Questions about the Me-262

[Erich]

what do you mean by not-effective till 1945 ? it wa very effective in the terms of chaos in 1944 to bomber crews flying over the Reich mis-matching ID of LW A/C, the bomber crews never seeing a jet till later in the war.

at least for propaganda purposes the ruse worked till Nowotny could get airborne.

the Ekdo's were palnned for training and testing new weapons systems as well as A/C, and if need be during that training to schedule military operations if need be. the jet was ready in the summer of 1944 to be filled to the units, the jets were not in mass production nor acceptable for a variety of reasons to replace any one particular JG, the reason behind Nowotny's small band of experimental staffel, the same applied to KG 51 and 54 who trusted their own small twin engine Me 410's

 

[HoHun]

Hi Syscom,

>OK, so you are all saying that even without Hitlers interference, the Me-262 still wasnt available in quantity untill the fall of 1944.

"In quantity" is a qualitative rubber term that doesn't permit any conclusions. Here are the quantified quantities, which I had posted earlier:

From the strength reports at The Luftwaffe, 1933-45, listing the Me 262 aircraft with the different units:

07/1944: 6 @ KG 51
08/1944: 20 @ KG 51
09/1944: 32 @ KG 51
10/1944: 52 @ KG 51, 5 @ KG 54
11/1944: 72 @ KG 51, 8 @ KG 54, 38 @ JG 7
12/1944: 100 @ KG 51, 21 @ KG 54, 14 @ JG 7, 23 @ EJG 2, 6 @ Kommando Braunegg

Note that due to "Hitler's interference", jet fighters made only an average 30% of the available Me 262 strength in the second half of 1944.

>And even then, because of training issues and no effective tactics, the -262 still was not effective untill 1945.

"Effective" again is a rubber term. What is "effective" supposed to mean?

>I am also wondering about the numbers of airframes on hand.

The strength reports of for one specific point in time each month. During the course of the month, the units received additional aircraft and lost (or transferred) other aircraft so that at any other date, they might have a larger or smaller number available, depending on re-supply and combat results.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Erich]

Henning your figures for JG 7 in November 44 is from where ? the unit did not exist........yet, still Kommando Nowotny unless you are using JG 7 is the broadest terms ?

E ~

 

[HoHun]

>Henning your figures for JG 7 in November 44 is from where ?

Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen, III./JG7

 

[Erich]

III./JG 7 still in the training mode at Lechfeld did start to operate at Decembers beginning though this was in 1's and 2's. JG 7 as a JG did not really become one till January 45.

of interest hopefully from the focus of the 9. (J) Fliegerdivision under G. von Maltzahn, January 1945 converting bomber pilots over to fighters as an advisement. From the GdF as a request: JG 7 at present undergoing conversion at the Brandenburg facility, to conclude by the end of March 1945.

this is almost too funny: Jg 300 and Jg 301 to be converted, from April 45 probably to the Me 262. avoidance of double conversion of the units of IX. (J) Fliegerkorps
the units of the above Korps have beeter blind flying training than JG 300 and JG 301 pilots............ my thoughts it does not matter during the spring of 45 time frame, it was of essence to produce and expand the Jg fighter arm to include as many 262's as possible.

December 44 it was planned to produce some 681 262's but OKL only received 499 crates. almost 200 were lost due to storage part probs, only 186 were delivered, while the remainder were smashed out due to bombings, ferry flight accidnets and railway transportation being attacked by Allied ground attack. the reports contine with supplied night fighter units, for the sturmgruppen and to the Versuchsverband.

really weird stuff. In ?De3cmber of 44 Welter was only testing a breif few examples of 262 -2 of them an an Ar 234 as for comparison trials. Obviously the Sturmgruppen never recieved any as the Fw 190A-8/R2 and R8 variants were expressly used.

 

[Erich]

one step further on JG 7

moved to bases outside of Berlin in late December 44 as I. gruppe was trying to form up as well as the abortive II. gruppe; it was not yet recorded as being on operational strength with Luftflotte Reich during this winter month .........

 

[syscom3]

Effective meaning that it was taking down more than one bomber per sortie, in mass formations. Just like what Erich mentioned what happened on March 17th.

Of course the jet was very capable on its own. But if it wasnt inflicting punishing losses (alone or in groups) then it wasnt effective so to speak.

From what people are saying, although it had tremendous capabilities and potential, by the time it all fell into place for the LW, the airwar was already won by the allies. And even if Hitler had left developement alone, it still wouldnt have changed things to any degree.

 

[HoHun]

Hi Erich,

>III./JG 7 still in the training mode at Lechfeld did start to operate at Decembers beginning though this was in 1's and 2's. JG 7 as a JG did not really become one till January 45.

The point is, the timeline shows that for several months, the jets went to KG 51 and not to fighter units. Whatever the fighter training timeline might be, these months were lost for building a jet fighter force.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Erich]

Henning I agree the bomber units were filled first, am just pointing out the time frame for JG 7, much of it looked great on paper and it had to as viewed for encouragement by the higher ups in the LW general stab then off to the small moustached kook der "F"

 

[HoHun]

Hi Syscom,

>Effective meaning that it was taking down more than one bomber per sortie, in mass formations.

During the Battle of Britain, Fighter Command "took down" one bomber per 104 sorties (in daylight combat). Considering that the RAF won the battle anyway, I think your definition of effectiveness still needs some polishing.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[syscom3]

Hohun, my definition of 'effective" is quite explicit.

With all of the advantages the 262 had over the allies, Im trying to figure out why they didnt have a sterling record untill the waning months of the war.

Erich answered some of it. Lack of training and tactics.

Others showed that the airframes were there but obviously not many got into the air and did something spectacular.

And obviously, even if the bomber versions of the 262 were magically converted to fighters, I dont see how they would have added much to the fight untill training and tactics were improved.

As for the 262's being made available earlier, it looks like those engines were limiting operations and only a few 262's were available at any given time untill the fall of 1944.

 

[Juha]

HoHun
question is what kind of sorties? If you incl all FC sorties then you incl sortie types which Me262A-1s didnt flew, for ex convoy protection sorties, standing patrols etc even if standing patrols were not so common during the BoB convoy patrols were rather significant job for FC.

Juha

 

[HoHun]

Hi Syscom,

>Hohun, my definition of 'effective" is quite explicit.

Well, if you want to stick to it ...

Your definition is completely unrealistic and thus totally useless.

To calibrate your expectations: The 1970 "Saber Measure (Charlie)" study shows that the average kill rate in WW2 was about 0.02 enemy losses per sortie (and additionally it showed that success in air war depended strongly on the relative sortie ratio).

If you set up an impossible goal (requring the Me 262 to do 50 times better than the average, while being strongly outnumbered), of course the Me 262 will fail to accomplish it - that proves nothing. The failure to meet unrealistic expectations doesn't mean that there was anything wrong with Luftwaffe jet fighter operations ... if you judge it by fantasy expectations, you are not able to tell the difference between good and poor operations.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

 

[Soren]

Syscom3,

Had Hitler not cut the program in 43 then the engines would've been up and running much sooner, and on top of that also improved a lot sooner. The Jumo 004D would've seen widespread use, greatly adding to the performance, range reliability of the Me-262. And this is exactly what would be the decisive blow against the Allies as it would allow the LW to strike down the Allied bombers fighters before they ever left the ground, the Me-262 being immune to interception because of its far superior performance.

Furthermore you would see the German nightfighter force equipped with a large amount of Me-262B-1a's instead of just a few, and they will all possess enough range to both intercept the bombers when the are about to arrive and hunt then down when they turn around to leave.

 

[Erich]

well the Posters origins of this thread had some questions so let us try and reason it all out with fact and not what-ifs as this thread is starting to border on that .....

 

[syscom3]

Soren, regarding the engines. Are you absolutely sure that even without Hitlers interference, the technology was advanced enough to introduce them sooner? Or was it a case that the engines would have been ready when historically they were, because problems had to be solved at their own timeframe?

Erich provided evidence of "what might of been" in that March 17 mission when lots of them flew together and tore up the allied formations.

But considering the general technical excellence of the LW and the pilots that did fly the 262, there are underlining reasons why they didnt fly them in mass earlier. Maybe the numbers of 262's that could actually get airborne was still low untill late in the war?

As for the seemingly low number of kills the jets had, perhaps the 30mm guns were good for only one pass and untill the R4M rockets were used, the chances of actually hitting the bomber was low?


This is what I am trying to get at.

 

[Erich]

correct to your latter assumption sys on the 3cm reason being the aces in the props that were led over easily enough to fly the jet made the largest impact of kills, they had former experience on the West/East fronts. now of course looking a the top 20 Me 262 aces one can see some unknowns amdist that bunch, in fact the rep for all Me 262 units today, A. Ambs was an unknown ace with 7+ kills all while flying in JG 7.

 

[Soren]

The technology was there Syscom3, however like all designs there were some small quirks to solve before the final product could enter full production status. In the case of the Jumo 004B it was some vibration problems, which were solved by an expert in accoustics who located the problem. Max engine rpm was cut to 8,700 rpm and the problem was solved. The point however is that this could've been done in 43 had Hitler not temporarily cut the budget and that would've meant a sooner introduction of the Jumo 004D which added the all extra important range reliability needed.

 

[kool kitty89]

Also I believe there had to be changes to the 004B due to decreased availabillity of nickel. (not a redesign of the full refractory metal 004A, but a change in the alloys used on the prototype 004B's to the production models)

I'm not sure of the specifics on this though. It would explain why that article on the 004 lists an alloy of 30%Ni/14%Cr/1.75%Ti (balance low-carmon/mild steel) opposed to the Tinadur alloys used in the production engines of 18%Ni/12%Cr/6%Ti. (and of course the alternative Nickel-Free Cromadur)
Or this is wrong about the composition of Tinadur:
listed here: Early jet engines



On the vibration issue I don't see why you'd need an accoustics specialist to tell you to limit the RMP below the speed wiere vibration occurs. I can see needing one to resolve the problem to allow higher operating RMP. (ie. 004D)

There were additional problmes with vibration of the compressor blades earlier on in development (on the 004A) which was aided by an accoustics expert, but this is asererate problem unrelated to the turbine resonance.



On another note the B-1 series used solid turbine blades, but they were air cooled with cooling air bleed flowing along the blades after flowing over the turbine disc face. This resulted in uneven cooling and much higher temperatures at the middle and outer portions of the blades.
The B-4 used hollow blades (and a lighter disc) that were much more satisfactory and additionally reduced engine weight by 40 lbs. (and reduced the amount of alloy used)

(I'm not sure what differences 004B-2 and B-3 had)

 

[kool kitty89]

Anselm Franz and the Jumo 004


Something odd about the mention of resonance problems in this article is that it mentions 3 struts down stream of the turbine rotor, but on all the pictures, diagrams, and discriptions of the exhaust nozzel assembly of the 004B (including elsewhere in that same articly) there are 6 struts, not 3.