The airplane that did the most to turn the tide of the war.

[RCAFson]

According to Sweeny, the bomb was released at 9,600 meters and they were buffeted by 5 shockwaves as they were departing the target area.

9,600 meters as almost 31,500 feet and is consistent with their assigned altitude of 30,000 feet over Kokura.

Not 28,900 feet.

Unfortunately much of what Sweeny wrote about the mission has been disputed by other members of the crew.

This is from the official history:

"Over Nagasaki they found
8/10 cloud and the run-in was ''90 per cent by radar," but at the last
second Beahan found a hole in the cloud and let go. It was then 1058
Nagasaki time.(59)"
Sweeney banked his plane sharply and pushed down from his
28,900-foot altitude. A minute later, when the explosion came..." (60).
"


P720, Volume Five THE PACIFIC: MATTERHORN TO NAGASAKI JUNE 1944 TO AUGUST 1945

 

[Civettone]

Well, now that we've taken that turn. How about the plane that did the least to alter the outcome of the war: The BA 349 Natter

World War II’s Worst Airplane

The product of an ambitious designer and a doomed regime, the Bachem Ba 349 Natter was a radical idea that almost worked.

www.smithsonianmag.com

Would have had a tremendous impact if it had been employed en masse.

Anyway, it's definitely not the B-29 which turned the tide. Wasn't used in Europe, and Japan didn't surrender because of the atomic bomb.

Kris

 

[NevadaK]

Would have had a tremendous impact if it had been employed en masse.

Anyway, it's definitely not the B-29 which turned the tide. Wasn't used in Europe, and Japan didn't surrender because of the atomic bomb.

Kris

We can disagree. The bombing survey's opinion is that the B-29 bombing campaign effectively destroyed the Japanese population's will to fight as well as crippled Japanese industry. That was the foundation of the surrender in 1945. Otherwise the war goes to 1948 or 1949, possibly ending in a stalemate.

 

[RCAFson]

We can disagree. The bombing survey's opinion is that the B-29 bombing campaign effectively destroyed the Japanese population's will to fight as well as crippled Japanese industry. That was the foundation of the surrender in 1945. Otherwise the war goes to 1948 or 1949, possibly ending in a stalemate.

There's no doubt that Japan suffered from the B-29's conventional and atomic attacks and that her population was war weary, but Japan, like Germany, was not a democracy and the decision to end the war was made by the emperor.

The leading reasons (in no particular order) for Japan's surrender include;

The loss of empire and naval blockade
The destruction of Japan's economy via conventional bombings
The threat of direct invasion of the home islands
The atomic bombings
The Soviet entry into the war and the loss of Japan's Asian empire and armed forces.
The threat of Soviet participation in the invasion of Japan.

With Allied occupation of Japan's Asian empire, even short ranged bombers would be free to hit Japanese Home Island targets. Japan's defeat and occupation by 1946 was a certainty, especially with millions of Soviet troops available to invade from the north and the west.

My personal opinion is that the atomic bombings provided a way for Japan to surrender whilst 'saving face' as not even the samurai spirit could be expected to defeat such cruel and inhumane weapons ( not that Imperial Japan would have hesitated for a second to use them, if they had them).

 

[33k in the air]

The leading reasons (in no particular order) for Japan's surrender include;

The loss of empire and naval blockade
The destruction of Japan's economy via conventional bombings
The threat of direct invasion of the home islands
The atomic bombings
The Soviet entry into the war and the loss of Japan's Asian empire and armed forces.
The threat of Soviet participation in the invasion of Japan.

One possibility not on the above list: the potential of the government's collapse and civil revolt.

Richard Frank mentioned this as one of the possible contributors to surrender. See the following video from the Unauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast channel on YouTube:

Downfall-Why Japan Surrendered with very special guest Richard Frank-Episode 225

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

We can disagree. The bombing survey's opinion is that the B-29 bombing campaign effectively destroyed the Japanese population's will to fight as well as crippled Japanese industry. That was the foundation of the surrender in 1945. Otherwise the war goes to 1948 or 1949, possibly ending in a stalemate.

It would never end in a stalemate. Japan was already beaten for all intents and purposes in 1945 (that does not mean they would have surrendered in 1945). Now it would have cost a lot more lives on both sides to finish it off by having to invade the home islands.

The war would have continued to 1947 tops, and it would cost a lot of lives.

 

[NevadaK]

It would never end in a stalemate. Japan was already beaten for all intents and purposes in 1945 (that does not mean they would have surrendered in 1945). Now it would have cost a lot more lives on both sides to finish it off by having to invade the home islands.

The war would have continued to 1947 tops, and it would cost a lot of lives.

The fear of stalemate on the American side was real. America's support for the war was flagging and the casualty rates for Iwo Jima and Okinawa were viewed as unacceptable to the American public and the impact of the Kamikaze attacks raised significant concerns as to the cost of the invasion. It was a significant deciding factor in Truman's decision to use the bomb.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The fear of stalemate on the American side was real. America's support for the war was flagging and the casualty rates for Iwo Jima and Okinawa were viewed as unacceptable to the American public and the impact of the Kamikaze attacks raised significant concerns as to the cost of the invasion. It was a significant deciding factor in Truman's decision to use the bomb.

Fear of something does not make something absolute.

Of course we are looking at things from a hindsight perspective, but there was never going to be a stalemate, especially once the Soviet Union entered the Pacific fight. Japan's military was already beaten back and for all intents and purposes defeated. It was only a matter of time, and many lives would be lost.

I don't disagree that the fear of great loss of life was a factor in dropping the bombs. I would wager to say that dropping the bombs was just as much if not more a show of force to Stalin and about solidifying our place as the sole Super Power at the time.

 

[NevadaK]

Fear of something does not make something absolute.

Of course we are looking at things from a hindsight perspective, but there was never going to be a stalemate, especially once the Soviet Union entered the Pacific fight. Japan's military was already beaten back and for all intents and purposes defeated. It was only a matter of time, and many lives would be lost.

I don't disagree that the fear of great loss of life was a factor in dropping the bombs. I would wager to say that dropping the bombs was just as much if not more a show of force to Stalin and about solidifying our place as the sole Super Power at the time.

It's hard to ignore hindsight. Contemporary thinking (1945) questioned whether or not the US population would be willing to absorb the kinds of casualties that the US was experiencing in the later stages of the war. The bombing survey points out that the US had very little understanding of what was going on inside of Japan.

 

[GregP]

It's hard to ignore hindsight, but you HAVE TO to arrive at a decision potentially acceptable to them at the time.

Looking at it from our perspective will never arrive at something that would happen then as they, at that time, did not have our history and experience to look at it with.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

One possibility not on the above list: the potential of the government's collapse and civil revolt.

Richard Frank mentioned this as one of the possible contributors to surrender. See the following video from the Unauthorized History of the Pacific War Podcast channel on YouTube:

Downfall-Why Japan Surrendered with very special guest Richard Frank-Episode 225

Even autocracies must pay attention to public opinion, in the end.

 

[GrauGeist]

The last Purple Hearts intended for the invasion of Japan were presented to early Gulf War recipients and when I was aboard NWS Seal Beach, there were still storage bunkers full of coffins produced in early 1945.

The calculations of Allied losses indicated a staggering amount of casualties in the estimated 18 months it would take to capture the Japanese home islands.

 

[Nick]

Wasn't it Dwight D. Eisenhower who said that the most important factors in winning the war were: The C-47 Dakota, te Willy's Jeep and the 2 1/4 ton truck? So let's consider the enormous importance of logistics in warfare. I recommend the C-47.

 

[glennasher]

We can disagree. The bombing survey's opinion is that the B-29 bombing campaign effectively destroyed the Japanese population's will to fight as well as crippled Japanese industry. That was the foundation of the surrender in 1945. Otherwise the war goes to 1948 or 1949, possibly ending in a stalemate.

You're discounting the submarine forces contributions immensely. They strangled the Japanese mainland's supply lines, and the citizens were starving to death without the foodstuffs from other lands. No oil got thru, either.

 

[EwenS]

You're discounting the submarine forces contributions immensely. They strangled the Japanese mainland's supply lines, and the citizens were starving to death without the foodstuffs from other lands. No oil got thru, either.

The USN subs did not begin to specifically target Japan's oil supplies from the DEI until late 1943. The last oil convoy sailed from Singapore in Jan 1945. In Q1 1945 about 800,000 barrels of mostly aviation fuel reached mainland Japan. After that, with US forces firmly based on Luzon in the Philippines air power as well as subs could be brought to bear on shipping in the South China Sea.

Not all the oil Japan needed was sent to Japan. Much was sent direct to forward bases from the DEI refineries so long as they remained viable.

 

[MiTasol]

And a lot was sent by submarines towing submarine barges.

Several of those were still in use in Rabaul in to the 70s in fuel storage farms.

 

[Admiral Beez]

Is there any aircraft that if in (reasonable) abundance could have turned the tide for France? The quick pick may be the Dewoitine D.520, but I don't think France was defeated because their M.S.406 and MB.152 were uncompetitive with the Bf 109s. What of ground attack, like the Bréguet 693? Or modern, fast bombers like the LeO 45?

 

[Greg Boeser]

Is there any aircraft that if in (reasonable) abundance could have turned the tide for France? The quick pick may be the Dewoitine D.520, but I don't think France was defeated because their M.S.406 and MB.152 were uncompetitive with the Bf 109s. What of ground attack, like the Bréguet 693? Or modern, fast bombers like the LeO 45?

View attachment 777793

France had plenty of aircraft. But their supply and maintenance were woefully inadequate.
I believe that the Luftwaffe had a sortie rate three times higher than the French.

 

[Admiral Beez]

France had plenty of aircraft. But their supply and maintenance were woefully inadequate.

French supply chain had to be a pain. For example, in addition to the US-sourced Curtiss Hawk 75, France had six entirely distinct single-seat, single-engine, monoplane fighter programs in production between 1936 to 1940.

1. Bloch MB.150. Specified 1934. First flight 1937. Introduced 1939.
2. Morane-Saulnier M.S.406. Specified 1934. (same as the MB.150). First flight 1938. Introduced 1938.
3. Arsenal VG-33. Specified 1936. First flight 1939. Introduced 1940.
4. Dewoitine D.520. Specified 1936 (same as the VG-33). First flight 1938. Introduced 1940.
5. Caudron C.714. Specified 1936 (same as VG-33). First flight 1936. Introduced 1940.
6. Koolhoven F.K.58. Specified 1937. Ordered from Dutch firm. First flight 1938. Introduced 1940.

By comparison by 1940, for single-seat, single-engine, monoplane fighters the Luftwaffe had just the Bf 109 and the RAF the Spitfire and Hurricane.

Wikipedia says that: During 1939–1940, French H75 pilots claimed 230 air-to-air kills (of a total of 1,009 air-to-air kills by the French Air Force during 1939–1940) and 81 probable victories in H75s against only 29 aircraft lost in aerial combat. While making up only 12.6 per cent of the French Air Force single-seater fighter force, the H75 accounted for almost a third of the air-to-air kills during the 1940 Battle of France. Maybe more Hawks could have turned the tide?

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

You're discounting the submarine forces contributions immensely. They strangled the Japanese mainland's supply lines, and the citizens were starving to death without the foodstuffs from other lands. No oil got thru, either.

The bomber's advocate would point out that that blockade was itself greatly aided by B-29 mining operations. I do agree with your point, and think the submarine's contribution to our victory is always overshadowed by the Bombs being dropped.