Military Service

[Zipper730]

Sometimes you amaze me Zipper, you don't seem to have a clue.

In another post on the Vietnam War, Mike had stated that there were proposals for jungle-warfare units (US Army), which were denied the ability to train in Laos, and operated only in small areas of Vietnam.

I think discussing anything with you is such a waste of time

Okay... let me quote you what Mike had written in a previous thread...

The Army had been told that by many of its own jungle warfare experts starting in 1965 when Col. Donald Blackburn became head of SOG. Blackburn had been an adviser in the Philippines in 1941. He escaped the Japanese, fled to the hill where he organized Filipino resistance fighters. By the time of MacArthur's return he headed 20,000 trained guerrilla fighters. In Vietnam Blackburn conceived of and implemented Operation Shining Brass. Initially Blackburn formed 5 US led recon teams: Two or three SF troopers plus 9 local Nung tribesmen.

Phase One: These Recon teams would infiltrate southern Laos, find NVA bases and supply areas and direct air strikes to them. In the meantime in Vietnam SOG would train company sized raiding units, "Hatchet Forces".

Phase Two: Once formed and trained these Hatchet Forces would land, sweep through and destroy a target and be gone before the NVA could react.

Phase three: In Laos itself, Laotian tribesmen would be recruited and trained to raid the NVA at every opportunity forcing them to mass together making them bigger and better targets for air raids and Hatchet Forces. The NVA would be attacked and harassed at every turn.

The plan was gutted by politics. William Sullivan US ambassador to Laos gutted the plan restricting operations to two small boxes along the border, refused to allow helo insertion and supporting air strikes.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

The most effective situation would have been to remove the enemy infrastructure so they cannot carry this out.

The US tried to do this from one end of the war to the other. Couldn't do it.

One way would be to better train the South Vietnamese

Once again, tried from beginning to end. Training happened; motivation didn't. Most South Vietnamese didn't want to die fighting "on the wrong side of history".

so they could turn people and use that to collect information; then use that to hunt down the key players and supporters.

There were programs to do that, first by RVN personnel, then by US special forces, but it was like trying to kill a multi-headed hydra with miraculous powers of regeneration. Then when everyone was exhausted and demoralized, the NVA took over the fight and the means to stop them just wasn't there. The corruption, brutality, and incompetence of the RVN government crippled its ability to motivate its people to defend it.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Okay, let's kiss and make up gentlemen...

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Okay, let's kiss and make up gentlemen...

"Gentlemen"?? Surely you jest! Let's not stoop to name-calling.

 

[mikewint]

you don't seem to have a clue.

Nor does anyone who wasn't there. Mere words fail to adequately convey just about anything relative to Vietnam

How did he get to where he was?

The same way just about any staff officer gets there: Total complete and utter CYA always and no matter what. You GOTTA look good on paper and pat and support the butts of anyone above you.
Westmoreland was such an officer AND he LOOKED the part BUT...
Westmoreland was an artilleryman. He never attended the Command & General Staff College nor the Army War College. Overseas during World War II he had limited line duty (16 months of battalion command, then 13 months in staff positions) and of his 14 months of command during the Korean War and its immediate aftermath he actually had spent eight months in reserve in Japan and only six months in Korea, and that during the mostly static final months of the war.
His senior staff lacked diversity, consisting mostly of people with backgrounds similar to his own. Thus there was little internal capacity for debating or evaluating his chosen course of action.
He ignored other viewpoints on how the war might be prosecuted. He dismissed the PROVN Study sponsored by Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson (which concluded that Westmoreland's way of war was not working and could not work) and similar studies by General Bruce Palmer Jr.
He deprived the South Vietnamese of modern weaponry, giving U.S. and other allied forces priority for issue of the new M-16 rifle and other advanced military weaponry. The South Vietnamese thus went for years equipped with castoff WWII-vintage U.S. equipment while the communist NVA were being armed with the AK-47 assault rifle and other top of the line Russian and Chinese equipment.
He denied senior civilian officials accurate data on enemy strength and composition. In a 1967 Special National Intelligence Estimate he imposed a ceiling on the number of enemy forces his intelligence officers could report, personally removing from the order of battle entire categories that had long been included. The report then falsely portrayed progress in reducing enemy strength.
His war of attrition, search and destroy tactics, and emphasis on body count did nothing to affect the war in the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam, where the enemy's covert infrastructure was left free to continue using coercion and terror to dominate the rural populace.
He underestimated the enemy's resolve, maintaining that if he could inflict enough casualties the communists would lose heart and cease their aggression against South Vietnam. Instead the enemy proved willing to absorb horrifying losses and keep fighting. Thus the "progress" Westmoreland claimed by racking up huge body counts actually did nothing to win the war. The enemy simply kept sending more and more replacements to make up his losses.
He overestimated the American people's patience and tolerance of losses. On a visit to Vietnam, Senator Hollings from Westmoreland's home state of South Carolina was told by Westmoreland: "We're killing these people," the enemy, "at a ratio of 10 to 1." Hollings replied, "Westy, the American people don't care about the ten. They care about the one."
His intransigent and uncompromising war policies squandered four years of support by much of the American people, the Congress, and even the media.

 

[mikewint]

Zipper, closely read post #42 by Wes. We might call it an "American" war but US forces by and large did NOT have unilateral freedom to do anything that they wanted. We were "guests" in a sovereign country and as such Saigon and ARVN forces were involved at some level in every operation NOT to mention the US military bureaucracy AND the politicos in the states.
remove the enemy infrastructure.... Sounds good but that infrastructure was EVERYWHERE in Vietnam throughout the Saigon leadership and even ARVN forces. They knew that eventually the US would pack up and leave and anyone co-operating fully with the US was on their own and doomed. Thus Hanoi knew what we were planning almost before we did.
turn people and collect information.... Could not begin to tell you how easy that was in most cases. Hardly a day passed that an NVA/VC deserter walked out of the jungle carrying a Chieu Hoi. Good meals, good treatment, some cash money and they could not stop talking. But now begins the tortuous convoluted process of trying to ACT militarily on that information. Working its way up the chain-of-command both Army and Saigon took 2-3 MONTHS. Everyone wanted credit no one wanted blame. By the time actual action took place the NVA/VC had been informed and were long gone

 

[tyrodtom]

I have always wondered what happened to those Chieu Hois after 75 .
With us being so careless with our classified paperwork in the last days, probably very few were still alive by June 75.

 

[mikewint]

Estimates vary, Hanoi's goal was to depopulate Saigon. ARVN soldiers were sent to "re-education camps" and required to become farmers. Of some 90,000 Vietnamese employed by the US during the war about 23,000 had been evacuated the rest were abandoned. The National Review claimed that a list of 30,000 CIA informants had been found at the embassy. They were systematically hunted down and killed by the NVA

 

[Zipper730]

The US tried to do this from one end of the war to the other.

And failed,

Once again, tried from beginning to end. Training happened; motivation didn't.

They were unwilling to fight because they figured we'd leave and when we did they were dead meat?

There were programs to do that, first by RVN personnel, then by US special forces, but it was like trying to kill a multi-headed hydra with miraculous powers of regeneration.

Was there any treaties that restricted the use of chemical agents at the time? I was told that modern day if we did that it would be classified a WMD and result in WMD attacks of all stripes.

Then when everyone was exhausted and demoralized, the NVA took over the fight and the means to stop them just wasn't there.

I'm pretty sure we were demoralized, was the VC also?

The corruption, brutality, and incompetence of the RVN government crippled its ability to motivate its people to defend it.

Were they more corrupt than NVN?

Mere words fail to adequately convey just about anything relative to Vietnam

The decisions made do seem almost incomprehensible...

The same way just about any staff officer gets there: Total complete and utter CYA always and no matter what. You GOTTA look good on paper and pat and support the butts of anyone above you.

The Iron Law of Institutions: People care more about their own positions in the institution (those wanting promotion, and those up top who want to look good) rather than the functionality of the institution (actually succeeding in fighting wars).

Westmoreland was such an officer AND he LOOKED the part BUT...
Westmoreland was an artilleryman. He never attended the Command & General Staff College nor the Army War College. Overseas during World War II he had limited line duty (16 months of battalion command, then 13 months in staff positions) and of his 14 months of command during the Korean War and its immediate aftermath he actually had spent eight months in reserve in Japan and only six months in Korea, and that during the mostly static final months of the war.
His senior staff lacked diversity, consisting mostly of people with backgrounds similar to his own. Thus there was little internal capacity for debating or evaluating his chosen course of action.

So, there was a major dysfunction in the US Army with a bunch of officers in command position that didn't really seem to have the requisite skill to lead troops to victory.

I'm curious if there were any other Generals available?

He ignored other viewpoints on how the war might be prosecuted. He dismissed the PROVN Study sponsored by Army Chief of Staff General Harold K. Johnson (which concluded that Westmoreland's way of war was not working and could not work) and similar studies by General Bruce Palmer Jr.

What was the gist of the PROVN study? As for General Palmer, he seemed to be the guy who knew his shit about what to do in the war from the limited data I found in searches

He deprived the South Vietnamese of modern weaponry, giving U.S. and other allied forces priority for issue of the new M-16 rifle and other advanced military weaponry.

Why did he do that? It seems rather foolish to bolster another nation to fight a war you're supporting if they don't have equipment that can actually win. Admittedly the M-16 probably was a good thing to not give them, as I think more of them would have died with it than without it at first until the various issues were addressed.

The South Vietnamese thus went for years equipped with castoff WWII-vintage U.S. equipment while the communist NVA were being armed with the AK-47 assault rifle and other top of the line Russian and Chinese equipment.

And this went from rifles, machine guns, artillery, mechanized equipment (not that I recall much of that being used in Vietnam), and communications, right on up to aircraft?

He denied senior civilian officials accurate data on enemy strength and composition.

So he did it to conform to some political premise, and/or keeping his job?

In a 1967 Special National Intelligence Estimate he imposed a ceiling on the number of enemy forces his intelligence officers could report, personally removing from the order of battle entire categories that had long been included. The report then falsely portrayed progress in reducing enemy strength.

Cooking the books, eh?

His war of attrition, search and destroy tactics, and emphasis on body count did nothing to affect the war in the hamlets and villages of South Vietnam, where the enemy's covert infrastructure was left free to continue using coercion and terror to dominate the rural populace.

Plus, the indiscriminate nature of our campaign probably did little to win their confidence...

He underestimated the enemy's resolve, maintaining that if he could inflict enough casualties the communists would lose heart and cease their aggression against South Vietnam.

You'd think he'd have connected the dots with his "life is cheap" mindset, that they'd fight tooth and nail. After all, if they have a disregard for human life, they can fight much harder and ruthlessly than we can (I don't consider this a virtue, but the fact is...).

He overestimated the American people's patience and tolerance of losses. On a visit to Vietnam, Senator Hollings from Westmoreland's home state of South Carolina was told by Westmoreland: "We're killing these people," the enemy, "at a ratio of 10 to 1." Hollings replied, "Westy, the American people don't care about the ten. They care about the one."

Well yeah...

We might call it an "American" war but US forces by and large did NOT have unilateral freedom to do anything that they wanted. We were "guests" in a sovereign country and as such Saigon and ARVN forces were involved at some level in every operation NOT to mention the US military bureaucracy AND the politicos in the states.

What restrictions and limitations did Saigon impose?

remove the enemy infrastructure.... Sounds good but that infrastructure was EVERYWHERE in Vietnam throughout the Saigon leadership and even ARVN forces. They knew that eventually the US would pack up and leave and anyone co-operating fully with the US was on their own and doomed.

And there were probably plenty of NVN spies in the mix...

turn people and collect information.... Could not begin to tell you how easy that was in most cases. Hardly a day passed that an NVA/VC deserter walked out of the jungle carrying a Chieu Hoi. Good meals, good treatment, some cash money and they could not stop talking.

They blabbed that easy?

But now begins the tortuous convoluted process of trying to ACT militarily on that information. Working its way up the chain-of-command both Army and Saigon took 2-3 MONTHS.

You'd think they could have it to the US in a couple of hours, and by courier a 2-3 days. The reason for the delay I guess is that the chain of command went from US Army -> South Vietnamese Army -> South Vietnamese Government -> US Intelligence -> Washington DC with sanitizing along every step to either cover people's asses, conform to a political narrative, and so on?

You'd think we'd have an intel network in Vietnam, the data goes from US Military, gets bifurcated with one path going straight to US Intel; the other path going to ARVN -> Saigon: It would have been a common sense approach since US Intel gets the data at the same time ARVN/Saigon gets it, and if they hold anything back, we still get the data anyway; should they collect anything we don't and actually pass it over to us, it's gravy. Since intelligence types are required to be a chess-master type and good at strategic thinking, they could be given mission orders from the US telling them what is supposed to be done, which they would presumably do. Orders can be changed periodically without incident.

Of course, everything done in Vietnam seemed to be incomprehensible so that idea seems like an idea that would never have been considered, or quickly thrown in the trash-can

 

[javlin]

I don't have a dog in this discussion but people still today look down on those that serve.My son leaves tomorrow morning to go back to Misawa Japan and while home on a deserved month of leave was ridiculed like Mike by a young lady.My wife asked Garrett why didn't you stand at the baseball game when active and retired Military please stand he stated many people don't like us but he did clap for WWII,Korea and VM vets.He never makes a big deal about being in the service it's his job/duty and he chose when he was about 15 and joining the JROTC.GO 35FW F-16's

 

[tyrodtom]

I'm sorry guys.
It's just hard for me to take anyone saying jungle warfare was restricted when my older brother was there 4 times.
Ever time patrolling and whatever, in the jungle. But evidently by someone's definition, that wasn't jungle warfare.

Saw various pictures of him taken by a friends of him in Vietnam, sometimes with him standing in ankle deep, sometimes waist level water.
Of him writing about spending a good part of his evening time removing leeches from sensitive parts of his body.
He was there in 63, 67, 69, and 71, or thereabouts.
He'd write me a little, but most of his correspondence went to his wife and my mother.
Most of what he tried to get across to me was " Whatever you do, don't come here".
I think part of the reason he took so many tours was to give me the option of taking advantage of the rule the services had of not putting two brothers in a combat zone at the same time. But it was a exception you had to apply for yourself, the service wouldn't do it for you.
I just didn't apply.

 

[Tieleader]

"Your Majesty, if we send enough troops to the colonies, the rebels will give up and peace will reign."
"Mein Fuhrer, if we drop enough bombs on them, the English will have no choice but to give up."
"Mr. President, if we and our British allies bomb them day and night for a year, we'll deprive the Nazis of the will and the means to fight and save our troops from high casualties on the ground."
Mr. President, to heck with with this half-assed limited war! Nuke those North Koreans into the stone age!"
Do we as a species ever learn?
Cheers,
Wes

When the last two hairless monkeys club each other to death the lesson will have been learned.

 

[mikewint]

Restricted Jungle Warfare…restricted in what sense? Political restrictions did exist, to a degree, like Sullivan's restrictions on how deep into Laos/Cambodia helos could insert troops. The jungle itself could both hinder and assist this restriction. The limited number of usable LZs in the jungle restricted where troops could be inserted but then the jungle also made exact location uncertain so ignorance was a viable excuse for going over the line.

When going into the jungle to conduct an operation you have to bring everything you're going to need for the entire operation. Food, water, medicine, ammunition, weapons, gear to clear a landing place or a trail, extra clothes, grenades, claymores, etc. Backpacks weighed +90 lbs (+41 kg). For quick recon missions a lot of this was left behind or replaced with extra ammo. This weight increased fatigue and prevented you from being able to walk as far or keep the same pace as you might under other conditions or in another environment. Therefore your endurance was restricted.

The big leaves and the thick treetops caused the light to come and disappear very quickly. When it is night in the jungle, it is really dark. Without any light source during the nighttime you cannot see anything not even your hand in front of your face. You could not wait for the dark to prepare for the dark.

Streams and rivers were common because of the large amount of precipitation. If a stream became blocked, a swamp was often formed. Swamps could be very difficult to go around and were even more difficult to go through. In swampy terrain 100 m an hour was excellent progress.

Both animals and humans make paths in the jungle that can be used to save time and energy, but these are almost never shown on maps. Thus you never really know where a path will eventually end up not to mention that the enemy probably also knows about and uses that same path. Progress along a path could easily reach a kilometer an hour. Local guides who live in the area, fish and hunt there will know every path BUT now comes the question of trust as any local could be directly or indirectly associated with the enemy. I've seen a local tribesmen cover in 45 minutes a distance that took us a day and a half to traverse.

A constant mix of heavy rain, strong sun and the heat lead to humidity levels over 90 %. Summer and winter do not exist. Instead there is a difference in rainfall. Monsoon rain constituted the only real difference in weather, making it wetter, moister and less warm. The average temperature was between 25 and 27 degrees Celsius all year around. As you might imagine in that environment Heat Stroke is a major factor.
Overheating is a life threatening condition that often occurs in hot and humid weather when your body loses a great amount of water and can no longer control its temperature. The odds of overheating increase dramatically if the soldiers are carrying a lot and working hard. In addition wet and compact clothes and gear reduce the body's ability to sweat and cool down exacerbating the overheating.
That being said the reverse is also common. After a rainfall or crossing a river you're going to be soaked, and if the weather is cloudy or it is night you can easily become cold and now hypothermia becomes a threat. So in addition to the heat you also have to know what to do when you're cold and how to work against the hypothermia.

In the jungle, finding water is easy, it's literally found everywhere, unfortunately, none of it is drinkable. As it invariably contained harmful bacteria and/or parasites that, if ingested, could cause sickness. Local water must be boiled or cleaned using water tablets (I developed a real taste for iodine) before drinking.

Another impact on endurance is hygiene. Good hygiene is critical for endurance, if the troops do not have good hygiene diseases will spread and small wounds and sore feet will soon become infected.

There are a great variety and quantity of insects and animals in the jungle. Insects tend to spread diseases, and there is always a risk of getting stung or bitten. Cuts and sore feet are a very common problem because the skin is almost always wet and in the jungle, there are a lot of sharp leaves that cut unprotected body parts like hands and face and there are some plants that have thorns both small and large. If you are not aware of them, you quickly get stuck or scratched. Such small wounds are generally not a problem but due to the hot and humid weather, all wounds tend to get infected much faster and more frequently. It is crucial to disinfect any wound as soon as possible. I would personally spend about 30 - 40 minutes each day taking care of my own wounds and rashes especially on the feet.

So, in short the jungle itself is the major restrictor. As in many other extreme environments, there are two enemies. One is the human enemy, the one that tries to kill you with violence- the one who shoots at you. The other enemy is the environment itself, with all the challenges it offers.
In order to win a war, both have to be managed. Managing only one of them will result in failure. The jungle does not take sides, but puts the same pressure on all who enter it. This means that neither side will have an advantage, unless one side is trained and prepared for the jungle environment.

In order to kill the enemy it is crucial to learn how to manage the jungle. If you don't, the jungle will itself become your worst enemy. Equally, if the enemy does not manage the jungle, it will kill him as well. Consequently, the jungle may be utilized to benefit one side if they are trained for it. The one who wins is the one who is able to survive the longest period of time in the jungle.

If the troops are able to handle the tough environment, they will not only increase their endurance in the field, they will also have a big advantage over an opponent who is untrained in jungle combat.
The jungle itself may very well reduce the enemy to a state where he is no longer able to fight.

 

[Zipper730]

I don't have a dog in this discussion but people still today look down on those that serve.

I don't usually have a dim view on everybody who serves. Sure, there were bad eggs, but my critique isn't usually those who served, it's those who made the decisions.

I'm sorry guys.

I sort of understand how you'd arrive at your position. The issue really had to do more with counter-insurgency operations, special warfare operations involving jungle combat.

Most of what he tried to get across to me was " Whatever you do, don't come here".

Smart guy!

 

[Zipper730]

Restricted Jungle Warfare…restricted in what sense?

The hatchet force and COIN proposal.

restrictions did exist, to a degree, like Sullivan's restrictions on how deep into Laos/Cambodia helos could insert troops.

Could the President have overridden Sullivan?

The jungle itself could both hinder and assist this restriction.

As in "oops -- accidents happen"

The limited number of usable LZs in the jungle restricted where troops could be inserted

I got a question: When was the first time anybody in the US or our allies realized that you could make an "instant LZ" with some ordinance?

When going into the jungle to conduct an operation you have to bring everything you're going to need for the entire operation. Food, water, medicine, ammunition, weapons, gear to clear a landing place or a trail, extra clothes, grenades, claymores, etc. Backpacks weighed +90 lbs (+41 kg).

Brutal I could imagine, and modern day that load has gone up (which is amazing as things usually tend to get smaller and lighter with time).

The big leaves and the thick treetops caused the light to come and disappear very quickly. When it is night in the jungle, it is really dark. Without any light source during the nighttime you cannot see anything not even your hand in front of your face. You could not wait for the dark to prepare for the dark.

And it would be my guess that despite the various night-vision technology developed up to this point (mostly for aviation, some dating back to WWII) none were on tap for infantry use off the bat?

So, in short the jungle itself is the major restrictor. As in many other extreme environments, there are two enemies. One is the human enemy, the one that tries to kill you with violence- the one who shoots at you. The other enemy is the environment itself, with all the challenges it offers.

And the enemy had ample experience.

 

[parsifal]

I found this to be interesting:

https://www.quora.com/Are-American-soldiers-trained-in-jungle-warfare-to-so-avoid-catastrophes-like-Vietnam

I also think this article worth a look at

http://ajrp.awm.gov.au/AJRP/remember.nsf/Web-Printer/CDB80BEBCB5BFCB2CA256AFB001AD079?OpenDocument

 

[parsifal]

The only question to ask yourself about both Korea and Vietnam, IMHO, is this: "What would General Grant have done?"
Seriously, Grant was a genius at WAR ... understanding all the dimensions from terrain, to technology, to logistics ... and he served a democratic government. He never took on airs as MacArthur did. He controlled himself which Patton couldn't, and he was as politically enmeshed as Eisenhower ever was with Monty.
Suggest john mosier's great book "Grant".

Grant was good, but Lee was better, his final defeat at the hands of grant notwithstanding.

Grant was not without his shortcomings. Top of the list was his incessant battles with alcoholism. If he were a commander in modern times he would have been dismissed for this on several occasions.

Grant vs. Lee

His most serious failing as a military man was his failures as a quartermaster. The success of his army is in no small measure more to do with the excellent preparatory work done by his predecessor, General Mclellan, who in many ways, despite his utter failure as a field commander, was instrumental in overhauling equipping and training the union army subsequent to those failures.

 

[soulezoo]

Did Ulysses S. Grant really have a Drinking Problem?

The drinking "problem" was largely a myth. One that was repeated often enough to become a "fact". The stories of his drinking came initially from fellow officers that he competed against for rank and command. Then later by political enemies.

 

[mikewint]

By today's standards Grant would most likely be termed an alcoholic BUT... Once again applying today's standards to the 1800s is not valid. It is VERY important to understand that throughout history water was invariably contaminated and unsafe to drink. The way to make it safe was to add alcohol in the form of wine or just to drink fermented beverages. In America beer, wine, whiskey, rum, and hard ciders were a mainstay.
In 1787, two days before they signed off on the Constitution, the 55 delegates to the Constitutional Convention partied at a tavern. According to the bill preserved from that evening, they drank 54 bottles of Madeira, 60 bottles of claret, eight of whiskey, 22 of porter, eight of hard cider, 12 of beer and seven bowls of alcoholic punch.
That's more than two bottles of fruit of the vine, plus a few shots and a lot of punch and beer, for every delegate.
By the 1800s the average American was drinking almost 8 gallons of alcohol a year (today it's about 2 gallons).
Getting back to Grant, by all documented accounts he was a binge drinker usually when bored or lonely. According to his friend Lt. Henry Hodges, "He would perhaps go on two or three sprees a year, but was always open to reason." Reports that he drank to inebriation during or before his Civil War battles seems to be untrue.
Grant also had crippling migraines which might have been mistaken for hangovers, especially since alcohol was prescribed for them. Now Grant did have throat cancer, which can be a physical sign of alcohol abuse, especially when paired with tobacco and Grant did smoke quite a bit.
IMHO, Grant's "drinking problem" was largely the result of a smear campaign against him by his rivals and political enemies – both "Lost Cause" Southerners still smarting from their defeat in the Civil War and his political opposition. These drunken Grant stories began after his two terms as Commander in Chief. In part they were upset over his attempts to enforce Reconstruction and protect the freedmen's rights. In particular, his use of federal troops to enforce the 14th and 15th amendments and confront the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacists was seen as tyrannical and imposing "black domination."

 

[soulezoo]

Grant was good, but Lee was better, his final defeat at the hands of grant notwithstanding.

Grant was not without his shortcomings. Top of the list was his incessant battles with alcoholism. If he were a commander in modern times he would have been dismissed for this on several occasions.

Grant vs. Lee

His most serious failing as a military man was his failures as a quartermaster. The success of his army is in no small measure more to do with the excellent preparatory work done by his predecessor, General Mclellan, who in many ways, despite his utter failure as a field commander, was instrumental in overhauling equipping and training the union army subsequent to those failures.

I think you read the link you provided wrong. In it, it states "Lee was not a good quartermaster". Then later it states for Grant "And, unlike Lee, he was a good quartermaster who made certain his men were well-supplied."

Mike above is correct in that it is dangerous to project values and traditions of today to those past.