like those that I disagreed with the hiistorians that say the IJA proved so inferior in Nomonhan and therefore Japan didn't attacked the USSR in 1941.

Nobody used Molotov Cocktails if they had better A/T weapons in hand, altogether too risky weapon for the user. Japanese were stupid if they didn't anticipate massive use of tanks by the Soviets, SU was well known of its vast tank fleet at least from mid 30s and had used a couple hundreds tanks during the Changkufeng Incident, which happened in fairly limited area, just a year before. Japanese simply didn't have enough A/T guns and didn't get a good one before they got their 47mm A/T gun ready. It was smallish but good for its size but units began to get it only was that in 1943.

Another question I launch for those historians is that the IJA himself belived that the main theater would be in Eastern Manchuria, in a well covered terrain suitable to IJA infantry tactics. I don't know why people talk so much of the Soviet tanks in the Mongolian plains.

Now Soviets happened to be fairly good in forest warfare themselves.

I don't want to praise the IJA as a high tech army, which surely it wasn't, but neither it was composed by a bunch of idiots just launching Banzai charges against their enemies like some say. Critics to the IJA like Coox did in this book are just critics. Every Army, Air Force and Navy has defects, which would appear more or less depending on the situation the force be employed.

Japanese Army had good infantry tactics, very good moral, good small scale artillery tactics, but wasn't used to massive use of arty like Soviet Army which had always and its predessor theRussian Army had since 16th Century, regarded artillery as very important arm. And Japanese had that habit to launch Banzai charges, which helped US troops for ex. on Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Kiska. SU infantry also had good firepower because it was partly armed with semi-automatic rifles, had good LMG and plenty of mortars. And against good infantry with plenty of firepower Banzau charges were just stupid.

Juha
 
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Japanese simply didn't have enough A/T guns and didn't get a good one before they got their 47mm A/T gun ready. It was smallish but good for its size but units began to get it only was that in 1943.

Why do you think they didn't have much AT guns? Simply because they didn't expected much tanks.

About the quality of their AT guns in Nomonhan, they were not world beaters, but were adequated against Soviet armor (apart from the non-employed KV-1 tank).

The 47mm gun started to be received in '42: Type 1 47 mm Anti-Tank Gun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

It wasn't used in great numbers mainly because the Japanese were involved in the Pacific War and the IJN receive top priority.

Now Soviets happened to be fairly good in forest warfare themselves.

I doubt they would be superior to the Japanese. Specially with other considerations of an invasion.

Japanese Army had good infantry tactics, very good moral, good small scale artillery tactics, but wasn't used to massive use of arty like Soviet Army which had always and its predessor theRussian Army had since 16th Century, regarded artillery as very important arm.

The Japanese didn't desconsiderated artillery. The problem was their arm proved inferior in Nomonhan, when they thought it was the opposite. They corrected the problerm after.

And Japanese had that habit to launch Banzai charges, which helped US troops for ex. on Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Kiska. SU infantry also had good firepower because it was partly armed with semi-automatic rifles, had good LMG and plenty of mortars. And against good infantry with plenty of firepower Banzau charges were just stupid.

The Banzai charges were only used as a last resource to break away from an enemy encirclement or not be captured. Against poorly armed enemies they were also employed.

SU infantry also had good firepower because it was partly armed with semi-automatic rifles, had good LMG and plenty of mortars.

The firepower of the IJA was not much different from the German Army, and they were experts in close quarters and night combat. They preffer to conduct their attacks on this form.
 
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You use of the double negative " didn't desconsiderated" is confusing. Do you simply mean the Japanese considered artillery? Or What ?

There are so many instances of the Japanese army using the Banzai charge at other times other than last resort, i'm surprized you'd make the statement that they only used it as a last resort. There's several examples at Saipan, Iwo Jima, Guadalcanal, and others where early use of the banzai needlessly wasted men.

My own father fought at Guadalcanal, in his opinion, the Japanese seemed too eager to die. A more thought out use of their soldiers abilities would have inflicted more casualties on the US troops.
 
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Why do you think they didn't have much AT guns? Simply because they didn't expected much tanks.

As I wrote, to provocate SU in late 30s and to expect that SU won't use much armour was silly

About the quality of their AT guns in Nomonhan, they were not world beaters, but were adequated against Soviet armor (apart from the non-employed KV-1 tank).

So one could expect, BT series tanks were not heavily armoured but clearly Japanese were not altogether satisfied with their 37mm Type 94 A/T gun because they in addition to the development of 47mm A/T gun began to develop 37mm Type 1 A/T gun as a stopgap measure.

I doubt they would be superior to the Japanese. Specially with other considerations of an invasion.

I don't know if they were superior but I doubt that Japaneses were superior to Russians, especially if Japan was the aggressor and so the fighting would have been on the home turf of Siberian troops.



The Japanese didn't desconsiderated artillery. The problem was their arm proved inferior in Nomonhan, when they thought it was the opposite. They corrected the problerm after.

Now Japan did not have production potential to challenge SU in artillery power.



The Banzai charges were only used as a last resource to break away from an enemy encirclement or not be captured. Against poorly armed enemies they were also employed.

Now as tyrodtom wrote that wasn't so, for ex. the first reinforcemets to Guadalcanal, an elite unit, was wasted in a banzai charge at their first contact with US Marines


The firepower of the IJA was not much different from the German Army, and they were experts in close quarters and night combat. They preffer to conduct their attacks on this form.

The first part of your claim isn't true, much of the infantry firepower in early WWII was based on LMGs and medium mgs and in those categories German MG 34 was clearly superior to the Japanese weapons.

Juha
 
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".... the Japanese seemed too eager to die. A more thought out use of their soldiers abilities would have inflicted more casualties on the US troops."

Throughout Nomonhan, Alvin Coox claims the Japanese soldiers admired the way the Soviet soldiers "died" -- i.e. refused to be taken alive - kept a grenade for themselves or whatever.

Think of battles of the past - The Carthaginians against Rome - on Italian turf. Cannae and Lake Trasamin Hannibal's soldiers cut Rome's armies to death. Crippling wounds that disembowel or demobilize. After the battle the Carthaginians finish off the wounded -- standard practice BTW for all armies of the time.

Japan was the only "sword infantry" in WW2 -- ceremonial doesn't count :). Their tactics were ancient - adapted to the 20th century -- but ancient. They lost to the USSR and they lost to the USA and they woke up and thrived :) in a global market place. :)

At Nomonhan launched the first-ever night tank attack.

MM
 
Hello MM
the Soviet way of self sacrifice was more effective than the Japanese, to keep firing from your dugout to the last and then blow oneself to pieces is more effective in killing enemies than run towards enemy mg-position while waving a sword or a rifle.

Juha
 
What would be the quantities of T-34 east from Ural in 1941/42?
I've read a short biography of Zhukov some time ago, and it mentioned about him asking from Stavka reserves, in late 1941, some tanks and fighters. Stavka (effectively Stalin) said: forget about any additional tanks, but I'll send you the planes.
 
I'm not 100% sure on the numbers but I think 2-300, I know that was the first area they were stationed and the Japanese were aware of them. The other 1,000 appears to have been the BT-7
 
Hey Michael, if you have Coox book, what is his opinion of the Japanese capability to take Siberia in 1941?
 
".... you have Coox book, what is his opinion of the Japanese capability to take Siberia in 1941?"

Hi Jenisch ... :) Merry Christmas to you in sunny .BR :)

I read Alvin Coox in the year 2000 - a very depressing read, I recall. The book doesn't look beyond September, 1939. However in his "conclusions and consequence" Summary, he suggests that until Nomonhan the Japanese were looking at Soviet territory as an expansion zone - and that after their thorough defeat (and it was a thorough defeat, it revealed weakness in Japanese thinking at many levels) Japan turned away from Soviet territories and looked to conquest by Sea - ultimately Pearl Harbor.

BTW - Japan remained fearful of the Soviets right up to August, 1945 when the Soviets attacked them -- achieving complete surprise when they attacked :). If that seems a bit of a contradiction - Japan and the Soviets had a peace treaty .... which the Soviets kept reassuring the Japanese they were going to RENEW .... right up to moment of attack. (Source for the latter, David Glantz, August Storm).

Chairs,

MM


Merry Christmas to all, reverence from Japan, :) :


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2J7rl3am5tA
 
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Sorry, I have to edit this post......
My English is not as good as I would like.....
 
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michaelmaltby Hi Jenisch ... :) Merry Christmas to you in sunny .BR :)

Thank you mate, equally to you and everybody here. Only here in the south where I live it's not so sunny, despite being summer now. lol

The book doesn't look beyond September, 1939. However in his "conclusions and consequence" Summary, he suggests that until Nomonhan the Japanese were looking at Soviet territory as an expansion zone - and that after their thorough defeat (and it was a thorough defeat, it revealed weakness in Japanese thinking at many levels) Japan turned away from Soviet territories and looked to conquest by Sea - ultimately Pearl Harbor.

Actually he tells this. Perhaps you read an old edition. In Google Books this part is not avaliable.

About Nomonhan changing the Japanese expansionist policy, I don't know if Coox relies in primary sources for this, because there's no conclusive evidence showing they really did this. This thesis is held by Western and Russian historians per deduction. I do not doubt the Japanese did take this course, but also thinking in obtain resources for a possible showdown with the Soviets later.
 

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