PART 1
After fallowing with attention the course of this thread about Custer and Little Big Horn, I would like to write some of my views on the battle, although this will probably spark another debate on the issue...
First I think we had all agreed about Custer's reffusal of Gattling Guns and aditional troops. Decision not to take Gattlings can be judged both as wrong or as a correct one (it depends on arguments you take in consideration), but refusal of aditional troops was surelly wrong. Period!
Now, let us see what could have been done with assets at Custer's disposall on 25th of June 1876 at the Little Bighorn - and that were 647 soldiers of 7th U.S. Cavalry, armed with Springfield carabines and pistols.
Custer's plan
Custer was arrogant... this had been written many times in previous posts. Yes, he was. And his agresive style of warfare, will to take risks and his personal bravery served him well in his career, both in Civil war and in fighting Indians up to that point.
Custer's decision to attack hostile village from three directions wasn't rash, it was straight from the book. In fact it was common Cavalry tactics during Indian wars to flank the enemy when ever possible and prevent them to scatter. Custer had limited knowlege of terrain ahead of him but he didn't greatly underestimated number of hostile Indians. He told his officers that they will probably face over 1000 warriors and actual number of wariors is now estimated to be around 1500. In fact Custer's plan of attack at Little Bighorn (Custer's plan was this: Reno in the front of the village, Benteen in the center and Custer in the extreme opposite) has been supported by such figures as US general in chief Nelson Appelton Miles, the most successful Indian fighter in US history, in his writings.
The true size of the Indian village
The village of Little Bighorn was never "five miles" long as the myth says... Lieutenant Oscar Long's early map from 1878 showed that the village was 1.32 miles long, not extending past Medicine Tail Coulee ford, which pretty much matches Grinnell's (based on Soldier Wolf's testimony) Ricker's (based on Respects Nothing's account) maps. The Indians moved north after the first day of fighting, giving the post-battle observers (General Terry's men) the impression of one continuous larger camp.
There were 1500 warriors and unknown number noncombatants in the village. We can speculate if Custer's plan was actually to take noncombatants hostage or not... maybe it was maybe it wasn't. Fact is that Indian village was not as large as sometimes claimed but still large enough for Custer to realise that he will need more troops and additional ammunition. This is the point when he sent orders to Benteen to join him and bring ammunition packs.
Reno's fight
Reno's attack opened the battle. After charging across the valey into the striking distance of the hostile village, Reno ordered a halt and deployed a skirmish line across portion of the valey. After warriors started to appear in growing numbers (note that this still wasn't the entire Indian force that Custer will later face), soldiers took better position in the timber by the river. Lieutenant Hare, of Reno's batalion, later said that holding the timber was evidently made to support Custer's flank attack against the village. But Reno left the timber (which was highly defendable position) after only 30 minutes of light fighting.
Here is description of this event by one of the participants:
"...I always felt that Major Reno utterly failed in his part in the valley attack in the disposition of his command when he fell back in the old stream bed; that he failed to exercise any fire control; that he could and should have held that position... Having made the decision to retreat, he made no disposition to cover that retreat or to properly inform the command of such decision; that he in person led a panic, straggling retreat, hereby sacrificing many lives and the morale of his command. The shock from the killing of Bloody Knife at his side or near him seems to have bereft him of the sense of official responsibility and to impel him to seek safety in flight. "
Lieutenant Edward Godfrey, Company K, 7th cavalry, after Little Bighorn (letter to Agent Asbury in 1929)
The witnesses make clear that after reaching Reno Hill, Major Reno wasn't under fire anymore. The warriors left him almost immediately, because they were watching the arrival of Captain Benteen and, close to him, the pack train.