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Parsifal said,
"German defeat was not just about the failure of a few individuals at the top. its defeat was total, from top to bottom, a defeat of all things and all people who aligned with the german cause. german methods, ideas, procedures, organizations, strategy and tactics were all comprehensively and irrecoverably defeated."
Sorry Parsifal, I don't get that.
Yeah, they lost the war, but methods, procedures, tactics? Their weapons were pretty good, procedures are just procedures, and almost everyone used similar tactics in simnilar situations at SOME time. Not saying you are wrong ... saying I don't understand why all things German were defeated.
If nothing else, at least they gave us Sauerbratten and sauerkraut ... gotta' say "thanks" for those ... cheers.
I read an interesting book where the author's thesis was basically that the Germans lost WWI and WWII because of overconfidence, underestimating their enemy, and flaws in their strategic thinking. The campaign against Soviet Russia perfectly illustrates this.
Don't forget the St, Pauli Girl, Greg!
insufficient numbers of 262's on any front the only real unit was JG 7 and look where the over-worked had to serve, a couple adhocs made ground attack impressions and some voctires aerially against the soviets in the lat months. the lack of suitable ground to air defenses was a definite trouble for the jet units
the Ta was no batter than any mark of the 51 no operational records during the war to even compare so don't try..........
The Ta 152 might have been better than the P-51, but that is not what the Germans needed. If the Germans wanted to tip the scales, they needed an aircraft which was far advanced to anything the Allies had. This is the only way they could break free from their numerical inferiority.
In fact, that was the idea behind the wonder weapons: Germany could not outproduce its enemies, so it had no choice but to rely on technological superiority. They failed to achieve this, or at least in time.
I wasn't saying the Ta152 would of won the war for the Germans, I was only suggesting that it may have proved more successful than the Me262 under the circumstances that existed, and there were a lot of unfavourable circumstances conspiring against the Me262.
It was, and many aces were produced during that year as they got amongst the bombers prior to being outnumbered by escorts. Much the same against the Russians, which rarely get a mention by comparison. By late 1944/early 45, pilot training dropped to an average of 25 hours each ( compared to 150 hours for an average U.S pilot, who also trained without the continuous bombardment, marauding ground attack aircraft, sabotage, lack of fuel etc). By that stage, it was all over bar the shouting.I'm under the impression German pilot quality was still pretty good during 1943.
I assume you are talking about specialized fighter training, not the whole training. For instance, American pilot training was well over 300-400 hours.It was, and many aces were produced during that year as they got amongst the bombers prior to being outnumbered by escorts. Much the same against the Russians, which rarely get a mention by comparison. By late 1944/early 45, pilot training dropped to an average of 25 hours each ( compared to 150 hours for an average U.S pilot, who also trained without the continuous bombardment, marauding ground attack aircraft, sabotage, lack of fuel etc). By that stage, it was all over bar the shouting.
Understood. My point is that Germany could no longer hope to win the air war with any piston-engined fighters, no matter how good. In order to still make the difference, it needed weapons which were a generation ahead of its opponents.I wasn't saying the Ta152 would of won the war for the Germans, I was only suggesting that it may have proved more successful than the Me262 under the circumstances that existed, and there were a lot of unfavourable circumstances conspiring against the Me262.
Understood. My point is that Germany could no longer hope to win the air war with any piston-engined fighters, no matter how good. In order to still make the difference, it needed weapons which were a generation ahead of its opponents.
Kris
Parsifal said,
Yeah, they lost the war, but methods, procedures, tactics?
Absolutely.Particularly on the eastern front..at the beginning the limited resources avaliable to the germans dictated that they adopt narrow points of breakthrough....schwerepunkts, followed by deep penetrations. Tanks would then be forced to sit there and wait whilst the slow moving infantry formations completed the encirclements and cleaned up. generally worked, but it was innefficient, and many Soviets that should have been captured got away.
german logistics was terrible, and pretty much cost them the war. The idea that they could tack on a few mobile units to an unmotorized main body was busted, particualalry as the motorized elements of the infantry (what little they had) fell out of the floor, and then even the horsedrawn elements also lost mobility
And the list goes on and on....this is just one example
Their weapons were pretty good, procedures are just procedures, and almost everyone used similar tactics in simnilar situations at SOME time.
Dont agree, sorry.Some weapons were excelent, some were technically excellent, but the wrong tool for the job, others were downright awful. Examples of excellent include the Nebelwerfer, MP38, MG42, Stug III Me 109 ju88, type VII. Examples of technically excellent but the wrong tool for the job include Tigers, Panthers, most of theiir truck MT in Russia, their artillery in winter(it wouldnt work), their battleships and short range cruisers. examples of terrible equipment...type II,Narvik DDs, F-boote, early war torpedoes, Me 110, Me 210. The problem for the germans though isnt that their weapons were not good, in the main they were excellent, in the field. the problem was that there were never enough of them. okay, so they were behind the 8 from the start, but their production decisions certainly did not help them. The 262 is very much in this category. It wasnt really ready for squadron service in 1944, or even 1945, yet it was eating into their production at a time when they needed everything they could get their hands on. it was criminal how the germans tended to waste their production.
procedeures make all the difference. if procedures didnt matter,why did the french lose in 1940, why did the british get nowhere for 3 years (in NA),why did the germans clobber the russians 41-2. but the germns did not adapt as fast or as well as the allies, and allied/soviet methods were not the sameas german methods. German armoured warfare was fundamentally different to the allies. They focused on the tank, and centred their firepower around it, whereas by 1944, the allies, with their far greater levels of mobility wre able to implement integrated assault teams to a much greater extent than the germans. Dont get me wrong, the germans had some of that, but their formations and techniques of 1940were nothing like allied techniques of 1944, they werent like german techniques of 1944 either, and allied and German techniques remained fundamentally differtnt in 1944.
Russians adapted and produced a unique style of warfare that was all their own. They began the war with essentially western TOE and thinking....but it failed them badly. they simply did not have the technical skills to do what was the norm in the western armies. in the west, a division was more or less the main combat unit,with high levels of integration and a variety of weapins that its commandrs had to co-ordinate. But this required high levels of technical proficiency to produce a fully integrated team.The russians did not have the leadership skills, the technical skill, the mobility to dod any of that. sothey simplified the command problem...rifle divisions weredevoid of nearly everything except the basic weapons...almost quite literally a rifle division was a division with just rifles. what little artillery there was, was mostly for los shooting. The russians formed fuge artillery armies that were magnificant assault TOEs, but hopeless in defence. They found their tank formations hopeless as well, far too complicated for them to be workable, so they formed smaller, simipler Tank and mech brigades, with a few SMG armed men and afew mortars in support, so that such formations were within the level of complexity that their commanders could handle.
because of that lack of C&C, even later in the war the russians adapted. their formations were never as flexible as their German counterparts, So that meant complicated narrow front assaults wouldnt work. Instead the Russians adopted broad front tactics, and something the russians nicknamed a "Zhukov symphany" or "Zhikov orchestra". basically one offensive after another in rapid succession to keep the germans reeling and off balance. Eisenhower used the same approach in france in 1944. germans never used those sorts of tactics.
I disagree. Given more time, the Me 262, Me 263, Ba 349 and He 162 armed with R4Ms would have stopped the Bomber offensive. In the end, it failed to do so, because there was not enough fuel and trained pilots. Plus, I assume the early radar warning system had collapsed in the Spring of 1945.I think that view was held by some Germans at the time. I think with hindsight we can say that even with the deployment of the Me 262 and other advanced aircraft Germany was in no position to win the air war.
She was being overwhelmed and nothing would have prevented the situation that developed by mid 1944 onwards.
Cheers
Steve
Parsifal said,
Absolutely.Particularly on the eastern front..at the beginning the limited resources avaliable to the germans dictated that they adopt narrow points of breakthrough....schwerepunkts, followed by deep penetrations. Tanks would then be forced to sit there and wait whilst the slow moving infantry formations completed the encirclements and cleaned up. generally worked, but it was innefficient, and many Soviets that should have been captured got away.
german logistics was terrible, and pretty much cost them the war. The idea that they could tack on a few mobile units to an unmotorized main body was busted, particualalry as the motorized elements of the infantry (what little they had) fell out of the floor, and then even the horsedrawn elements also lost mobility
And the list goes on and on....this is just one example
Dont agree, sorry.Some weapons were excelent, some were technically excellent, but the wrong tool for the job, others were downright awful. Examples of excellent include the Nebelwerfer, MP38, MG42, Stug III Me 109 ju88, type VII. Examples of technically excellent but the wrong tool for the job include Tigers, Panthers, most of theiir truck MT in Russia, their artillery in winter(it wouldnt work), their battleships and short range cruisers. examples of terrible equipment...type II,Narvik DDs, F-boote, early war torpedoes, Me 110, Me 210. The problem for the germans though isnt that their weapons were not good, in the main they were excellent, in the field. the problem was that there were never enough of them. okay, so they were behind the 8 from the start, but their production decisions certainly did not help them. The 262 is very much in this category. It wasnt really ready for squadron service in 1944, or even 1945, yet it was eating into their production at a time when they needed everything they could get their hands on. it was criminal how the germans tended to waste their production.
procedeures make all the difference. if procedures didnt matter,why did the french lose in 1940, why did the british get nowhere for 3 years (in NA),why did the germans clobber the russians 41-2. but the germns did not adapt as fast or as well as the allies, and allied/soviet methods were not the sameas german methods. German armoured warfare was fundamentally different to the allies. They focused on the tank, and centred their firepower around it, whereas by 1944, the allies, with their far greater levels of mobility wre able to implement integrated assault teams to a much greater extent than the germans. Dont get me wrong, the germans had some of that, but their formations and techniques of 1940were nothing like allied techniques of 1944, they werent like german techniques of 1944 either, and allied and German techniques remained fundamentally differtnt in 1944.
Russians adapted and produced a unique style of warfare that was all their own. They began the war with essentially western TOE and thinking....but it failed them badly. they simply did not have the technical skills to do what was the norm in the western armies. in the west, a division was more or less the main combat unit,with high levels of integration and a variety of weapins that its commandrs had to co-ordinate. But this required high levels of technical proficiency to produce a fully integrated team.The russians did not have the leadership skills, the technical skill, the mobility to dod any of that. sothey simplified the command problem...rifle divisions weredevoid of nearly everything except the basic weapons...almost quite literally a rifle division was a division with just rifles. what little artillery there was, was mostly for los shooting. The russians formed fuge artillery armies that were magnificant assault TOEs, but hopeless in defence. They found their tank formations hopeless as well, far too complicated for them to be workable, so they formed smaller, simipler Tank and mech brigades, with a few SMG armed men and afew mortars in support, so that such formations were within the level of complexity that their commanders could handle.
because of that lack of C&C, even later in the war the russians adapted. their formations were never as flexible as their German counterparts, So that meant complicated narrow front assaults wouldnt work. Instead the Russians adopted broad front tactics, and something the russians nicknamed a "Zhukov symphany" or "Zhikov orchestra". basically one offensive after another in rapid succession to keep the germans reeling and off balance. Eisenhower used the same approach in france in 1944. germans never used those sorts of tactics.
I am spechless.... Thats an unbelieving post even for parsifal
DO YOU HAVE ANY IDEA OF THE ORDERS OF BATTLE AFTER MID 1942??????????
Even in the final stages of the war when soviets attacks met organised german resistance were crashed. The "great" tactic of the soviets was that the germans could not defend efficiently the entire front and the soviets were braking through the weak spots with their massive numerical superiority. Even in the battle of berlin were unable to pierce the external defences before the defendrs spent all their ammo. In Kurland were defeated in 6 great battles by the isolated and badly outnumbered Army group North .GREAT TACTICS
In west the americans had so many tanks that were equiping with them, even the infantry divisions.
The german army hugely outnumbered on all fronts, under totaly hostile skyies, with its communications codes broken , with its alleis (finlad,rumania,bulgaria,italy) betraying him, with the "neutal" countries clearly supporting the alleis,with no raw materials fought a fighting retreat to the end without colapsing and launching painful local counter attacks .Did not collapse like the french and the english in 1940 or the soviets in 1941 (saved only by the stupid western support). Even the american pushed them back only when they had massive superiority
Thats speaks about tactics effectivenes on TACTICAL level
I disagree. Given more time, the Me 262, Me 263, Ba 349 and He 162 armed with R4Ms would have stopped the Bomber offensive. In the end, it failed to do so, because there was not enough fuel and trained pilots. Plus, I assume the early radar warning system had collapsed in the Spring of 1945.
But that does not take away that the jet interceptor was definitely the only way to go.
Kris
The Luftwaffe's use of the Komet was a waste of resources. Even considering the Natter Viper was a pure waste of time.I disagree. Given more time, the Me 262, Me 263, Ba 349 and He 162 armed with R4Ms would have stopped the Bomber offensive. In the end, it failed to do so, because there was not enough fuel and trained pilots. Plus, I assume the early radar warning system had collapsed in the Spring of 1945.
But that does not take away that the jet interceptor was definitely the only way to go.
Kris
If we look at kill-loss ratio, the Komet was a successful point defence interceptor, but lack of fuel and inefficient unit location limited its usefulness. Only few flew missions in 1945. It would have been a real asset as the Me 163C or 263 and armed with the R4M. The Natter was probably the best wonder weapon the Germans came up with in 1945. If time had allowed it, it would have revolutionized air combat over Germany. The idea was pure genius: basic trained pilots in a manned air defence missile whose only job was to fire the R4M or Foehn rockets towards the bombers, and then eject with the vital parts of the plane ready for re-use. Brilliant !The Luftwaffe's use of the Komet was a waste of resources. Even considering the Natter Viper was a pure waste of time.
Had they promoted and funded the jet program in it's early days, they would not have been grasping at fantasy projects while trying to fight a defensive war. The He280 and the Me262 would have made thier debut before the Allied bombers started pounding them into ruin and desperate last-ditch fighters like the He162 would have never been drawn up.
If we look at kill-loss ratio, the Komet was a successful point defence interceptor, but lack of fuel and inefficient unit location limited its usefulness. Only few flew missions in 1945. It would have been a real asset as the Me 163C or 263 and armed with the R4M. The Natter was probably the best wonder weapon the Germans came up with in 1945. If time had allowed it, it would have revolutionized air combat over Germany. The idea was pure genius: basic trained pilots in a manned air defence missile whose only job was to fire the R4M or Foehn rockets towards the bombers, and then eject with the vital parts of the plane ready for re-use. Brilliant !
Kris