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syscom3
Pacific Historian
But it looks like it only effected production by two months or so.
Questions about the Me-262
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kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
The order also proabably reduced the time taken to ramp-up into full production. (even after the couple months are taken into account)
But the biggest detrimental effect I'd say would be the diversion of actual aircraft produced to bomber units instead of fighter units.
And if the bomber variants were used as fighters there performance would still be somewhat less due to the added drag of the bomb racks. I believe there were also some structural problems with the revised nose structure used on the (A-2) bomber versions. (lightened to maintain the CoG) In particular mention of the nose failing while firing the cannons.
Transition to the jets was gramted still a problem. It may have been a bit easier to convert twin-engine fighter pilots, if there'd been a truely capable twin day-fighter in service with the LW. (ie the Fw 187) Even better would have been another twin jet in service earlier (ie. the He 280), even if only in limited usage it still could have helped a great deal in getting the Me 262 fully operational.
*But of course, now I'm getting into what-ifs and alternat histories, which is a bit off topic. (interesting of course) But something to think about with the He 280 is: while it had gone through testing significantly earlier than the 262 and was somewhat more suited to the lower thrust engines available, but the big question would the HeS 8 engines have been able to reach production quality early enought to make a difference. (and getting into the HeS 30 is an even bigger discussion)
But the biggest detrimental effect I'd say would be the diversion of actual aircraft produced to bomber units instead of fighter units.
And if the bomber variants were used as fighters there performance would still be somewhat less due to the added drag of the bomb racks. I believe there were also some structural problems with the revised nose structure used on the (A-2) bomber versions. (lightened to maintain the CoG) In particular mention of the nose failing while firing the cannons.
Transition to the jets was gramted still a problem. It may have been a bit easier to convert twin-engine fighter pilots, if there'd been a truely capable twin day-fighter in service with the LW. (ie the Fw 187) Even better would have been another twin jet in service earlier (ie. the He 280), even if only in limited usage it still could have helped a great deal in getting the Me 262 fully operational.
*But of course, now I'm getting into what-ifs and alternat histories, which is a bit off topic. (interesting of course) But something to think about with the He 280 is: while it had gone through testing significantly earlier than the 262 and was somewhat more suited to the lower thrust engines available, but the big question would the HeS 8 engines have been able to reach production quality early enought to make a difference. (and getting into the HeS 30 is an even bigger discussion)
KrazyKraut
Banned
- 337
- Apr 21, 2008
Yeah, if airframes had to be retrofitted with components or other alterations that would be a solid indication that production started too early. However with new technology there are always certain issues that only surface once the thing is put to use, so it'll be hard to tell if it was rushed. I have never heard of any changes regarding the 262-airframe that are out of the ordinary.
That is exactly the opposite of what the books say on this topic
One point on the "political meddling" aspect. When you say airframes weren't ready or engines weren't ready you see this as a sign that political interference didn't matter. But I think the political interference and especially the initial lack of interest had a lot to do with why engines and airframes weren't ready fast enough. They didn't get the attention they needed.
I misquoted, sorry. The quote should read
"Yet, if anything, production of the aircraft was initiated too early with the result that Me262 airframes were starting to come off the assembly lines before **the engines to power** them were ready to enter mass production"
Couple of more quotes regarding the engines:
" Due to Allied economic blockade, German industry was critically short of nickel and chromium from the summer of 1941. These elements were essential ingredients for effective high temperature-resistant steel alloys, but Junkers engineers were forced to use substitutes whenever possible.
Jumo 004 turbine blades were manufactured from a steel-based alloy containing 30% nickel and 15% chromium, a material sufficiently resilient to withstand the very high temperatures and high tensile stresses encountered. Under these conditions the blades soon developed 'creep', gradually deforming and increasing in length. When blade creep exceeded a laid-down limit the engine had to be changed.
Jumo 004 flame tubes were formed out of mild steel sheet, with an oven baked spray coating of aluminium to prevent oxidation. This inelegant material did not survive long at the extreme temperatures generated in the hottest part of the 004, and during running the flame tubes slowly buckled out of shape.
Limited by turbine blade creep and flame tube buckling, as exacerbated by problems with the fuel regulation system, the running life of pre-production Jumo 004 engines rarely exceeded 10 hours. Then the Me262 had to be grounded for new engines to be fitted.
...
In September 1944, following a series of incremental improvements, the nominal running life of the the Jumo 004 at last reached 25 hours. Although the engines' life was still short, given the desperate war situation that was considered sufficient for the design to be frozen so that mass production could begin.
...
Walther Hagenah described the problems facing III/JG7 when he joined the unit:" By the time reached III/JG7 there were insufficient spare parts and insufficient spare engines; there were even occasional shortages of J-2 fuel. I am sure all of these existed and production was sufficient, but by that stage of the war the transport system was so chaotic that things often failed to arrive at the frontline units".
Hello HoHun
Quote:" The point is, the timeline shows if there hadn't been Hitler's bomber order, the Luftwaffe would have been in 7 or 8/1944 where it historically was in 11 or 12/1944. That's the impact of Hitler's interference.
Whether it was smart to have bomber pilots fly the Me 262 a fighter is a different question, though I suppose it would probably not have happened without Hitler's jet bomber decision that allowed the Kampfflieger to get a foot into the door."
Now EKdo Lechfeld was formed at the beginning of 44 got the V8 proto in April and its first Me 262A-1as in May, and the latter were not front-line capable because of many quality problems. First interception around mid-July. Named EKdo 262. Even the experiences of Kommando Nowotny, which got its 262s with production standard engines in Sept 44, showed that still pilots needed more training and a/c weren't really ready for first line combat.
On use of bomber pilots as Me 262 fighter pilots, as I wrote "Because of German single engine fighter pilots were not used to or trained to instrumental flying the idea was to use redundant bomber pilots, who also had also multi engine experience as fighter pilots. That was thought to be especially useful when weather was overcast."
There was a clear rationality behind the use of bomber pilots. But IMHO very important reason was organizational jealously. LW bomber barons saw their units disbanded and probably wanted to save at least a few bomber units besides V-1 launching unit (KG53/3 IIRC) etc, even if as fighter. So IMHO in any case we would have seen KG(J) unit designation. That influence of bomber barons might explain why they didn't use more NJG pilots. EKdo Lechfeld was formed mostly out of III./ZG 26.
KK
where you got the info
Quote:" in terms of the hinderance of Hitler's order that it be used as a bomber meant that (while delay in introduction as a fighter was only moderately delayed) there were far less fighter versions available (~1/4) than would have been had the fighter-bomber model not been produced. (possibly moreso given that this requirement slowed development as a whole somewhat as well)"
According to Price's article in International Air Power Review Vol. 23 Me 262A-1a production was about 1,000 and A-2a more than 100. On 9 Apr 45 Me 262 situation in operational units: 163 day fighters (JG 7, KG(J) 54, JV 44), 21 fighter-bombers (KG 51), about 9 NFs and 7 Tac Recce.
I recommend Boehme's JG 7 and Radtke's KG 54 book to those who want more reliable info on Me 262 as a fighter, Boehme's book covers also EKdo Lechfeld/262/Kommando Nowotny. The newest article by Price is in International Air Power Review Vol. 23.
Juha
Quote:" The point is, the timeline shows if there hadn't been Hitler's bomber order, the Luftwaffe would have been in 7 or 8/1944 where it historically was in 11 or 12/1944. That's the impact of Hitler's interference.
Whether it was smart to have bomber pilots fly the Me 262 a fighter is a different question, though I suppose it would probably not have happened without Hitler's jet bomber decision that allowed the Kampfflieger to get a foot into the door."
Now EKdo Lechfeld was formed at the beginning of 44 got the V8 proto in April and its first Me 262A-1as in May, and the latter were not front-line capable because of many quality problems. First interception around mid-July. Named EKdo 262. Even the experiences of Kommando Nowotny, which got its 262s with production standard engines in Sept 44, showed that still pilots needed more training and a/c weren't really ready for first line combat.
On use of bomber pilots as Me 262 fighter pilots, as I wrote "Because of German single engine fighter pilots were not used to or trained to instrumental flying the idea was to use redundant bomber pilots, who also had also multi engine experience as fighter pilots. That was thought to be especially useful when weather was overcast."
There was a clear rationality behind the use of bomber pilots. But IMHO very important reason was organizational jealously. LW bomber barons saw their units disbanded and probably wanted to save at least a few bomber units besides V-1 launching unit (KG53/3 IIRC) etc, even if as fighter. So IMHO in any case we would have seen KG(J) unit designation. That influence of bomber barons might explain why they didn't use more NJG pilots. EKdo Lechfeld was formed mostly out of III./ZG 26.
KK
where you got the info
Quote:" in terms of the hinderance of Hitler's order that it be used as a bomber meant that (while delay in introduction as a fighter was only moderately delayed) there were far less fighter versions available (~1/4) than would have been had the fighter-bomber model not been produced. (possibly moreso given that this requirement slowed development as a whole somewhat as well)"
According to Price's article in International Air Power Review Vol. 23 Me 262A-1a production was about 1,000 and A-2a more than 100. On 9 Apr 45 Me 262 situation in operational units: 163 day fighters (JG 7, KG(J) 54, JV 44), 21 fighter-bombers (KG 51), about 9 NFs and 7 Tac Recce.
I recommend Boehme's JG 7 and Radtke's KG 54 book to those who want more reliable info on Me 262 as a fighter, Boehme's book covers also EKdo Lechfeld/262/Kommando Nowotny. The newest article by Price is in International Air Power Review Vol. 23.
Juha
Hi Juha,
>Even the experiences of Kommando Nowotny, which got its 262s with production standard engines in Sept 44, showed that still pilots needed more training and a/c weren't really ready for first line combat.
Well, if the KG 51 aircraft had been given to Kommando Nowotny, they'd have given the Luftwaffe fighter arm 3 months worth of a headstart by providing the training that historically was lacking. Nowotny perhaps was not the optimum leader for a new jet fighter unit either - he was an accomplished ace, but maybe a cool, methodical tactician like Wolfgang Späte (who had led the Me 163 operational trial squadron JG 400) would have been a better choice. The fighter arm was not well-prepared for the Me 262 introduction, but I'd speculate that's because they only sneaked in through the back door ...
However, what would you see as the specific shortcomings of the Me 262 as first line fighter aircraft in September 1944?
>There was a clear rationality behind the use of bomber pilots. But IMHO very important reason was organizational jealously.
I absolutely agree that there was a bomber arm vs. fighter arm turf war going on. However, I think the rationality for preferring bomber pilots followed the desire of the bomber arm to run the show, not because bomber pilots really made better jet fighter aces. In fact, I think you'd have needed a fighter pilot mindset to successfully exploit the strengths of the Me 262, though the technical experience of the bomber pilots might have been a bonus. Just assigning jet fighters to an existing Kampfgeschwader could not provide the fighter mindset requried for jet fighter operations ...
>So IMHO in any case we would have seen KG(J) unit designation.
With the Kampfflieger having gained a lot of standing at the expense of the fighter arm, you might be right. Fighter advocates like Milch and Galland lost influence over the jet fighter issue, and the bomber arm was also seen as politically more reliable than the fighter arm, whatever good that might do in combat. Steinhoff actually described how fighter units were required to install a "national-socialist liaision officer"- more or less a political commissar. Still, I think integrating bomber pilot with cadre-staffed fighter units would have been a more promising course of action that the KG(J) approach ...
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>Even the experiences of Kommando Nowotny, which got its 262s with production standard engines in Sept 44, showed that still pilots needed more training and a/c weren't really ready for first line combat.
Well, if the KG 51 aircraft had been given to Kommando Nowotny, they'd have given the Luftwaffe fighter arm 3 months worth of a headstart by providing the training that historically was lacking. Nowotny perhaps was not the optimum leader for a new jet fighter unit either - he was an accomplished ace, but maybe a cool, methodical tactician like Wolfgang Späte (who had led the Me 163 operational trial squadron JG 400) would have been a better choice. The fighter arm was not well-prepared for the Me 262 introduction, but I'd speculate that's because they only sneaked in through the back door ...
However, what would you see as the specific shortcomings of the Me 262 as first line fighter aircraft in September 1944?
>There was a clear rationality behind the use of bomber pilots. But IMHO very important reason was organizational jealously.
I absolutely agree that there was a bomber arm vs. fighter arm turf war going on. However, I think the rationality for preferring bomber pilots followed the desire of the bomber arm to run the show, not because bomber pilots really made better jet fighter aces. In fact, I think you'd have needed a fighter pilot mindset to successfully exploit the strengths of the Me 262, though the technical experience of the bomber pilots might have been a bonus. Just assigning jet fighters to an existing Kampfgeschwader could not provide the fighter mindset requried for jet fighter operations ...
>So IMHO in any case we would have seen KG(J) unit designation.
With the Kampfflieger having gained a lot of standing at the expense of the fighter arm, you might be right. Fighter advocates like Milch and Galland lost influence over the jet fighter issue, and the bomber arm was also seen as politically more reliable than the fighter arm, whatever good that might do in combat. Steinhoff actually described how fighter units were required to install a "national-socialist liaision officer"- more or less a political commissar. Still, I think integrating bomber pilot with cadre-staffed fighter units would have been a more promising course of action that the KG(J) approach ...
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
Hi Timppa,
>Walther Hagenah described the problems facing III/JG7 when he joined the unit:" By the time reached III/JG7 there were insufficient spare parts and insufficient spare engines; there were even occasional shortages of J-2 fuel. I am sure all of these existed and production was sufficient, but by that stage of the war the transport system was so chaotic that things often failed to arrive at the frontline units".
Hm, this site points out that Hagenah was transferred to a Me 262 only in March 1945:
Aces of the Luftwaffe - Walter Hagenah
Of course, at that time German logistics had pretty much broken down, but the resulting problems did not affect the mid-1944 introduction of the Me 262 yet.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>Walther Hagenah described the problems facing III/JG7 when he joined the unit:" By the time reached III/JG7 there were insufficient spare parts and insufficient spare engines; there were even occasional shortages of J-2 fuel. I am sure all of these existed and production was sufficient, but by that stage of the war the transport system was so chaotic that things often failed to arrive at the frontline units".
Hm, this site points out that Hagenah was transferred to a Me 262 only in March 1945:
Aces of the Luftwaffe - Walter Hagenah
Of course, at that time German logistics had pretty much broken down, but the resulting problems did not affect the mid-1944 introduction of the Me 262 yet.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
That is right, I should have mentioned it. The whole article is 9 pages though, including a cutaway of night fighter version of Me262B-1a/U1 version with radar, I'm too lazy to type it all.
PS.
I have heard that Böhme's book, "Jagdgeschwader 7: Die Chronik eines Me 262-Geschwaders, 1944/45" is a good read, from development/design standpoint also.
Amazon.com: Jg 7: The World's First Jet Fighter Unit 1944/1945 (Schiffer Military History): Manfred Boehme, David Johnston: Books
As an Amazon Associate we earn from qualifying purchases.
Hello HoHun
Only one thing to say, EKdo Lechfeld/EKdo 262 were forerunners of Kommando Nowotny, and got their first Me 262 in April at latest and first series production a/c in May, so fighter arm had its head start, thanks to Milch who saw it that all Me 262s were produced as fighters contrary to Hitler's orders up to when Hitler lost his head in late May conference just because that fact dawned to him. What happened in June I cannot recall, probably EKdo 262 was put on ice as fighter EKdo. It was at this stage than the lost time loss to fighter use of Me 262 happened according to Price IIRC. I'll read the newest Price article when I'll have time but it might take a while.
Of course if KG 51 planes were given to Nowotny that would have helped but Germans would still need more time to train fighter pilots and to develop tactics.
Juha
Only one thing to say, EKdo Lechfeld/EKdo 262 were forerunners of Kommando Nowotny, and got their first Me 262 in April at latest and first series production a/c in May, so fighter arm had its head start, thanks to Milch who saw it that all Me 262s were produced as fighters contrary to Hitler's orders up to when Hitler lost his head in late May conference just because that fact dawned to him. What happened in June I cannot recall, probably EKdo 262 was put on ice as fighter EKdo. It was at this stage than the lost time loss to fighter use of Me 262 happened according to Price IIRC. I'll read the newest Price article when I'll have time but it might take a while.
Of course if KG 51 planes were given to Nowotny that would have helped but Germans would still need more time to train fighter pilots and to develop tactics.
Juha
SoD Stitch
Banned
That is exactly the opposite of what the books say on this topic
Agreed; in fact, the first tail-dragger 262 airframes used a Jumo Ju 210G recip engine in the nose to test the airframe, because the 004's weren't ready yet. When the BMW 003's were (supposedly) ready, they tested them on the same airframe that already had the Jumo recip installed, just in case the engines failed in-flight, which they did.
Njaco
The Pop-Tart Whisperer
IIRC, even though they started pulling Me 262s back for modifications because of Hitler's orders in late May 44, Ekdo 262 was allowed to retain a few Me 262s and so continued with training.
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
It wouldn't have been because the 004 wasn't ready as the BMW engines had been originally intended and the V1 was the only one to use the Jumo 210.
Also the BMW engines tested on the V1 prototype were early "flight worthy" prototype P.3302 (109-003) engines and only produced 1,100-1,200 lbf of thrust.
(incedentally the BMW P.3302 engines, while smaller than the 004's were still a bit larger than originally anticipated, possibly meaning the abandoned P.3301/109-002 were originally chosen.)
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
Juha, I'm not sure about 1945, but according to HoHun's figures only 1/3 of the Me 262's in service were fighters at the end of 1944.
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
I'm not sure when the "freezing" of the design takes place in terms of the model, or to what it actually refers to as developments certainly continued up until the wars end with the much improved 004D entering production/pre-production just prior to the end.
Delcyros seems to have a good deal of information regarding the jets, perhaps he could expand on my comments on these issues.
Hello KK
in the message I quoted you wrote 1/4.
And at the end of 44 fighter Me 262 units were training their pilots after the hard lessons of Kdo Nowotny.
And anyway according to Price's newest article and according to his mid 90s articles "on 10 Jan 45 I. and II./KG 51 had 52 Me 262s and intensive training effort was in progress, involving around 180 of jet fighters, to work up units preparing to go into action, JG 7, I. and II./KG(J) 54, and the pilot conversation unit III./EJG 2.
And the 6 @ Kommando Braunegg were in a big need as it was TacRec unit.
jUHA
in the message I quoted you wrote 1/4.
And at the end of 44 fighter Me 262 units were training their pilots after the hard lessons of Kdo Nowotny.
And anyway according to Price's newest article and according to his mid 90s articles "on 10 Jan 45 I. and II./KG 51 had 52 Me 262s and intensive training effort was in progress, involving around 180 of jet fighters, to work up units preparing to go into action, JG 7, I. and II./KG(J) 54, and the pilot conversation unit III./EJG 2.
And the 6 @ Kommando Braunegg were in a big need as it was TacRec unit.
jUHA
kool kitty89
Senior Master Sergeant
Ok, sorry I meesed up with that 1/4 comment.
It seems the fighters got more priorety by early '45.
It seems the fighters got more priorety by early '45.
Hi Juha,
>Only one thing to say, EKdo Lechfeld/EKdo 262 were forerunners of Kommando Nowotny, and got their first Me 262 in April at latest and first series production a/c in May, so fighter arm had its head start
"Erprobungskommando" means "Trial Command" - they tested the operational aspects of flying a fighter with ground-breaking new technology, not a job you could simply skip. They didn't have enough aircraft to train new fighter pilots anyway, and this breakdown of breakdown of early Me 262 deliveries (until 10 August 1944) provided by Price shows that KG 51 had first priority even early on:
I./KG 51: 33
Erpr. Kdo. 262: 15
Erprobungsstelle Rechlin: 14
Messerschmitt testing: 11
Junkers engine testing: 1
Two-seater conversion at Blohm und Voss: 10
If the KG 51 aircraft would have gone to the Erprobungskommando, this would have tripled its capacity, effectively making it possible to being the training of jet fighter pilots in addition to the trial duties. Instead, Hitler's order diverted the jets to KG 51 ... at the expense of the fighter arm.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
>Only one thing to say, EKdo Lechfeld/EKdo 262 were forerunners of Kommando Nowotny, and got their first Me 262 in April at latest and first series production a/c in May, so fighter arm had its head start
"Erprobungskommando" means "Trial Command" - they tested the operational aspects of flying a fighter with ground-breaking new technology, not a job you could simply skip. They didn't have enough aircraft to train new fighter pilots anyway, and this breakdown of breakdown of early Me 262 deliveries (until 10 August 1944) provided by Price shows that KG 51 had first priority even early on:
I./KG 51: 33
Erpr. Kdo. 262: 15
Erprobungsstelle Rechlin: 14
Messerschmitt testing: 11
Junkers engine testing: 1
Two-seater conversion at Blohm und Voss: 10
If the KG 51 aircraft would have gone to the Erprobungskommando, this would have tripled its capacity, effectively making it possible to being the training of jet fighter pilots in addition to the trial duties. Instead, Hitler's order diverted the jets to KG 51 ... at the expense of the fighter arm.
Regards,
Henning (HoHun)
Hello HoHun
I agree, even if EKdos had some capacity to train pilots, without it it/they would not have pilots to fly its/their Me 262s.
But the overlook of need of 2-seater model in time meant that conversion training wasn't going on as effectively as it should have been.
Juha
I agree, even if EKdos had some capacity to train pilots, without it it/they would not have pilots to fly its/their Me 262s.
But the overlook of need of 2-seater model in time meant that conversion training wasn't going on as effectively as it should have been.
Juha
This source:
http://www.enginehistory.org/German/Me-262/Me262_Engine_2.pdf
says the blades were made alloy containing 30% nickel, 14% chrome, 1.75% titanium and .12% carbon.
Also, "exhaust cone is made up of aluminized mild steel".
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syscom3
Pacific Historian
OK, so you are all saying that even without Hitlers interference, the Me-262 still wasnt available in quantity untill the fall of 1944.
And even then, because of training issues and no effective tactics, the -262 still was not effective untill 1945.
I am also wondering about the numbers of airframes on hand. What were the true numbers for aircraft available for use? It must have been a fraction of the total, at any given month.
And even then, because of training issues and no effective tactics, the -262 still was not effective untill 1945.
I am also wondering about the numbers of airframes on hand. What were the true numbers for aircraft available for use? It must have been a fraction of the total, at any given month.
