WW2 bombers. If Germany had the allies heavy bombers would they have won the war?

[Lighthunmust]

Hello
Drew didn't sunk the Bv 238, he sunk a big French flying boat, Latecoere Late something.

Juha

This of course could be wrong, but this is from wikipedia:

"The sole completed BV 238 was strafed and sunk while docked on Schaal Lake in September 1944 by three P-51 Mustangs of the 361st Fighter Group. Named "Detroit Miss", the lead Mustang was piloted by World War II ace Lieutenant Urban "Ben" Drew, and another was piloted by William D. Rogers. This represented the largest single aircraft to be destroyed during the war.
Drew was told after the raid that he had destroyed a BV 222 Wiking (another large flying boat). He continued to believe this was the case until he was contacted by the BBC in 1974 for a documentary, and told that their research had determined that the aircraft he had destroyed was actually the BV 238 V1, undergoing flight tests at the seaplane base at Schaal Lake."

What source do you have stating "he sunk a big French flying boat, Latecoere Late something"?

 

[Juha]

Hello
my source was an article on the subject in a Aeroplane Monthly maybe 10 years ago, the writer had done fairly good research on the subject and had also contacted Drew who, after seeing the evidence admitted that his victim was the big French flyboat not Bv 238. It was simply misidentification on the part of Drew, after all he was first identified his victim as Bv 222.

Juha

 

[Readie]

I think you're right John, it would have been incredibly cynical.
But given the looming German technical advances a years pause on the eastern front might have dragged it all out for a lot longer than it took.
I'm actually more surprised Stalin would have allowed that to happen as late as '43 but I guess nothing looked certain until much later (although Stalingrad was a huge defeat for Hitler they did have Kharkov soon after to give the Russian serious pause for thought).

It may be cynical, but we supplied the Russian's through convoys giving them supplies we could ill afford and, I think I'm right in saying, the Russians never formally acknowledged. We desperately needed the Russians to engage the Germans to give us a breathing space.
You are right about advances too...within a year the Germans could have perfected the V2, Jet fighters etc.

Footnote.
Churchill was one of the great cynics.

Cheers
John

 

[wuzak]

They just do not ever have the fuel to operate them along with their fighters etc etc (they actually built a lot of He 177s many if not most of which appear to have done very little) or enought of the properly trained crews to fly them.

It would have been interesting if the Germans had got their aviation steam turbines working, which could be run on anything that burns, basically.

There were at least two projects - the Junkers turbines, rated at 3000hp, that were being worked on in the first half of the war, but cancelled in 1942, and the later 6000hp turbines being developed for the Me264 from about 1944, and designed to run 70% coal dust/30% petrol..

 

[tyrodtom]

We seem to act as if Germany was the only ones with advanced projects that just needed more time to develope.

America had the ultimate advanced project, and the means to deliver it, and did exactly that, just a few months after Germany surrendered.

 

[Readie]

We seem to act as if Germany was the only ones with advanced projects that just needed more time to develope.

America had the ultimate advanced project, and the means to deliver it, and did exactly that, just a few months after Germany surrendered.

Hooray. You are right and we had the Mr Whittle beavering away with the Jet engine too.
What else was on offer?
VW, we turned that down ( big mistake)
Rockets, you encompassed that knowledge into NASA.
Two stroke engines, BSA used that for the Bantam.

Ummm.... you guys get rocket technology and we get a two stroke motorcycle engine.
You couldn't write the script
Cheers
John

 

[Lighthunmust]

Hello
my source was an article on the subject in a Aeroplane Monthly maybe 10 years ago, the writer had done fairly good research on the subject and had also contacted Drew who, after seeing the evidence admitted that his victim was the big French flyboat not Bv 238. It was simply misidentification on the part of Drew, after all he was first identified his victim as Bv 222.

Juha

Thank you. That is very interesting. I shall look into this when I have time and keep an open mind. Any one else heard this about Drew and the French Flying Boat?

 

[rank amateur]

According to A. Prices "last year of the luftwaffe" KG 200 used some Lioré et Olivier 246's, a pretty big plane but I can't imagine anyone mistake this with a Bv 222. Shame I can't supply a pic.

 

[psteel]

We seem to act as if Germany was the only ones with advanced projects that just needed more time to develope.

America had the ultimate advanced project, and the means to deliver it, and did exactly that, just a few months after Germany surrendered.

"Nessecity is the mother of invention"

 

[Gixxerman]

We seem to act as if Germany was the only ones with advanced projects that just needed more time to develope.

America had the ultimate advanced project, and the means to deliver it, and did exactly that, just a few months after Germany surrendered.

Well, as much as I agree that that seems a general attitude I think it's only fair to say that here lots of people are very well aware that the allies also had some incredibly advanced stuff in their labs too.

From the bomb to the T28 super heavy tanks to advanced radar to jets (including axial flow jets) and not forgetting the huge impact the proximity fuse had (and would have had if things had gone on much longer) the allies had pretty much everything Germany had.
Physics not being owned by any nation.

The 2 exceptions, I think, being the V2 large liquid fuelled rockets and the V1 cruise missile.

Allied AAA coupled with proximity fuse seems to have drastically curtailed the V1's impact (although it was incredibly cheap, £125 a time being mentioned).
But I can recall reading that allied strategists were actually happy to see Germany devote such huge resources on the V2 because at that cost and with only a 1000kg warhead it was a hugely expensive means to achieve very little.
Obviously that would all have changed had they been able to put an atomic bomb on the tip but even if Germany did get the bomb in time in those days it would have been vastly more weight than the 1000kg the V2 could carry.

The reason why I mentioned a delay and what might have come was really in regard to the eastern front, as that would have been where a truce, or more likely pause, would have occurred.
The Russians also had their effective spy rings so how much they would have found things like say several hundred/thousand V1s lobbed in their direction a surprise and one they had no counter to is open to question.

 

[tyrodtom]

The V1 never had the range to threaten anything vital in Russia, and wasn't accurate enough to target supply points, munition or fuel depots.

The Russians probably could have just ignored them.

 

[psteel]

http://chapters.scarecrowpress.com/08/108/0810857766ch3.pdf

"operational research", norden bomb site, cep - Google Search

down load [PDF] "Precision Guided Munitions: History and Lessons for The Future" ; Kaufman


I read these two files it appears that the USA did have access to guided munitions designs prewar, but were so convinced of the soundness of surgical strategic bombing that they opted for what they believed was the cheaper option. Predictions in 1940 were that Japan and German industry could be reduced to ashes in 6 months.

The Germans on the other hand had the Spanish Civil war experience to show them the limitations of level bombing and instead invested in Dive Bombing in the short term and guided muntions in the long run. However as with most such programmes the war got in the way and on going development was suspended until after Stalingrad when Hitler finally seems to have gotten the point that they 'might be' loseing the war.

 

[Readie]

http://chapters.scarecrowpress.com/08/108/0810857766ch3.pdf

"operational research", norden bomb site, cep - Google Search

down load [PDF] "Precision Guided Munitions: History and Lessons for The Future" ; Kaufman


I read these two files it appears that the USA did have access to guided munitions designs prewar, but were so convinced of the soundness of surgical strategic bombing that they opted for what they believed was the cheaper option. Predictions in 1940 were that Japan and German industry could be reduced to ashes in 6 months.

The Germans on the other hand had the Spanish Civil war experience to show them the limitations of level bombing and instead invested in Dive Bombing in the short term and guided muntions in the long run. However as with most such programmes the war got in the way and on going development was suspended until after Stalingrad when Hitler finally seems to have gotten the point that they 'might be' loseing the war.

Interesting informative. Thanks for posting it.

Hitler should have taken the hint earlier in WW2..when he remarked "Failure has had the healthy effect of once more compressing Italian claims to within the natural boundaries of Italian capabilities''
With axis allies like the Italians the game was up.

Cheers
John

 

[Juha]

According to A. Prices "last year of the luftwaffe" KG 200 used some Lioré et Olivier 246's, a pretty big plane but I can't imagine anyone mistake this with a Bv 222. Shame I can't supply a pic.

According the Shores' Thomas' 2nd TAF Vol 4 the a/c Drew destroyed was the 6-engined Potez-CAMS 161 proto.

Juha

 

[nuuumannn]

Dunno how I stumbled on this thread, but I might as well chuck in my two cents. John's question is not a bad one. The Germans certainly had the technology that, had it been applied in a more cohesive way, could have had a more positive outcome for the Nazis. Thankfully, their own approach let their side down, though not for lack of trying. At the outbreak of WW2 the Germans had the best and largest aerial reconnaissance capability in the world, and with its development and use of radio navigation and bombing aids, potentially the most accurate bombing force. Both these capabilities were squandered during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz. The use of navaids for bombing out the centres of cities like Coventry were a waste of a superb capability - the RAF would not adopt such sophistication for another couple of years after Coventry, and it didn't take the British long (in the scheme of things) to come up with a deterrent, but this didn't detract from how clever the German equipment was. Had the Luftwaffe been more succinct and targetted industrial sites from the outset, the results might have had a far worse impact on the war for the British.

This is where reconnaissance comes into the picture. The German resources that Theodore Rowehl and Canaris of the Abwehr had assembled was very effective, including having overflown and taken photographs of just about every pre-war military installation in the country, but Britain's use of radar meant that anything entering British airspace was able to be tracked almost immediately, intercepted and shot at. Putting it succinctly, during the Battle of Britain and the Blitz, the Germans had little opportunity to quantify the results of their bombing raids, which made determining how well they were doing very difficult. This meant they had to rely almost solely on what the bomb aimers and pilots were telling them to gauge their raids' effectiveness, which naturally allowed for error, and gave an uneven and inaccurate picture of the strategic situation. Obviously, there were breakthroughs that meant aerial recon assets got through, such as the quest for speed and altitude - the Ju 86P and the Ar 234, but ultimately fixes for these were found with high flying interceptors and in the Arado's case, ending the war (!), but jet interceptors were around the corner in wartime Britain by 1945.

The denial of the use of aircraft over Britain throughout the rest of the war, with a co-ordinated and effective air defence network in place against them, as well as the dawning realisation that neither the British, Americans or Russians were going to relent as the war wore on led the Germans to take a different approach, hence the V weapons. There was little the Allies could have done to prevent the V 1 and V 2 campaigns that they historically didn't do. The V 1 and V 2 programmes were set back by bombing and interdiction campaigns throughout their development. The V 1s could be caught in flight, but their biggest problem was that they were terribly inaccurate and it is arguable that they consumed resources that should have been spent elsewhere and that this meant the whole V 1 campaign was a waste of time, effort and resources with little practicable result for the Germans. The same could be argued regarding the V 2 campaign, but for the fact that it was unstoppable once launched and was truly an advanced terror weapon with enormous potential. Again however, the use of resources dedicated to the programme certainly advanced technology - the V 1 could have been designed and built by any country with its own aviation industry - it was not very advanced, but militarily the V 2 campaign was misguided for several reasons, not least was that by the time the V 2 offensive began, Germany had neither the resources nor the time left to launch an offensive with weapons that might have resulted in an outcome it sought, in hindsight of course.

Technology was not the Germans' problem, it was the attempted attaining of unachieveable strategic goals - see Ops Sealion and Barbarossa, for example, and the material waste that these entailed, as well as a general underestimation of their enemies. The one thing we can be thankful for is that the Nazi hierarchy was what it was; there was much infighting, currying of favour and general lack of knowledge of the strategic situation for various reasons. This all induced a level of chaos at a managerial level that meant that focus was lacking and those who knew better of a lesser rank were ignored.

 

[yulzari]

The Luftwaffe was limited by fuel and the Allies were not. This underlies all.

 

[Shortround6]

The Luftwaffe was limited by fuel and the Allies were not. This underlies all.

The Germans were limited by fuel in two ways.

The allied bombing campaign would have been very different if the allies had been limited to 87 octane fuel.
Any talk of German long range massive bombing campaigns has to be looked at in that light.
Less efficient engines (from a power to weight ratio) means heavier engines in given gross weight aircraft which means fewer bombs per aircraft sortie.
Which goes back to the German lack of fuel in general. More German sorties to carry the same amount of bombs as the allies carried while facing the German lack of fuel?

As examples the B-17 and B-24 would not have worked with 87 octane fuel. The take -off power would have been several hundred HP less per engine and the engines would not have made the power at altitude that they did. This could be "solved" by fitting R-2600 engines but they weigh about 500-600lbs more per engine and that weight has to come out of the gross, either fuel or bombs.
British bombers with 1375HP Hercules engines?
Merlins limited to 6lbs of boost? (or a bit more?)

Germans might have speed up development of the DB 603 but that is a 1900-2000lb engine and not a 1400-1500lb engine so you have the same problem.
Lets remember it is the 30 minute or 1 hour rating that counts with bombers. You have to get off the runway and climb to operational heights. 5 min sprint ratings don't work.

Hundreds more sorties to drop the same tonnage of bombs when you don't even have enough 87 octane fuel for 100hp trainers is not a way to win a war.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Germans were limited by fuel in two ways.

The allied bombing campaign would have been very different if the allies had been limited to 87 octane fuel.
Any talk of German long range massive bombing campaigns has to be looked at in that light.
Less efficient engines (from a power to weight ratio) means heavier engines in given gross weight aircraft which means fewer bombs per aircraft sortie.
Which goes back to the German lack of fuel in general. More German sorties to carry the same amount of bombs as the allies carried while facing the German lack of fuel?
....
Germans might have speed up development of the DB 603 but that is a 1900-2000lb engine and not a 1400-1500lb engine so you have the same problem.
Lets remember it is the 30 minute or 1 hour rating that counts with bombers. You have to get off the runway and climb to operational heights. 5 min sprint ratings don't work.

Hundreds more sorties to drop the same tonnage of bombs when you don't even have enough 87 octane fuel for 100hp trainers is not a way to win a war.

German engines were making very useful level of power on 87 oct fuel, be it for take off, or long-time (30 min) climb, or economical cruise. They certainly don't need DB 603 to equal power and payload of most of Lancasters, Halifaxes or Stirlings. A 34-42 liter engine chioce has it's strong sides vs. a 27-36 liter engine choice.

 

[Shortround6]

when?
The 601s were pretty much under 1000hp for 30 minute ratings.
The 601N needed 96 octane.
The 605 makes decent power but doesn't show up until 1942???
and the 605 gained about 100 kg in weight over the 601?

Please remember that it takes time for these large fleets of bombers to show up.
The B-17 is a special case in that it took years of dribs and drabs before production was started in earnest but it took until late summer of 1942 for the 1000th B-17 to be built, the last 500 in about 4 months.
It took from the end of 1940 until early summer of 1942 to build the first 500 B-24s but the next 500 showed up in 3-4 months. It helps if you have 3-5 factories making an airplane.

When is this German super-bomber designed and around what engines?

Some of the early British 4 engine bombers with early engines weren't really all that good. Halifax Is with Merlin X engines, Short Stirling Is with Hercules II engines (1375hp for take-off) Later Mk Is got 1500hp Hercules Xis and the MK IIIs of 1943 got 1635hp Hercules VI and XVIs.

Lets make sure we are comparing the same capabilities.

 

[tomo pauk]

when?
The 601s were pretty much under 1000hp for 30 minute ratings.
The 601N needed 96 octane.
The 605 makes decent power but doesn't show up until 1942???
and the 605 gained about 100 kg in weight over the 601?

30 min rating:
DB 601Aa - 950-1050 PS from SL to 4 km (1940)
DB 601E - 1200 PS or better from SL to 4.9 km (mid 1941)
BMW 801A - 1470 PS at 1 km, 1300 PS at 4.5 km (mid 1941)
Jumo 211B - 1000 PS at 2 km, 920 PS at 5 km (early 1940)
Jumo 211F - 1200 PS at 2 km, 1060 PS at 5.2 km (early 1941), 211J from early 1942 is
Re. weight increase - the 'no free lunch' rule applies as always.

Please remember that it takes time for these large fleets of bombers to show up.
The B-17 is a special case in that it took years of dribs and drabs before production was started in earnest but it took until late summer of 1942 for the 1000th B-17 to be built, the last 500 in about 4 months.
It took from the end of 1940 until early summer of 1942 to build the first 500 B-24s but the next 500 showed up in 3-4 months. It helps if you have 3-5 factories making an airplane.

When is this German super-bomber designed and around what engines?

I don't recall suggesting anything like 'super bomber'. I will suggest a normal, plain vanilla 4 engined bomber, designed around Jumo 211 engines, since they are in best supply in 1940-41.

Lets make sure we are comparing the same capabilities.

Yes, lets do it