operation sea lion

[Civettone]

And in good weather, with 1,000 bombers, in a month in 1940 the Luftwaffe managed to sink a few destroyers and a handful of coasters.

Strange how you come up with information the next day and disregard it the other. During that Channel Phase you were talking about you gave the figure of a 1000 bomber sorties of which 70%* were directed against naval shipping (which to me also meant attacks on ports). I'm talking about 5000 sorties a day and this with better bombers and better crews. I just look at Pedestal (or even Crete?), look at the number of warships sunk by the Luftwaffe with a fraction of those sorties and see the number go up, even with British fighters.
How you can foresee the AA gunners of the Royal Navy shooting down ALL 1000 German bombers in two days ... isn't even funny anymore.

Of course, that's about as realistic as your prediction, but hey, if we are basing things on what could possibly happen, rather than on historical performance...

I am basing it on historical performance: the RAF lost twice the number of fighters although confronted with a smaller amount of German fighters. The LW sank quite a lot of ships in Pedestal, Crete and even Dunkirk. I just make the calculation. That's basing it on historical performance.

(* I very much doubt that 70% was against shipping. Because although I quoted the BoB diares, I left out the night bombing as this was not relevant to the discussion we had at that time. What I can tell is that at least 70% of the missions were not against shipping. Not the same thing as missions of course...)

A hundred miles? Where do you come up with such figures?

I didn't. It was a question. How far can you see from the air? All I know is you can see the British coast from the Belgian coast on good weather. Isn't that a 100 miles? Of course a ships, even a convoy, is too small to be seen at just a distance.

No. The Germans entire stock of ASV radar aircraft in 1942 was a single He 111, fitted with a captured British radar, and operating in the Mediterranean.

That doesn't make sense as the Germans found the H2S so much better than their own Rostock radar. Wouldn't that mean that the Fw 200C-4 (with Rostock) was already operational by then?

However, the main point is that even with the same supplies each day, you have far less capacity.

I understand that but I still don't see how they come from 100,000 men to 10,000 men a day.

I don't think you are reading what the source is saying. Those are the forces present in the area, and some forces that weren't even in the area at all. Few of those were "put on alert".

Well, all I did was take a OOB. And coupled with The RN went on immediate notice every night from the beginning of February, against a nighttime passage through the Straits of Dover. then that makes me conclude the Channel Fleet was put on alert.

Nothing about "assigned to operation fuller". That smacks of a deliberate attempt to mislead.

Well, that reminds me of that list of targets you listed during the Channel Phase. I also asked if you were deliberately misusing information. I also had the feeling when you came up with 3 fighters for every bomber. That's finding information and using it for your purpose. I haven't said anything more about it because I shouldn't doubt your intentions. Likewise, you shouldn't question mine. I interpreted the way I did. No bad intentions.

If the Germans were planning an invasion, a few simple changes would be decreased RAF bombing of Germany, and increased attacks on the channel ports, and in particular Brest.

Doesn't matter. Most of the Luftwaffe would be send to France.
And moving British night bombing to France would result in a move of German nightfighters and Flak.

Another would have been moving the fleet out of Scapa Flow if German heavy units were in the south to support an invasion.

I doubt it. Tirpitz was still in Norway.

Another would be even more mining of the beaches, and even more mining of the channel.

Ok, taking the German minesweepers from the Baltic, including those from the double minesweeper production.

Answers.com is a mirror for wikipedia. Anyone can go in and change any of the figures. As such, it's not very reliable.

It is not reliable, ergo it's wrong?

What does the daily running of slow convoys of merchants through the channel in July 1940 prove about German capabilities to stop the RN?

Like in the beginning of my post. A 1000 sorties all through July. And only half of them against shipping? And that's with untrained crews and less suited German bombers.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

David, can you edit your post? It seems you copied and pasted an older post in your new post...

Kris

 

[renrich]

Udet, You make some good points about the US Navy and the Pacific Amphib. landings. However, in doing so I believe you undermine your own arguments. To begin with, the Dieppe Raid was a raid not an invasion. It had very limited objectives, the resources utilised by the British were limited and although a fiasco, to censure the British and the RN severely seems to be excessive to me. If you look at the major amphibious invasions carried out by the Allies in WW2 both in Europe and the Pacific you will notice particular characteristics. The first one is that the Allies controlled the sea almost exclusively. The second one was that they controlled the air above the sea totally or almost totally. The exceptions to that were that the Allies had not total control of the air at Sicily, Salerno and Okinawa. They had total control in N. Africa, Anzio, Normandy and Southern France(all of which the British played a large role in) and in the rest of the Pacific landings. In those landings where absolute air supremacy was not obtained however there was no enemy naval forces of any importance to deal with. If the Allies had had to deal with serious opposition in the air as well as a powerful enemy naval force then those landings might have failed or may have never been attempted. Let us remember that the US politicians and commanders were pushing for a cross channel invasion of France in 1943. They were dissuaded by the British because the Brits knew that the Allies could not muster enough landing craft by 1943 to do the job and air supremacy would have been problematical at best. Let us examine an amphibious invasion in the Pacific that came close to failing. Guadalcanal was unopposed in the landing and the US had air and sea supremacy. The Navy pulled back their carriers and control of the air was lost so the supply ships left without unloading all the supplies necessary to sustain the landing force. Also the IJN sent a TF down the Slot and decimated the covering force of cruisers( Battle of Savo Island, worst naval defeat in US history, one of my uncles was on the only surviving Allied cruiser) The issue was in serious doubt but the Japanese had not enough troops on the island to take advantage of the situation. Control of the sea teetered back and forth as well as air control with the IJN landing reinforcements at night and the Allies having a tenuous control of the air in the daytime. The Henderson Field fliers kept the IJN at bay in the daytime as well as fighting the land based Japanese bombers to a standoff. The Marines barely hung on by teeth and toenail. If the Japanese had been able to concentrate and coordinate their forces they could have prevailed but were never able to do so. To reiterate if the Japanese had been able to attain air supremacy by knocking out Henderson Field and suppressing the US carriers then their naval forces could have denied the Marines any reinforcement and resupply and the battle was over. That would be the situation I would see in a Sealion II except the landing would not be unapposed and I doubt the ability of the Wehrmacht to gain much more than a beachhead.

 

[pbfoot]

I'm not sure if this has been mentioned but the RN did not wish to espose any heavy units for the Dieppe raid for fear of losses the same can be said for the heavy bombers that were available but not used

 

[Hop]

How many destroyers, how many steamers were sunk?

I posted the quote from Wood and Dempster earlier in this thread.

Of course your story changes every time. I've seen you argue that the Germans were waging vast scale terror bombing campaign in July 1940 against te British mainland,

Source for this? (Note to other readers, Kurfurst likes to make up quotes by other people)

I've never said anything of the sort. German bombing of Britain was light in 1940, although they did bomb at night. It wasn't until late August they really began stepping up night bombing of British cities.

In fiction. In reality, the first air attacks were pressed against RN units around Crete on the morning of 21st May 1941. At around 04:30 on the 23rd Cunningham was force to recall all forces to Alexandria.

No, Cunningham ordered Force A to return to Alexandria. The rest returned briefly for ammunition.

RN losses by this point were:

Juno (destroyer)
Greyhound (destroyer)
Gloucester (cruiser)
Fiji (cruiser)

The last of the ships sunk wasn't until the 1st of June.

Hop, even you should understand that if the LW has well over 1000 bombers at hand (closer to 1500 in fact), then it can be done.

Can it? The Luftwaffe had well over 1,000 bombers to hand in the BoB, they never once managed 1000 bomber sorties in a night, let alone a day.

Well you still owe the facts regarding those convoys to make your point.

Cunnigham found that after 2 days of continous LW attacks performed by a fraction of the LW bombers, he could no longer operate in daylight due to air attacks.

But he did still operate in daylight. On the 26th May, Force A was about 50 miles due south of Crete at 1.30 in the afternoon. The next day at 9 am they were heading for Kasos island, NE of Crete.

The Glenroy, Coventry Stuart and Jaguar were attacked by stukas at 6.20 on the 26th,

Strange how you come up with information the next day and disregard it the other. During that Channel Phase you were talking about you gave the figure of a 1000 bomber sorties of which 70%* were directed against naval shipping (which to me also meant attacks on ports). I'm talking about 5000 sorties a day and this with better bombers and better crews.

I'm trying to point out that 5,000 sorties a day is utter fantasy.

In the BoB the Germans deployed about 1,900 bombers and dive bombers against Britain. Their peak number of sorties in a week was just over 2,100, day and night. Only 3 weeks during the BoB did they manage to fly over 2,000 sorties a week.

And you suggest they fly 5,000 a day?

How you can foresee the AA gunners of the Royal Navy shooting down ALL 1000 German bombers in two days ... isn't even funny anymore.

I agree. It's as ridiculous as them sinking all RN ships in 2 days, or the Luftwaffe flying 5,000 bomber sorties a day.

I am basing it on historical performance: the RAF lost twice the number of fighters although confronted with a smaller amount of German fighters.

But flying totally different missions. The Luftwaffe were flying interceptions of small bombing raids, that were attacking targets the Germans didn't really care about. As such, the Germans had the advantage, to a far greater extent than the RAF possessed during the BoB (the RAF were defending targets they had to defend during the BoB)

The LW sank quite a lot of ships in Pedestal, Crete and even Dunkirk. I just make the calculation. That's basing it on historical performance.

No, it's not. Take Crete. 600 Luftwaffe combat aircraft managed to sink 9 RN warships over 10 days. With no air cover.

During the BoB, 3,000 Luftwaffe aircraft managed to sink about 20 ships (nearly all small merchants) over a period of a month.

I very much doubt that 70% was against shipping.

That's what Hooton says. Considering that practically every figure you have come up with has been wrong, I know which source I'll trust.

I didn't. It was a question. How far can you see from the air?

Depends what you are looking at, and the visibility. The smaller the target, the harder to see.

All I know is you can see the British coast from the Belgian coast on good weather. Isn't that a 100 miles?

At it's closest point, on the Belgian/French border, the distance is almost exactly 50 miles. At the most distant point, on the Belgian/Dutch border, the distance is just over 80 miles. Ostend is about 65 miles.

That's looking towards Kent. If you look towards East Anglia, the distance is about 80 miles.

That doesn't make sense as the Germans found the H2S so much better than their own Rostock radar. Wouldn't that mean that the Fw 200C-4 (with Rostock) was already operational by then?

The Germans didn't capture an H2S set until Feb 1943, and it was some time before they understood what the badly damaged device was. So it wasn't until much later in 1943 they could compare it with their own radars, and Rostock was in service by then.

Hooton gives the following detailas of Luftwaffe surface search radar.

Fug Atlas tested July 1941
Fug Neptun-S tested some time later. Both "disappointing". Captured ASV Mk II tested against both German radars July 1942, and found to be "far superior". Rostock in development at this time, but production so low that by November 1942 only 5 surface search radars in use in the west, and one of those was the captured ASV II.

That means the Luftwaffe might have had 1 effective radar just coming into use in the summer of 1942, but that's not going to be much use in a battle, as it takes time to integrate the radar, learn to use it properly, etc.

Well, all I did was take a OOB.

But you labelled it "assigned to Operation Fuller" when it wasn't, and the source didn't say it was.

And coupled with The RN went on immediate notice every night from the beginning of February, against a nighttime passage through the Straits of Dover.

It wasn't. Barnett goes into more detail about the alert status:

Both the Admiralty and the Royal Air Force began to put into operation contingency plans matured over a whole year for dealing with a German dash up the Channel and through the Straits of Dover. Air squadrons were placed at indefinite short notice, while the C-in-C Nore (Vice Admiral Sir George H D'O. Lyon) was requested to reinforce Dover Command with six destroyers and up to six motor torpedo boats. The Admiralty also placed the minelayer Manxman under Dover's orders. The Naval Staff History rightly comments that the striking power of these naval forces "was not great". At the request of the Vice Admiral, Dover (still Bertram Ramsay), six Swordfish of 825 squadron, Fleet Air Arm, at Manston in Kent were placed at his disposal.

<snip bit>

He could not expect his "slender forces" to remain on standby indefinitely, and therefore must determine as best he could the likely time of German arrival in the Straights of Dover.

<snip more about speculation on when the Germans would transit the straights>

Ramsay's plan was to launch combined attacks by Swordfish and motor torpedo boats in the straights, in order to cripple the enemy while he was in range of British shore based batteries and radar; and later to launch a destroyer attack beyond the Straight to the eastward where the destroyers would have freedom to manoeuvre unconstrained by British minefields or enemy shore batteries

Ramsay had control of all the naval forces for the operation, and that was it. MTBs, 6 destroyers, 6 Swordfish. No mention in his planning of cruisers, battleships, submarines etc.

It is not reliable, ergo it's wrong?

It's not sourced. It's simply a claim, by an unknown person.

Even more, the wording

Ultra staff and technology successfully decoded over 50 messages a week. However, by 1942, German radio and wire traffic increased exponentially.

Suggests 50 messages a week was before 1942. They go on to describe the increase in message traffic, and methods used to keep up with it.

Like in the beginning of my post. A 1000 sorties all through July. And only half of them against shipping? And that's with untrained crews and less suited German bombers.

But that's the point. How much anti shipping training did the bulk of the Luftwaffe have? Those Stuka units operating in the heart of Russia would not have been well trained in anti shipping operations, would they?

You keep suggesting that the whole Luftwaffe bombing force, or most of it, would be making multiple attacks a day against the RN. But that's your fantasy, not mine, I am basing my objections on the historical realities, not on fantasies the Luftwaffe was never capable of.

Lets give another example. You claim 10,000 anti shipping sorties in a day.

In August 1940, the Luftwaffe launched their all out offensive against the RAF, with bombing raids all over Britain, day and night (although concentrated in the SE, of course). Did they open with 10,000 bomber sorties on the first day? No, far less than 1,000.

In fact, it took them from 12th August to about the 17th September to make 10,000 bomber sorties. The entire critical period of the Battle, from Eagle day to after Battle of Britain day, from the German hopes of smashing the RAF in 3 days to Hitler postponing Sea Lion, occurred in the time it took the Luftwaffe to fly 10,000 bomber sorties.

If it took the Luftwaffe in 1940 over a month to fly 10,000 bomber sorties, of all sorts, day and night, how are they going to fly 10,000 anti shipping sorties in 2 days?

 

[plan_D]

"What about HMS Worcester?"

What about it? You consider a few torpedo attacks by Royal Navy DDs against German BCs a fleet action? It makes me wonder what you consider the clashes between the IJN and USN as, "Super mega fleet actions"?

Face it, the Channel Dash did not pitch fleet against fleet as the Royal Navy never met the convoy with a fleet.

"Interesting, especially in relationship to your previous post of how overstretched the Royal Navy already was. First Syscom asks for the USS Wasp and now you're calling back Force H. That leaves Malta unprotected.
Not to mention how long it would have taken Force H to get to the Channel.
And you will leave a part of the Home Fleet in the north although it was much closer to the Channel than Force H was? Interesting to say the least."

It does not leave Malta unprotected and even if it did, the German war machine seems to be so geared up for an invasion of Great Britain it would not matter. But, in reality, you forget about the fleet in Alexandria.

It didn't take too long for Force H to sail from Gibraltar to the Bismarck, so it wouldn't be that long of a delay. In any case, it'd only be required in the event of the Kriegsmarine using its BCs.
It's not that interesting, since the Royal Navy wouldn't need to use all the Home Fleet and could keep some left in Scapa Flow. Using some of Force H and some of the Home Fleet allows the Royal Navy to trap the entire force in the Channel. Stopping any retreat to Brest or Wilhelmshaven.

"Intense? From what I've read is that most of the German bombers were used to attack land targets.
On the morning of 22 May, VIII Air Corps started an all-out attack on the British fleet
which suggests it wasn't an all-out attack before."

The Royal Navy only sailed against the first invasion fleet the day before. Implying that the Royal Navy was being attacked when it first entered battle, and then suffered an "all out attack" the next day.

"Compare the British fleet around Crete with the Channel Fleet. Compare the number of German aircraft in Greece with the number which would have been assembled in France."

So, the German numbers will be greater as will the RAF numbers. At Crete the RAF had no planes, so even a single Hurricane in Britain would have given them more strength than what they had on Crete.

"Are you saying the Kriegsmarine consisted solely of battlecruisers?"

So, what else are you going to use? The out-gunned DDs or the vulnerable U-boats?

"What a joke. Since when did German HQ have anything to say? Since when did they care about losses?"

The Germans cared about losses, this is summer 1942 ... not winter 1944.

"I think it's a pity you don't take the effort to read my previous posts. Bletchley Park and Enigma has already come up. And as nobody mentioned it since, I think my arguments were convincing that British Intelligence wasn't that all-knowing. They could decode about 20 messages a week. They failed to know about the Channel Dash or the outbreak of the Bismarck."

I think it's a pity you don't have more of a clue. Your numbers are wrong; and the simple fact that ULTRA were critical in sinking the Bismarck (as I have mentioned) just makes this pathetic argument null and void.
Instead of looking at what you think ULTRA didn't know about, how about what they did know about? Every invasion made by the German war machine was known by Britain weeks before it happened, and that includes Barbarossa.

"Wrong! That's one of my essential arguments: they would no longer have the home advantage. If you would have read at least some of my posts, you would have read it as I already explained this 10 times.
The British aircraft would have to fight over the German held beaches and over the Channel which is not exactly friendly territory. Unlike the BoB the British squadrons would not be able to scramble in time as the Germans would be flying over the Channel when the RAF would take off.
Just like the Germans lost the BoB due to attrition, now the British will lose it for the same reason."

My word, how can you just announce that it's wrong? Just because the Germans have set foot on the British sands it doesn't make the RAF fighters instantly lose home advantage. The British fighters had their radar cover, had the shortest distance to fly and had more chance of getting back to safe terrority.

Have you even looked into the Battle of Britain? The Luftwaffe formations were often spotted over the Channel, and the RAF would still scramble in time.

You would be throwing the Luftwaffe into the exact same situation they encountered in the Battle of Britain. Whoever is defending has the better position, fact. The only way to overcome that position is surprise, and an invasion like the one you're attempting wouldn't have surprise in any sense of the word.

 

[daishi12]

Hi Kris, could I just ask a quick question as to what basis do you have that the LW would be able to withdraw a significant proportion of it's forces from the Ostfront?

As far as I can see, there has been an assumption that Russia would have been neutralized as a threat. It is my opinion that for this to happen, the Werhmacht would have needed to have invaded and occupied several hundred thousand square kilometers of land including Murmansk, Kiev, Stalingrad, Moscow, Archangel, Kursk and the Crimea.

Given the depth of feeling that the Russians had for the invading Germans I would anticipate that there would be scattered large scale engagements and also continuous partisan activity.

How many men, tanks and aircraft could be pulled back from the Ostfront without giving Russia the opportunity for an overwhelming counter offensive?

 

[Civettone]

Can it? The Luftwaffe had well over 1,000 bombers to hand in the BoB, they never once managed 1000 bomber sorties in a night, let alone a day.

You draw the wrong conclusion. Just because they didn't use a 1000 bombers in one go, doesn't mean they couldn't. I've never eaten jumped off a bridge before, but that doesn't mean I wouldn't manage.

I'm trying to point out that 5,000 sorties a day is utter fantasy.

Are you saying 5 missions a day is impossible? The German Stukas and Bf 109 pilots managed just that on several occasions against the Russians under often difficult circumstances and with an inadequate supply system.

The Luftwaffe were flying interceptions of small bombing raids, that were attacking targets the Germans didn't really care about. As such, the Germans had the advantage

No, that's still not the reason why the Germans shot down twice as many fighters as the British did. What's the difference in dogfighting over Britain or dogfighting over France? I see three differences: fighting time, AA ground fire and pilots being captured when shot down. Only the first one could in some way give the advantage to the Germans. But all in all, the Spits were defeated by the German Bf 109s and Fw 190s fair and square. And it's not just France, just look at North Africa.


And another thing. A couple of people tell me that I don't take into account that the British would have done things differently than they historically did. I think that's true, they would have done things differently. I probably fail to think about this but the arguments of what the British would have done differently so far have not convinced me.
But in all honesty, I also believe you guys are making the same mistake. You're thinking of a RAF which was there in 1942. But as I said, the bulk of the Luftwaffe would have been called back from the Ostfront and have confronted the RAF. As the Germans shot down twice as many as they lost, and they only had 250 fighters in France, you can imagine what that means when they have 1250 fighters. I'm not going to state that the British would have lost 5 times more fighters but I don't see how one can disagree that British losses would have been much higher.
Same thing goes for the British shipping and other targets. 5 times more bombers, 5 time more sorties.

600 Luftwaffe combat aircraft managed to sink 9 RN warships over 10 days.

Another example of how you bend the facts to represent what you want. First, it was not a target rich environment which makes it difficult to actually find targets and given the long distances, they could fly less sorties. Second, those Luftwaffe combat aircraft you mention did not have a primary goal of destroying the Royal Navy and attacking them for 10 days, what is what you're suggesting. And third, those 600 combat aircraft also include 1/3 fighter aircraft.

During the BoB, 3,000 Luftwaffe aircraft managed to sink about 20 ships (nearly all small merchants) over a period of a month.

Now you make it sound as if 3,000 aircraft were trying to sink ships over a month. Their primary mission was not to sink ships and how many of those aircraft were bombers capable of sinking ships?
And again, they weren't trained in anti-shipping.

And against Russia, fewer bombers were more succesful in sinking ships.

Ostend is about 65 miles.

Good call. It was Ostend where I saw England's shore. So to come back to my point. I can imagine me seeing 50% further when I would be flying in an aircraft over Ostend.
As such visibility could be up to a 100 miles. Naturally one cannot see a ship from that distance but that's not what I was claiming.

Rostock in development at this time, but production so low that by November 1942 only 5 surface search radars in use in the west, and one of those was the captured ASV II.

Thank you for the information. I'm not to proud to admit that I wasn't aware of this. All I knew was that the Germans compared the H2S with the Rostock so I assumed it was already operational.

But you labelled it "assigned to Operation Fuller" when it wasn't, and the source didn't say it was.

Fair enough. I did assume that the OOB meant these forces were available to Ramsay.

But that's the point. How much anti shipping training did the bulk of the Luftwaffe have? Those Stuka units operating in the heart of Russia would not have been well trained in anti shipping operations, would they?

Several units were trained in attacking naval targets. Those that weren't would have had months to train.

You keep suggesting that the whole Luftwaffe bombing force, or most of it, would be making multiple attacks a day against the RN. But that's your fantasy, not mine, I am basing my objections on the historical realities, not on fantasies the Luftwaffe was never capable of.

It seems you make the BoB the standard for all Luftwaffe operations. The BoB was going to last for a longer period. If the Germans were planning on keeping up the offensive, they couldn't fly too many sorties. Same thing with Kursk, it was to be a short offensive of days not weeks.
German bombers could fly up to 5 short-range missions a day. That's perhaps not your reality but unfortunately it's historical reality. I suggest you read up on Luftwaffe operations on the Eastern Front.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

You consider a few torpedo attacks by Royal Navy DDs against German BCs a fleet action? It makes me wonder what you consider the clashes between the IJN and USN as, "Super mega fleet actions"?

Now now PlanD, you don't have to be right all the time. It's ok to just admit that it was a fleet action. So what if you forgot about Worcester? Big deal, it happens to the best of us.

It does not leave Malta unprotected and even if it did, the German war machine seems to be so geared up for an invasion of Great Britain it would not matter.

I thought you would say that but that's a problem in your reasoning. You think about moving units back to Britain for defending the island but you don't know when it's going to happen. As you (or Hop?) said, the British would prepare themselves as soon as Russia was out of the war, so starting in late 1941/early 1942. As the Germans were going to invade somewhere in April-July, they would have half a year of advantages. You make the logical error that the Germans will have to divert forces like the British would but in fact, the bulk of their forces would simply be withdrawn from Russia so they could keep up their presence elsewhere.

But, in reality, you forget about the fleet in Alexandria.

I wouldn't be too sure about that. I see Rommel winning in El Alamein and taking Alexandria and the Suez Channel.

The Royal Navy only sailed against the first invasion fleet the day before. Implying that the Royal Navy was being attacked when it first entered battle, and then suffered an "all out attack" the next day.

So? The Luftwaffe didn't all out attack the Royal Navy and lost an invasion fleet because of it. Then they attacked the Royal Navy and didn't lose an invasion fleet after that

So, the German numbers will be greater as will the RAF numbers. At Crete the RAF had no planes, so even a single Hurricane in Britain would have given them more strength than what they had on Crete.

You don't get it. The Germans had fighter aircraft in Greece. As the British didn't have fighters, these fighters were unopposed. If the British did have fighters, it wouldn't mean things would have been different: the Germans could have protected their bombers.

So, what else are you going to use? The out-gunned DDs or the vulnerable U-boats?

So now you're saying Germany only had battlecruisers, destroyers and U-boats? No cruisers, torpedoboats, Schellboote?
And what do you mean by outgunned DDs? German destroyers had many weaknesses but at least their guns were bigger than those on British destroyers.

The Germans cared about losses, this is summer 1942 ... not winter 1944.

The Germans cared about losses? Did Hitler care about losses? Did Göring care about losses? Did German HQ have anything to say?

I think it's a pity you don't have more of a clue.

Yeah, I would probably also think it's a pity. But like you said I don't have a clue. So I don't even know I don't have a clue and should think it's a pity. Poor me...

and the simple fact that ULTRA were critical in sinking the Bismarck (as I have mentioned) just makes this pathetic argument null and void.
Instead of looking at what you think ULTRA didn't know about, how about what they did know about?

It's pretty clear cut to me. ULTRA provided the British with lots of information but not the whole story. They had to go on by indications like your example of the Bismarck showed. The British didn't decode a message saying when the Bismarck would sail. They didn't decode a message when the G&S would sail. And that's only naval matters. There are several more army related matters which the British failed to foresee.
So to call my idea that the British might not decode a message that would tell them when the invasion would take place, pathetic is ok by me. But I think it's clear overestimation of British capabilities and underestimating the German ones.
And don't forget that the Germans would have done their best to deceive the British by sending false information and using decoys. That's not wisful thinking from my part, that's logic thinking.

The British fighters had their radar cover, had the shortest distance to fly and had more chance of getting back to safe terrority.

As many radar installations were close to the shore, I don't think they would have lasted that long. The British would have to move or rebuild some of them.
The fighting would have taken place in two areas.
One is the Channel. The British didn't have the distance advantage and as it would have been a contested area between both sides, the British would no longer have the home advantage.
Two is the invasion area. The British would have the distance advantage but I already said there would be a CAP over the territory (with the disadvantages that come with it), so British scramble time is of less importance. But the British would have the disadvantage of flying and crashing over German held territory. Sure, they could try and fly back the friendly territory but usually you don't have a choice. You bail out because you have to. This will usually lead to landing over enemy territory. And if not, there's as much chance of drowing in the Channel as landing in British held territory.

Have you even looked into the Battle of Britain? The Luftwaffe formations were often spotted over the Channel, and the RAF would still scramble in time.

And would intercept them over the Channel?
I'm sure this happened but most fights did take place over land.

You would be throwing the Luftwaffe into the exact same situation they encountered in the Battle of Britain.

I already explained what the differences are. Fighting would no longer be over hostile territory. That is the main reason why the Germans lost the Bob: they lost because of attrition. This time, it'll be the RAF that will lose it.
And as you don't intend to use the entire Home Fleet to destroy my invasion fleet, I don't think those Royal Navy units will last long against against a thousand well-trained and well-suited dive bombers. Especially now that I know you'll be sending in Force H all the way from Gibraltar which is over 2,000 km away.

Whoever is defending has the better position, fact.

So my invasion troops that have dug in, are in a better position. My plan keeps on getting better and better.

Kris

 

[Glider]

As requested I have tried to edit your posting.

Hi David
I must thank you for doing the effort of looking up stuff and backing up your arguments.

Don't really understand why you are enquiring about the "own power" notion. All I'm saying is that river barges were succesfully used by the British.

You then gave a fair bit of info about the testing...

Many thanks for the info, I need to amend my views, but, and it's a big but, they were not assault craft. It's a huge risk. The quote was from Ian Allen book British Warships of WW2 re the use of derricks and seaworthiness.

Thank you for adding this wonderful piece of information. It's completely new to me that the Japs were given a grand tour.
On the other hand, I don't know what to conclude from it. I can imagine the Americans also being unimpressed when they would have seen it. It however does not mean they would have been unsuccesful. I also wonder what exactly those preparations are. What do they refer to? Do you have an online source for this so I can read up on it??

Its not on line but in a book called the Burning Blue ISBN 0-7126-6475-0. The book is supposed to be about the BOB which contains nothing new but it does have some comments on the American and Japanese views of the BOB including a section on the aftermath including the comments mentioned re the invasion

The Germans had 250 fighters for that job. In my scenario (with increased production and the fighters withdrawn from the Ostfront) they would have had 5 times more fighters, if not more.

I realise this, but the area covered is hundreds of times larger and the resources are going to be thin, very thin even with 5 times the aircraft. You yourself said that to keep one unit overhead on a CAP requires 5 in total, I was allowing for a surge due to the invasion.
Using my 1 to 3 ratio 1500 fighters will give you 500 overhead all day and that is pushing it.
If you want to hold back a reserve to support bombers attacking a key area or a RN attack then you have less overhead.
The RAF in May 42 had 42 squadrons of Spits (Squadrons of the RAF) call it 650 planes a number that would have increased with the threat of invasion. 650 alone would be sufficient to give your 500 planes overhead a very hard time as they can attack and retreat at will, choosing their moment. Not forgetting the additional 21 attack squadrons of fighter bombers mentioned before.
Remember these were in place and are minimum numbers. An invasion threat would have pulled out all the stops.
Remember these numbers exclude the RCAF who were in the UK at the time

The Kriegsmarine was quite capable of dealing with the British Channel Fleet.
And I'm just wondering if torpedoes wouldn't go underneath barges?? .

With what?, the BC's are in the Atlantic and you have a handful of cruisers and destroyers. The RN has KGV's, Nelsons, Queen Elizabeth class, numerous cruisers and compared to the Germans, almost unlimited numbers of destroyers. All intent on death and destruction and hang the losses as this is make or break time for the war.

Actually they wouldn't go under, but it doesn't matter, one 4in or 4.7in shell would do the job. Torpedo's would be a waste but the MTB's would use them

Well, that's exactly what I'm planning on doing. If the Germans can hold on to Stalingrad, they can also hold on to the British beaches for a couple of days..

Then Germany lose, big time. The key to an invasion, any invasion, is that you build up your forces faster than the enemy.
If the defender wins the race, the Invasion forces are trapped and unable to move against dug in defenders with support.
If the invader wins the race, they break through and get into the rear of the enemy forcing a retreat.
Give the British 2 days and you are trapped, with nowhere to go

Even more than three units! So with only 1/5 (or so) of the German fighters destined for CAPs they would form a truly minimal CAP while the bulk of the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy. That's the choice I'm making, that's the gamble. With the bulk of the Luftwaffe attacking the Royal Navy, the RAF would have to choose too. Attack the troops or attack the German dive bombers. My guess is that they would probably try to do both. Do you agree? ..

The British have 650 plus fighters to escort the RN taking on your 500 and 21 squadrons plus of GA planes to run amok attacking your troops, support vessels anything they can find against minimal opposition due to your withdrawn/minimal CAP. They would have a field day and the resources to do both.

Where are you going to get those Australians from? Australia decided that its troops would fight in the Pacific. SAAF was already in Africa. So if you pull back the RAF I can also pull back the Luftwaffe?
As such I don't think pulling back your units will do you any good. ..

You have said it yourself. If the GAF pull out of North Africa then the RAF can leaving the Italians to face the SAAF. Fair comment on the RAAF but my money is on the SAAF.
It gives the RAF an additional 10 squadrons of Hurricanes, 3 of Spitfires and 4 of Kittyhawks which will certainly help. You now have 31 squadrons of GA planes causing hell while your CAP is close to zero. The German army is going to love your plan

I don't care what the British are capable of. You said the Germans didn't have the minesweepers needed. I showed they did. ..

Not quite. You showed me a number which I didn't disagree with, plus I gave a suggestion as to how the difference could have been made up and the basis for my number. I have done more digging and the Germans had a class of Motor Minesweepers called R Boats and these are small naval vessels designed for the job and more likely to have been the cause of the difference. Basically these were the size of an S boat but slower and used for a number of roles including minelaying and escort. The British equivalent was the Fairmile B, and both were considered as part of coastal forces by the German and British navies.
Germany definately didn't have 90 fleet minesweepers and I was trying to help you out of our hole.

Read Kurfürst post: BC tried for months and couldn't destroy their target!! And you say it's good enough? ..

As per my last posting yes, that's good enough for me. 350 bombers would play merry hell in the enclosed landing area. PS the ships were not destroyed but they were hit a number of times, one by 5 bombs and the other 4.
By the way this number is based on Sterlings, Halifax's, Manchesters, Wellingtons, Whitleys and Lancasters in front line squadrons, so my original assumption of 6000lb a plane as payload is on the low side by some margin, its probably around 8-9000lb.
Nowhere have I included the Bostons, Hampdens, Hudsons, Blenhiems who would have done something. Also the first 1000 bomber raid was in 1942 so the 350 assumption is also way down on what would have been possible.
Remember these are actual figures on planes in place. The German figures are based on huge assumptions

Don't change your point. You said the Allies were outnumbered. Do you take this back or not? ..

Sorry but I never said the allies were outnumbered. My whole point has been that the Allies had the greater numbers but couldn't get off the beach as the area was under artillery fire and to small to manoeuvre in. If the Germans outnumbered could hold the Allies then the Bitish outnumbered could hold the Germans.
Please point out where I made this statement and I will change it

You're missing my point: because the Germans knew exactly where the bombers were, they didn't even need ground control (even though they did have the Liechtenstein radar).
British night fighters were not very succesful in engaging German night fighters. Ask Erich if you don't believe me. In those early days the equipment was not advanced enough to have accurate positioning of the enemy, and the Beaufighter was not as good as the Mosquito. You have to remember one very very very important thing about nightfighting, and it's something which Erich taught me: the eyes are the most important weapons of nightfighters. Once within visual range that's all you got. German Bf 110s had 6 eyes.

I'm jus saying that the Germans didn't need to fear the Beaufighters. They didn't fear them when escorting their own bombers, so why would they fear them now? This is not my personal opinion, this is looking at loss figures of German nightfighters prior to the arrival of the Mosquito. ..

I am absolutely confident that Erich would support my premise that the British having Ground Radar Control would be a significant advantage because the British had been using this basis for interceptions since Oct 1940 and by May 1942 it was well practiced and very successful. German losses on raids at night over Britain were alarming as a percentage of the planes involved which backs up the scenario. Germany also used the same tactics over Germany with similar success.
It was very unusual for nightfighters to take each other on at this stage of the war. Both sides tended to fight over home ground hence the realative lack of losses on both sides.


Hope this helps and I await a reply with interest. Have Fun

 

[bigZ]

I think the problem with a succesful invasion of Britain in 42 in this thread relies on too many suppositions. Like any plan it is only as good as its weakest point.

By 42 Bletchley park could easily read Luftwaffe and Heer messages using the Bombe. The Kriegsmarine was the toughest as operator procedure was stict unlike the other services but still could be cracked with Banburismus. By 43 it took 2 minutes to crack any Kriegsmarine message.

 

[Jabberwocky]

So my invasion troops that have dug in, are in a better position. My plan keeps on getting better and better.

Interesting definition of "better and better".

The Germans, facing the problem of assembling divisions on enemy soil to pursue an INVASION, decide to dig in.

Doesn't make any sense to me.

If the Wehrmarcht is dug in statically after the first day, then all they have is their initial lodgement area with which to marshall the follow up forces. No room to maneouver, deploy armour, artillery, field hospitals, HQ areas, ammunition dumps or build airfields and supply depots.

Looking at similarly sized opposed landings (Salerno, Dragoon, Normandy, Nth Africa) in WW2, infantry forces advanced a maximum of about 1-3 miles inland while heavily or moderately opposed, 3-5 miles while lightly opposed and 6-8 miles while unopposed. Suppose the initial landings are only lightly opposed and the Germans advance about 4 miles inland and then dig in to wait for reserve divisions.

This puts their entire beach head under the guns of the RRA (not to mention the RN).

In June 1942 there were 52 light/field regiments (25lbrs or some with older QF3.7 inch Howitzers) of 3 x 8 guns each, 15 Medium regiments (4.5" or 6", some with the new 5.5" or older 60 lbrs on new carriages) of 2 x 8 guns and 5 heavy regiments (5.5", 6" and 2 regiments with the new 7.2") of 2 x 4 guns. That is a total of approximately 1,500 guns, of which about 1,100 are in central or southern UK, with the rest at training commands or in Wales and Ireland.

This, of course, discounts the "super heavy" and fixed costal emplacements in the south of England and the Anti-Tank regiments, some of which were equipped with 2 x 3.7" AA guns in an anti-tank role, in addition to the 2 pounders or 6 pounders. The 3.7" gun were never almost used for AT work though, and they were converted back into the AAA role.

(There are other such interesting abberations in the RRA anti tank regiments deployed to the home forces in 1941. Concerned that the 6lbr wasn't being delivered fast enough, some 100 3" inch guns were converted for anti tank duties and mounted on modified 25 lbr carriages, which had actually been recently redesigned to accomodate the 17 pounder AT gun. 50 of there were then passed on to the Home Guard, who promptly mounted them in pill boxes because they didn't have big enough trucks to transport them. Unfortunatley, performance details on them are scanty at best, but in 1942 a 12.5 lbs AP shell at 2,100 fps is going to hurt whatever it hits.)

Even if only 10% of these guns are available on the first day, every sucessive day is going to see a rapid build up of artillery, infantry and armour to oppose the landing while the Home Guard and local divisions aim to fight a delayinng battle.

The Germans need WEIGHT if they are to succed with Sealion. Weight of numbers in infantry and armour, weight of supply, weight of reinforcements. If you go static in the initial phase (fisrt two or three days), then its VERY difficult to build up any sort of weight, because the small lodgement is going to get bombed, shelled and bombarded into oblivion. The Germans need to be willing to sacrifice large numbers of infantry casualties (say, the initial elements of the assault divisions) against static defences in the first 72-96 hours, and to advance at least 10-15 miles inland, to put the landing sites out of the range of British artillery.

 

[Jabberwocky]

RAF Fighter Command order of battle for operation Jubilee:

51 Spitfire squadrons (including USAAF 31st FG)
8 Hurricane squadrons (mostly 'Hurribombers')
4 Mustang squadrons
3 Typhoon squadrons
2 Whirlwind squadrons

At 12 aircraft each thats 720 single engine dayfighters available, and this is not the entire strength of Fighter Command. RAF 'establishment' strength was 18-20 aircraft per squadron, of which 12 usually flew. Additional aircraft and pilots could be used however.

I'll have a proper OOB for FC month by month in 1942 by tomorrow (when I go and get a new book ).

 

[syscom3]

Jabberwocky, in additon to what you said, we need to add the effect of bombing of the RAF on the beachheads.

Of course the Germans would need to go to the defense so soon, because they don't have the capability to unload heavy eqmt on unimproved beaches in the numbers needed to make an offense work.

The RAF would simply carpet bomb the beaches and wipe out the barges and infrastructure. And all this can be done at night when the LW and KM cant provide any support (he does avoid that little detail doesn't he).

 

[Civettone]

I think the problem with a succesful invasion of Britain in 42 in this thread relies on too many suppositions. Like any plan it is only as good as its weakest point.

Fair enough. All I'm proving is that it was possible, not that it would definitely succeed. People tell me it's impossible no matter what. To that I disagree. The Germans pulled off more impressive stuff than that in Belgium, France, Russia, North Africa, ... If they hadn't happened I'm sure no one would have believed they were possible.

If the Wehrmarcht is dug in statically after the first day, then all they have is their initial lodgement area with which to marshall the follow up forces. No room to maneouver, deploy armour, artillery, field hospitals, HQ areas, ammunition dumps or build airfields and supply depots.

True.

Suppose the initial landings are only lightly opposed and the Germans advance about 4 miles inland and then dig in to wait for reserve divisions.

Ok

That is a total of approximately 1,500 guns, of which about 1,100 are in central or southern UK, with the rest at training commands or in Wales and Ireland. (...)
Even if only 10% of these guns are available on the first day, every sucessive day is going to see a rapid build up of artillery, infantry and armour to oppose the landing while the Home Guard and local divisions aim to fight a delayinng battle.

All I'm asking is that they hold on for three days. The Germans were faced with a similar opposition in Stalingrad for weeks and they held out. And it's not that the Russians weren't trying to defeat them.

As the landing area is very wide - some German plans show 150 miles - there is a whole lot of beach to shell. I don't see the British assembling all of their artillery in the first two days after which the second wave would land. Having maximum 10 guns per mile against them I think the Germans could succeed in getting the second wave ashore. And after that the third.
I think this could be accomplished by concentrating assault and supporting fire from the Kriegsmarine and a 1000 German bombers on certain breakthrough points. Most of the British artillery would be located on other positions and would not be easily moved from one place to another.
I think this is the main advantage of having such a wide landing zone. It makes up a bit for the depth (as there are always guns with a range sufficient to get to the beaches).

But yes, this will be very costly for the Germans. But this is what I said in my very first post.

At 12 aircraft each thats 720 single engine dayfighters available, and this is not the entire strength of Fighter Command. RAF 'establishment' strength was 18-20 aircraft per squadron, of which 12 usually flew. Additional aircraft and pilots could be used however.

Against the 1250 German fighters I proposed. And don't forget that these fighters are in France from 1942 onwards which would theoretically multiply the British losses by 5. So the aircraft numbers that you mention would be significantly less.
And simply getting additional pilots is not that easy as pilots were still the bottleneck for British fighter numbers, not production. They could get them but they would not be experienced or even trained properly.

And I don't consider the Typhoon fully operational in the Summer of 1942. It still had many bugs: in Dieppe they lost two due to structural tail problems with nothing to show for it.

The RAF would simply carpet bomb the beaches and wipe out the barges and infrastructure. And all this can be done at night when the LW and KM cant provide any support (he does avoid that little detail doesn't he).

Syscom, can I help you can't read??
I have already explained this several times, so why do you say that I avoid the subject? First, carpet bombing is not suited for tactical missions. Second, British accuracy was horrible. Third, 300 German nightfighters to attack 500 British bombers, and knowing exactly where they were. It would have been the highest number of night bomber loss ever.

Kris

 

[syscom3]

I have already explained this several times, so why do you say that I avoid the subject? First, carpet bombing is not suited for tactical missions. Second, British accuracy was horrible. Third, 300 German nightfighters to attack 500 British bombers, and knowing exactly where they were. It would have been the highest number of night bomber loss ever.

Kris

Ive read quite a bit of what you have written and its obvious your blind to some basic points.

Carpet bombing beaches is not a difficult thing to do. Drop some flares and dump your bombs. You hit barges on the beachline and all of a sudden they're a beach obstacal that your invading army must clear. Put a bunch of holes in the sand and its another obstacal your vehicals and tanks must navigate through to get ashore.

Ever wonder why the allies didn't carpet bomb the beaches at Normandy? For that exact reason. The need to get troops and eqmt off the beach as soon as possible.

And then there's the delusion you have that your KM will stay afloat for days on end to provide fire support. Of course your navy will not be touched and will sink the RN without effort.

And of course your minefields will keep the RN out yet inexplicably, the Allied minefields neither work nor harm your ships.

And of course the RN subs will fire every torpedo they have at your ships and fail to hit a single target.

And of course, you will be able to maintain 100% sortie rate even when hit by the RAF, and never take a single loss because we all know the -109 is magnitudes better than the Spit.

And your night fighters will operate with impunity and inflict 100% damage on the RAF! And of course they have so much fuel endurance, that they can maintain CAP from sundown to sunrise.

And never mind that you will not have an intact port in which to unload your heavy eqmt, because magically, all your invasion barges (most of them unpowered) will appear when they're needed and unload the eqmt. faster than the allies LST's and LCT's managed to do in 1944.

Plus you have these magical "sleds" that will move the eqmt off the beaches inland at a rate better than what the allies managed to do with purpose built craft.

And of course we must allow you to have complete surprise in this invasion. No one sees your barges being loaded and no one notices the increase in military traffic. Everything is magic. Even though multiple ports need to be used, all with different times needed to get the ships sortied, no one notices a thing happening.

And of course we must also believe that your magical forces can bring in divisions across the sea in a daily basis faster than what the Allies can do on interior lines of communication over land. (You do understand what interior lines of communications means dont you)?

Simply amazing.

If you want to argue the case for your invasion for 1940 or 1941, its possible. If you want to argue the case for this for 1942, you are very hard pressed to prove it.

You argue tactics, I'm arguing logistics. I dont care if your KM is twice or 3X better than the RN because it doesn't matter. The RN would win a battle of attrition with you because there were more ships to send into battle. Same with your LW. It will take just as bad losses as in 1940, except in this case, you have far more at stake.

Your arguments carry the same similar flaws. You dictate the outcome on what you want the allies to do, not what the allies were capable of.

 

[Civettone]

Drop some flares and dump your bombs. You hit barges on the beachline and all of a sudden they're a beach obstacal that your invading army must clear. Put a bunch of holes in the sand and its another obstacal your vehicals and tanks must navigate through to get ashore.

Ever wonder why the allies didn't carpet bomb the beaches at Normandy? For that exact reason.

Source?

And then there's the delusion you have that your KM will stay afloat for days on end to provide fire support.

No, only the first day. Then retreat until the Royal Navy is defeated. I never claimed that the KM would not suffer losses.

And of course your minefields will keep the RN out yet inexplicably, the Allied minefields neither work nor harm your ships.

Didn't say that either. But will those minefields stop the entire invasion fleet?

And of course the RN subs will fire every torpedo they have at your ships and fail to hit a single target.

Everybody keeps repeating that subs couldn't operate in the Channel? You're disagreeing with them?

And of course, you will be able to maintain 100% sortie rate even when hit by the RAF, and never take a single loss

Never said that.

And your night fighters will operate with impunity and inflict 100% damage on the RAF! And of course they have so much fuel endurance, that they can maintain CAP from sundown to sunrise.

Never said that.

And never mind that you will not have an intact port in which to unload your heavy eqmt, because magically, all your invasion barges (most of them unpowered) will appear when they're needed and unload the eqmt. faster than the allies LST's and LCT's managed to do in 1944.

You didn't read my posts in which I wrote about German Pioniere engineers. I also said that the divisions would be infantry divisions. And in 1940 most barges were unpowered but this wouldn't be the case in 1942.

Plus you have these magical "sleds" that will move the eqmt off the beaches inland at a rate better than what the allies managed to do with purpose built craft.

Nothing magical about them. The Germans land along a wider front.

And of course we must allow you to have complete surprise in this invasion. No one sees your barges being loaded and no one notices the increase in military traffic. Everything is magic. Even though multiple ports need to be used, all with different times needed to get the ships sortied, no one notices a thing happening.

No complete surprise but at least confusion. The British could have been mislead by spreading wrong information, by decoys and by the fact that the British would expect an air offensive to preceed the landings. And the British wouldn't know where the landing would take place. I don't think complete surprise could be achieved but at least the British would only be sure hours before the actual landing. But why am I explaining this to you? You don't read what I write.

And of course we must also believe that your magical forces can bring in divisions across the sea in a daily basis faster than what the Allies can do on interior lines of communication over land. (You do understand what interior lines of communications means dont you)?

I didn't say that.

Your arguments carry the same similar flaws. You dictate the outcome on what you want the allies to do, not what the allies were capable of.

You do something similar. You compare what the Germans might have done in 1940 with what the allies did in 1943/1944. The latter you present as the standard.

Kris

 

[syscom3]

Seems tough for you to comprehend that BC would be bombing at night on the beaches? And flak isnt going to be a problem because you neglected to bring them for your invasion.

Source?

Various publications on the bombing strategy for the 8th and 9th AF on the runup to the invasion and the morning of the invasion.

SHAEF specifically told the AF's (of the Brits and US) not to bomb the beaches themselves as it would create obsticals for the trucks and tanks, and for follow on landing craft.

No, only the first day. Then retreat until the Royal Navy is defeated. I never claimed that the KM would not suffer losses.

So your forces will not have any direct fire support on a broadly invaded coastline after the first several hours. Hardly a grand way to support your invasion. And what are your forces going to do at night for heavy artillery? And what will your forces do during the daytime when low hanging clouds limit the LW? I can see the RN (and even the USN) sail a few warships right up to the beach and have them use your unprotected forces for target practice.

Didn't say that either. But will those minefields stop the entire invasion fleet?

It would give everyone problems, with the RN coming out for the best of it. They can lay minefields within their coastline with impunity. You cant clear mines untill the day of the invasion in which your forces will be at high risk. And once your forces retreat for the night, the allies can sail right on in and mine them again.

Everybody keeps repeating that subs couldn't operate in the Channel? You're disagreeing with them?

The RN could station subs in the channel to be used solely for anti shipping. Hazardous, but well worth the risk.

Other points:
Why is your LW not degrading as a force after intense combat and sortie rate?

Why is your LW able to defend on a broad front, both your bombers and your own ports and the KM at sea?

You didn't read my posts in which I wrote about German Pioniere engineers. I also said that the divisions would be infantry divisions. And in 1940 most barges were unpowered but this wouldn't be the case in 1942.

Your divisions are all light infantry. Capable enough to grab a beachhead, but incapable of offensive movement against prepared defensive lines.

Nothing magical about them. The Germans land along a wider front.

And the allies win, because you cant concentrate force on a specific point. Youre immediatly on the defensive hoping heavy eqmt shows up on time and enough quantity to blunt an allied attack that can be formed up in hours.

No complete surprise but at least confusion. The British could have been mislead by spreading wrong information, by decoys and by the fact that the British would expect an air offensive to preceed the landings. And the British wouldn't know where the landing would take place. I don't think complete surprise could be achieved but at least the British would only be sure hours before the actual landing. But why am I explaining this to you? You don't read what I write.

The Germans wont have any surprise. Theres only a few specific dates you can invade, the weather and sea state dictates whether you sail or not, the resistance will tell the allies whether your forces are boarding the barges, etc, etc.

And no air offensive before the invasion? Hehehehehhehe........ youre landing light infantry on defended beaches, on a broad front, with prepared defensive lines that will essentially be intact on invasion day. Plus your KM fire support wont be around after day 1, theres no guarentee that the allied navies wont be able to bust through a thin defensive line your navy has set, with the bulk of your invading army supplied by slow moving barges that will need 1/2 a day to get to their landing points (at the shortest points). And to top it off, you have no amphib forces to facilitate the rapid movement of supplies from off shore directly inland off the beach.

You do something similar. You compare what the Germans might have done in 1940 with what the allies did in 1943/1944. The latter you present as the standard.

I'm not doing that at all.

In 1940, your scenario was possible. 1941, risky. 1942, failure was guarentee'd.

I see what your capabilities are, as being limited by follow on support and 24/7 fire support for the first few days.

 

[Glider]

Kris

Silence as they say is golden and Udet seems to have gone quiet as well.

Still looking forward to your reply

Good Luck

David

 

[plan_D]

"Now now PlanD, you don't have to be right all the time. It's ok to just admit that it was a fleet action. So what if you forgot about Worcester? Big deal, it happens to the best of us."

Kris,

I see you're resorting to childish behaviour without actually facing the challenge. My point: one ship attacking does not make it a fleet action. Why? Because for it to be a fleet action two opposing fleets must meet in battle, one ship does not make a fleet.

"I thought you would say that but that's a problem in your reasoning. You think about moving units back to Britain for defending the island but you don't know when it's going to happen. As you (or Hop?) said, the British would prepare themselves as soon as Russia was out of the war, so starting in late 1941/early 1942. As the Germans were going to invade somewhere in April-July, they would have half a year of advantages. You make the logical error that the Germans will have to divert forces like the British would but in fact, the bulk of their forces would simply be withdrawn from Russia so they could keep up their presence elsewhere."

Defeating the Soviet Union would not increase the German naval assets elsewhere. The Kriegsmarine would number exactly the same in the Med as they did in reality, next to none. A diversion of Royal Navy forces from there would not make a difference.

I must point out that you only quoted some of my posted; as I mentioned it would take a few days for Force H to sail to the Channel. So, they would not need to be returned as soon as Soviet Russia was defeated.

"I wouldn't be too sure about that. I see Rommel winning in El Alamein and taking Alexandria and the Suez Channel."

I'm sure you do. Pray tell your wonderful plans for shipping your exhausted troops from Soviet Russia and through the Med, past all those roaming Royal Navy and RAF assets?
It would be nice to increase the numbers Rommel had, but the fact of the matter is you'd have to prepare the exhausted soldiers and ship them to North Africa before the battle.

"So? The Luftwaffe didn't all out attack the Royal Navy and lost an invasion fleet because of it. Then they attacked the Royal Navy and didn't lose an invasion fleet after that"

The Luftwaffe were attacking the Royal Navy upon its entrance to the battle, even with the Luftwaffe attacking the Royal Navy sunk the first invasion fleet.
Under this "all out attack" the Royal Navy still damaged the second invasion fleet and turned it back. On top of that, the Royal Navy evacuated thousands of troops.

"You don't get it. The Germans had fighter aircraft in Greece. As the British didn't have fighters, these fighters were unopposed. If the British did have fighters, it wouldn't mean things would have been different: the Germans could have protected their bombers."

It would have been completely different had there been a squadron of Hurricanes or two on Crete. Given that the Luftwaffe used close escort the air battles would rage around the bomber formations, which means the raids would have been disrupted and bombers would have been shot down.

"So now you're saying Germany only had battlecruisers, destroyers and U-boats? No cruisers, torpedoboats, Schellboote?
And what do you mean by outgunned DDs? German destroyers had many weaknesses but at least their guns were bigger than those on British destroyers."

How old are you? It's like "discussing" with a child. No, I didn't say all the Kriegsmarine had was Battlecruisers, Destroyers and Submarines.

The German E-Boats being used as a defensive screen, are you kidding me? And the German cruisers and destroyers were out-gunned, simply because the Royal Navy would bring more to the battle. The Royal Navy would deploy more guns, meaning the Kriegsmarine would be out-gunned.

"The Germans cared about losses? Did Hitler care about losses? Did Göring care about losses? Did German HQ have anything to say?"

Of course, how silly of me. I seem to have forgotten that Germans were all suicidal and losses were nothing of importance. Is that why the heavy Fallschirmjager losses at Crete, around 50% (KIA and WIA), caused a big upheavel in German High Command and with Hitler? Because they didn't care about losses ... or, maybe, because Hitler didn't like the nice German uniforms getting dirty, right?

"It's pretty clear cut to me. ULTRA provided the British with lots of information but not the whole story. They had to go on by indications like your example of the Bismarck showed. The British didn't decode a message saying when the Bismarck would sail. They didn't decode a message when the G&S would sail. And that's only naval matters. There are several more army related matters which the British failed to foresee.
So to call my idea that the British might not decode a message that would tell them when the invasion would take place, pathetic is ok by me. But I think it's clear overestimation of British capabilities and underestimating the German ones.
And don't forget that the Germans would have done their best to deceive the British by sending false information and using decoys. That's not wisful thinking from my part, that's logic thinking."

Do you even read your own words? Seriously, to proclaim that an invasion would go through without the British having a single idea about the time or place is beyond belief. Are you aware that every invasion made by the Germans after that of Poland was known to the British ULTRA team?
It's not an overestimation of British capabilities, and I doubt you actually think. It's surprising you don't fall over more often given that your sense is wandering.

"As many radar installations were close to the shore, I don't think they would have lasted that long. The British would have to move or rebuild some of them.
The fighting would have taken place in two areas.
One is the Channel. The British didn't have the distance advantage and as it would have been a contested area between both sides, the British would no longer have the home advantage.
Two is the invasion area. The British would have the distance advantage but I already said there would be a CAP over the territory (with the disadvantages that come with it), so British scramble time is of less importance. But the British would have the disadvantage of flying and crashing over German held territory. Sure, they could try and fly back the friendly territory but usually you don't have a choice. You bail out because you have to. This will usually lead to landing over enemy territory. And if not, there's as much chance of drowing in the Channel as landing in British held territory."

Of course, Kris, all those radar installations would be destroyed just like they weren't in the Battle of Britain. If you look at the Battle of Britain in some more detail instead of simply reading the part about how Britain won, you'd see that the Germans took great effort in destroying the radar chain and didn't do it.

The RAF would be able to intercept the German formations over waters closer to home, giving them a range advantage. Any flight toward Britain would be picked up and the RAF would be able to scramble in good time. Meanwhile the Luftwaffe would be flying blind, wasting hours and fuel, looking for RAF bomber formations.
Actually a lot of the time aircraft would be able to fly some distance before crashing. This gave pilots chance to get back to friendly terrority before bailing. Drowning in the Channel would be a problem for both air forces.

"So my invasion troops that have dug in, are in a better position. My plan keeps on getting better and better."

Digging in to a beach under constant attack, does give you a better position. Plus the British would not need to advance on you, it's the invasion that has to move. If you're contained and dug-in on the beach, you've lost the battle.